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Abstract
In contemporary Platonic scholarship, Socrates is quite often depicted as a
hyper-rationalist, i.e., an individual that relies upon reason alone in his philosophical
pursuits. And, such a position is not entirely unsupported, especially when one considers
the rigor with which Socrates engages his interlocutors via the elenchtic method, not to
mention the charges of impiety and atheism, for which he was found guilty. Yet, while
Socrates did indeed hold reason in the highest esteem, when we look to the texts, we find
evidence to suggest that he also took seriously the role played by divine inspiration in the
pursuit of truth. Not only do we find examples of Socrates recognizing the potential for
truth that the divinely inspired seem to exhibit, but further, we find Socrates himself to be
the recipient of such divine revelation in the form of his daimonion. And, while some
scholars have dismissed such references as mere ironic gestures, I argue that these
dismissive, and admittedly anachronistic, claims are entirely unfounded. Instead, I
propose that Plato recognized, and valued, the role that divine inspiration played in the
case of Socrates. Yet, while the divine inspiration experienced by Socrates is seen in a
positive light by Plato, given the uniqueness of his situation, Socrates, and his
methodology, can no longer be the model upon which philosophical investigation is
founded. Thus, recognizing the limitations of Socrates, limitations which are alleviated
via divine assistance, Plato, in his late period, develops a new methodology, i.e.,
collection and division, one which might allow for the definitional knowledge which he
seeks without reliance upon divine revelation. Despite this change, however, I maintain
vi

that even in the late Platonic period, Plato still recognizes the value of divine inspiration.
As such, Socrates, while perhaps not a philosopher in the unqualified sense according to
Plato’s later understanding of philosophy, might rightly be understood as a unique
individual, one who, through divine inspiration, is given access to truth, albeit a truth he
is unable to fully explain.
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Introduction
As the title indicates, this dissertation is a defense of divine inspiration in the case
of Socrates. This idea, i.e., that we ought to take seriously the role that divine inspiration
plays in Plato’s dialogues arose from my reading of Plato’s Sophist, wherein we find the
Eleatic Stranger, replacing Socrates as the main protagonist, attempting to establish a
precise definition of Sophistry using the new methodology of collection and division.
Interestingly, one of the stranger’s attempts towards a definition of the sophist seems to
perfectly describe Socrates. And, while the Stranger expresses reservations about such an
individual truly being a sophist, the ambiguity we are left with following this definition is
quite troubling. Given Socrates’ place of prominence throughout Plato’s dialogues, that
he would now be associated with sophistry, as opposed to the shining example of what a
philosopher ought be, seems problematic. Thus, given the fairly drastic change in Plato’s
methodology that occurs in these late dialogues, one which not only places Socrates in
the background, but also exchanges the Socratic elenchos for the method of collection
and division, Socrates’ status is not altogether clear, an ambiguity that leaves us with the
question as to how are we to understand Socrates in Plato’s late period. Is this new
methodology an indication that Plato’s understanding of philosophy has changed? If so,
as Socrates is now no longer occupying center stage, does Plato still consider Socrates to
be a philosopher? If not a philosopher, then is he a sophist? Surely this cannot be true,
for considering Plato’s view of sophistry throughout his dialogues, that he would
associate Socrates with sophistry is cause for concern.
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Yet, it must be noted that, despite his consistent disavowal of knowledge,
Socrates does seem to know things with certainty, not simply specific ideas, such as his
claim that in matters of justice we should follow the one and not the many, or that the
virtues of piety, justice, temperance and wisdom are interconnected, but further, his
ability, when engaged in the elenchos with his interlocutors, somehow always properly to
guide the discussion towards what is right. Is Socrates simply feigning ignorance then, as
Thrasymachus accused him of in Book I of the Republic? If true, then indeed it would
seem that such behavior would make him closer in kind to the very sort of sophist Plato
seems to abhor, one who utilizes deception to defeat his opponents in argument.
Given the unpleasantness of such a prospect, I proposed a new thesis, one which
would explain Socrates’ seemingly inexplicable ability to “know” what is right, while all
the while being sincere in his proclaimed state of ignorance. My thesis is this: We must
take seriously the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates, for, in so doing, we
might save Socrates from the dreary fate of Sophistry, all the while gleaning insight into
Plato’s understanding of Socrates in the late dialogues.
However, as this thesis is dependent upon the idea that his confidence in his
beliefs is inexplicable by purely rational means, I first needed to establish that Socrates’
methodology of choice, the elenchos, was unable to allow for the acquisition of positive
moral doctrine. And, while all who read Plato are well aware of the aporetic nature of the
dialogues, specifically the earlier Socratic dialogues wherein we are left without an
answer to the inquiry put forth, in recent years, a number of scholars have argued that the
elenchos can, and does, allow for Socrates to establish the very sort of positive moral
truth that seems to elude him at every turn.
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At the center of the newly invigorated debate regarding the merit of the elenchos
was Gregory Vlastos, who, after mining through the Gorgias, made his “discovery” of a
particular passage (479e), wherein, following a long elenchtic debate, exclaims,
(T1) Has it not been proved that what was asserted [by myself] is true?
Drawing from this passage and others of a similar vein, Vlastos proceeds to argue that we
can take this as evidence in support of the position that the elenchos allows Socrates the
ability to establish positive moral doctrine. As my thesis depends on Socrates inability to
establish positive moral doctrine through the elenchos alone, I spend the majority of
Chapter 1 arguing against Vlastos’s position, doing so through raising a series of
objections which, I believe, make his position untenable. I conclude the chapter by
claiming that the Elenchos is used by Socrates not to establish positive moral truths, but
rather, as a tool to expose the inconsistencies in the beliefs of others. Given this
conclusion, one which removes the possibility of the elenchos being solely responsible
for the confidence with which Socrates carries his moral beliefs, the origin of this
conviction still remains uncertain.
With this uncertainty established, that Socrates might be considered a sophist by
Plato is not an altogether implausible prospect. Thus, I begin Chapter 2 of my
dissertation by focusing on Plato’s Sophist, his major work on sophistry, wherein, as
noted above, the 6th attempt to define the sophist seems to be an exact description of
Socrates. If we are to save Socrates from sophistry, it must be proven that we are not to
take this definition as a true definition of the sophist. To accomplish this task, I start first
by providing an analysis of the new methodology utilized in the dialogue, that of
collection and division, for it is this method of division that the Stranger utilizes to define
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the Sophist. Yet, we find that when it comes to defining the sophist, things are not quite
so simple. So difficult is this task, in fact, that we are presented with seven attempts to
define the sophist, each providing a different conclusion than the last. In his various
attempts, the Stranger defines the Sophist as a hunter (of young men), various types of
salesmen, a combatant, a cleanser of souls, and finally, a deceitful imitator. And, while it
is the 6th definition, i.e., that of the cleanser of souls, that will eventually be associated
with Socrates, as my thesis is dependent upon Socrates not carrying the title of sophist, I
argue that, despite the varying definitions we are given, it is the seventh and final
definition, i.e., the individual who creates the false appearance of being wise, that we are
to take as Plato’s final, and exclusive, definition of the sophist.
Having argued that the 6th definition should not be considered a proper definition
of sophistry, a point which would seem to excuse Socrates from the charge of sophistry,
the question remains as to whether or not Socrates is thus to be considered a Philosopher?
As I noted above, given the changes in methodology, as well as Socrates’ diminished role
in the later dialogues, not to mention the similarities between Socrates and the individual
described as the noble sophist of the 6th definition, that Socrates is still considered by
Plato to be the paradigmatic example of the philosopher is, on my view, very unlikely.
Indeed, given the evidence we find in these later dialogues, I argue that Plato has
recognized the limitations of the elenchtic method, which, as I argued in Chapter 1,
cannot produce positive doctrines, but rather, only expose the inconsistencies in the
beliefs of others, and, while that is a necessary component of the philosophical process, if
one is to truly establish the sort of definitional knowledge Plato seeks, a new
methodology is required, i.e., the method of collection and division. And, while Socrates
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does engage in the new method on a couple of occasions, most notably in the late
dialogue the Philebus, we find that, in comparison to the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist
and Statesman, Socrates lacks the requisite skill to properly complete the divisions to
achieve a proper definition. This failure, coupled with the new requirements Plato sets
for philosophy, led me to the conclusion that while Plato does not now consider Socrates
to be a sophist, neither does he consider him a philosopher in the unqualified sense.
Given this point, the question arises: How are we to understand Socrates? In
answer to this response, I argue in the second half of my dissertation that Plato takes
seriously the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates. And, while my initial
thoughts on this conclusion were of gleeful excitement, when I presented this idea in its
nascent stages, I was met with some particularly aggressive dissent from the audience.
To suggest that Socrates, the same individual who banished the poets from the kallipolis,
would seriously entertain such fantasy was obviously absurd! Granted, Socrates does
reference his daimonion at times, but surely this is to be taken in jest, an ironic tongue in
cheek reference not to an actual divine entity, but to reason itself. Yet, while this hyperrationalist understanding of Socrates may fit nicely in our contemporary understanding,
one which quite consistently pits philosophy against religion, such views are, on my
view, exceptionally anachronistic, not to mention simply unsupported by textual
evidence. Indeed, the role of the divine is so prevalent throughout the dialogues that to
ignore the role of religion and the divine in the case of Socrates would be akin to, to
quote Gregory Vlastos, “a Surgery which kills the patient.”
My defense of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates is thus divided between
two chapters. In Chapter 3, I examine the early dialogues, i.e., those dialogues that are
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traditionally held to be Socratic in nature, whereas in the final chapter, I turn my attention
back to the later dialogues to show that, despite the changes in methodology, and the
development of Plato’s thought, Plato still holds religion and the concept of divine
inspiration in high esteem. Beginning with Chapter 3, my reasoning is divided into two
main sections, arguing (1) that the character of Socrates has a sincere reverence for
matters of religion, and (2) that Socrates takes seriously the role of divine inspiration.
Beginning with the former, when faced with accusations of impiety (and then atheism) in
the Apology, it would seem that Socrates is making a mockery of the charges, as he
cleverly manipulates Meletus into befuddlement. Yet, while it may be true that in
manipulating the charges, Socrates’ true beliefs are still somewhat ambiguous, we are
presented with a significant amount of evidence throughout the early dialogues to suggest
that while Socrates may not believe in the gods of Homeric and Hesiodic myth, he did
believe in the existence of divine beings. And, as we are told, these gods are perfectly
wise, and, given the connection Socrates posits between knowledge and morality, these
gods are also perfectly moral. Given the obvious disparity between such perfectly moral
gods and the somewhat lascivious gods of Homer, such a belief may seem somewhat
blasphemous. Yet, I argue that such a conception of the gods, i.e., perfectly wise/moral,
was not at all uncommon at the time in Athens. Further, while this belief may not
perfectly align with the tradition, it is still clear that Socrates does believe in the gods, a
point which would save him from the charge of atheism.
Following the defense of Socrates belief on matters of religion/theology, I
conclude the chapter with an analysis of divine inspiration in particular. And, while the
daimonion is perhaps the most obvious example, there are other passages that would
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indicate that Socrates takes divine inspiration and revelation quite seriously. For
example, in the Apology, not only does Socrates admit that the poets have access to the
truth through inspiration (albeit a truth they cannot explain), Socrates clearly states that
he has a duty to philosophize as he was ordered to do so by the gods. What is important
about this claim, and others like it, wherein Socrates follows the command of the gods is
that, on such occasions, Socrates does not understand, at least at first, why the gods
command him to do such things. Yet, despite his lack of understanding, Socrates obeys.
Such blind obedience void of immediate understanding becomes particularly problematic
for those scholars who would claim that these references to the divine are nothing more
than mere allusions to reason dressed up in language of divine reference. On the other
hand, if we take his belief in the existence of perfectly wise/moral gods seriously, then
his willingness to obey such divine commands blindly (a blind acceptance which is, in
and of itself, somewhat uncharacteristic for Socrates) makes much more sense.
Turning our attention to the daimonion, we find even more evidence to support
this position. For, while there are a number of passages wherein Socrates’ daimonion
offers its advice as to what he ought not do, those instances that are of particular
importance to my argument are those where we find Socrates, having decided to perform
some action, only to be warned against it by his daimonion, a warning that, it should be
noted, Socrates always heeds. If, as has been noted by scholars such as Martha
Nussbaum, we are to take these instances of divine intervention ironically, as mere
references to reason itself, then how do we explain odd circumstance of Socrates deciding
upon some course of action, a decision which itself would require a deliberative process,
only to, when confronted by his daimonion, act against his initial decision. In examples
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such as these, which are many, we find evidence that Socrates takes his daimonion and
the advice offered with exceptional sincerity, doing so, in fact, often times against his
originally intended course of action!
Having argued that we ought to take divine inspiration to play a significant role in
the early dialogues, my final chapter focuses upon the late dialogues and the continued
importance of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates. As mentioned above, with these
later dialogues comes a number of significant changes, most notably the change in
methodology, as well as the diminished presence of Socrates. And, while Socrates is not
entirely absent, in those dialogues wherein Socrates is once again leading the discussion,
it seems to be the case that we are given varying images of Socrates. In the Theaetetus,
we are presented with Socrates the midwife. In the Sophist, as I have argued, we find
Socrates the noble sophist. And finally, in the Philebus, we find a Socrates who gives up
the elenchos for the new method of division! Given these seemingly disparate images, it
is difficult to determine precisely how we are to understand Socrates in the eyes of Plato.
In answer to this problem, I argue that, while there are indeed differences between the
images of Socrates as presented, we find that there is a common thread between them all,
and that is a continued reverence for and reliance upon divine inspiration. Indeed, in the
Theaetetus, Socrates clearly claims that his ability to determine which ideas are good and
which are mere wind eggs is due to the god’s assistance. In the 6th definition, we find
similar connections to the divine, as the “noble sophist” of definition 6 is the individual
who is able to purge others of their false beliefs. An ability of this sort would surely be
required in order to determine which belief requires purging, just as the midwife
maintains. And finally, in the Philebus, while Socrates does use the method of division to
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determine the varying types of goods, the discussion begins with a moment of revelation,
wherein Socrates admits to having received a revelation directly from the gods, a
revelation that serves as the initial foundation for the discussion that follows. As such,
we once more find a continued reliance upon divine inspiration in the case of Socrates
even throughout Plato’s late period.
Thus, I believe that these late images provide us with a very interesting insight
into Plato’s understanding of Socrates, specifically that Plato recognized the role that
divine inspiration played in the case of Socrates. And, while this gift provided Socrates
with the ability to excel in argumentation, and life, Plato recognized that individuals such
as Socrates were exceptionally rare, and as such, a new method was required that could
not only lead to the positive doctrines, but further, did so without direct guidance by the
divine.

9

Chapter 1: The Limitations of the Elenchos
Overview of the Elenchos
The guiding question for Chapter 1 is the following: Does the elenchtic method of
the early Platonic dialogues provide Socrates with knowledge?1 Considering Socrates’
consistent disavowal of knowledge, this question has opened the door to rigorous
scholarly debate. Further confounding the issue is the fact that despite Socrates’ claims
to ignorance, there are instances where Socrates expresses his beliefs with such
conviction that he seems to contradict his own disavowal of knowledge.2 As absolute
ignorance regarding the very definitional knowledge he seeks would preclude the
possibility of any claims to knowledge by Socrates, many scholars have strived to make
sense of this paradox,3 doing so through a careful examination of the elenchos, the
methodology of choice for the Socrates of the early dialogues.4
At the center of this debate regarding the merit of the elenchos was Gregory
Vlastos. Inspired by an unwillingness to accept Socrates as a dogmatist, Vlastos, in his
now famous article, “The problem of the elenchus: method is all,” proposes a
1

I will be following the generally agreed upon ordering of the dialogues as noted in Vlastos

2

Examples listed by Vlastos (1994 pp. 11-12) include but are not limited to the following: Crito
47a-48a – That in matters of justice we should follow not ‘the many’ but ‘the man who knows.’ Ion – That
the poet and rhapsode are guided by madness, not via techne.; Protagoras 329e-333b – that piety and
justice, temperance and wisdom are inter-entailing.
3

There are those who argue that Socrates is merely feigning his ignorance, relying upon it as a
tool to manipulate his interlocutors, not for malicious purposes, but rather to encourage them on, allowing
them to believe Socrates is traveling with them on their journey towards Truth. See Gulley, (1968) p. 69.
This doubtfulness is toyed with by Plato himself through Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic (337a47), albeit in a much more aggressive manner, as Thrasymachus believes it to be a tactic utilized to avoid
answering questions honestly.
4

That the elenchos is the only methodology used by Socrates is a point of contention amongst
scholars. Benson (2000) pp.34-37 and Kahn (1992) pp. 248-253, for example, argue that Socrates employs
varying methodologies, e.g., in passages in the Crito, wherein Socrates drops the elenchos altogether in
favor of a direct form of speech, or in the Menexenus, wherein we find Socrates delivering a funeral oration
with little to no interaction with his audience.
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controversial argument which, he believes, provides sufficient evidence to prove that the
elenchos can, and does, allow Socrates to acquire positive moral truths.5 As there has
been much debate regarding the precise nature of the elenchos, let us first establish the
definition of the elenchos as provided by Vlastos:
Socratic elenchos is a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary
argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer’s own
belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own
beliefs.6
We find that for Vlastos, while the elenchos is necessarily adversarial, i.e., Socrates must
be engaged with an interlocutor in debate; the key component for the elenchos is that it is
a search, a search limited to moral truths.7 In other words, the elenchos is not to be used
to determine the truth of mathematical principles, nor is it geared towards more specified
practical applications, such as those pertaining to proper diet or medical advice.8 Further,

5

Vlastos 1983.

6

Vlastos 1994, 4

7

See Ap. 29c, 28e, and 41b.

8

In response, one could look to the Meno as evidence to Socrates using the elenchos towards the
proving of mathematical principles. Vlastos believes the elenchos as such to be a reduced form, used
strictly in a negative sense to correct the “mistakes” of the slave boy. As Vlastos (1991, ch.4 n. 54)
explains, the mistakes of the slave boy, “are due to his having placed unthinking trust in suggestions he
reads into what Socrates has said.” Instead, “the boy must say what he judges for himself to be true for his
own reasons, prepared to defend it against Socrates.” For Vlastos, this use of the elenchos, i.e., one that is
strictly “negative” or corrective, in its deployment, is incomplete due to its failure to prove any particular
doctrine. Further, it is important to note that on Vlastos’ account, the mathematical topic at hand in the
Meno is indicative of a major change in Plato’s thinking and methodology, one which marks a distinct
change in the character of Socrates from one concerned solely with moral issues, to a Socrates now
interested in more epistemological and metaphysical ideas. For Vlastos (1991, cps. 2 and 3), given this
major change in Socrates from the Meno onwards, we must be careful to distinguish the Socrates of the
early dialogues from the Socrates of the middle and late periods.
However, while I find much of Vlastos’ argument regarding the evolution of the character
Socrates to be quite compelling, there is evidence to suggest that Socrates, as early as the Euthyphro, was
very much concerned with epistemological issues, as well as matters of methodology. It is perhaps too
long of an argument to make in full here, however, I will point out that we need think only of Socrates’
response to Euthyphro’s first attempt to define piety. On Socrates’ view, Euthyphro’s first attempt fails to
capture the definition of piety itself, as it is merely an example of an action that might be considered pious.
Indeed, given Socrates’ attention to acquiring the proper definition, one that satisfies the definitional
requirements stipulated by Socrates, it is not altogether clear that we can entirely divorce the
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the elenchos is not used to investigate the very nature of the methodology itself. In other
words, when engaged in a “What is the F?” question, e.g., “What is Piety?” Socrates
never debates the conditions for a correct answer, but rather sets those conditions himself,
asking only for assent from his interlocutors.9
As to what the elenchos does focus on, we find that Socrates is quite clear in his
own agenda, i.e., that he is searching for truth as it pertains to morality.10 And, to be sure,
Socrates does not discriminate in his pursuit of this truth, as he is willing to talk to
anyone who is willing to engage him so long as they adhere to a very rigid condition: that
each individual answer his questions honestly.11 Regarding this condition, Vlastos offers
three points to explain why it is important that all interlocutors be honest in their
answers:12 (1) To test the honesty of the argument. If the goal of the elenchos is to not
simply to win the argument, but to uncover the truth, then it is imperative that all parties
offer forward only their own personally held beliefs. If this adherence to truth is not
maintained, then the interlocutor is free to argue any position that might give him an
advantage. Should this occur, and the interlocutor is particularly skilled in argumentation,

epistemological from the moral in these early dialogues. Further, concerning the claim that the elenchos of
the Meno is “incomplete,” I will argue in this chapter in full that the elenchos is never used in any of the
dialogues to successfully prove any doctrine at all, mathematical or otherwise.
9

See Laches 191e11 – Here, Socrates explains to Laches that the definition of courage to be given
must cover all of the agreed upon cases of courage. As Vlastos notes, Socrates does not ask if Laches
agrees with these parameters, but rather, simply asks if he understands how they are to proceed. However,
given that they have already agreed upon various cases of courage, one could argue that Laches has already
assented to the parameters.
10

Vlastos provides examples to this end from Republic 352d, as well as from Gorgias 487e-488a

and 472c-d
11

See Gorgias. 500b: “By the god of friendship, Callicles, don’t think that you can play games
with me and answer whatever comes to your head, contrary to your real opinion.” Republic I. 346a: “My
good man, don’t answer contrary to your real opinion, so that we may get somewhere.”
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conclusions could be reached that not only fail to uncover the truth, but further, present as
“truth” a falsehood.
(2) To test one’s seriousness in their pursuit of the truth. The point here is that in
order to guarantee that the interlocutor does indeed value the truth as much as Socrates,
the interlocutor must fully invest themselves in the process. By offering their own beliefs,
by putting themselves on the line, such dedication is solidified. Thus, if I were to engage
in an argument, and was arguing from a position that I did not truly believe, then, if the
opposing side began to gain the advantage, the drive to continue defending my position
would be lacking. On the other hand, if my position is one I truly believe in, then I will
be more rigorous in my responses, and as a result, both parties are able to dig deeper into
the question at hand.
(3) The elenchos is not merely a methodology used towards the establishment of
moral truths but also one that seeks to effect change in those who participate. Vlastos
points to the Apology 29e-30a:
And if one of you says…he does care, I will not let him go nor leave him, but will
question and examine and refute him. And if he seems to me to not have the virtue
he says he has, I shall reproach him for undervaluing the things of greatest value
and overvaluing trivial ones.
It is not enough then to simply inquire as to how, in general, humans should live their
lives, but further, to ensure that those specific individuals with whom Socrates engages is
living the life that they should be in that moment. In other words, Socrates is not satisfied
with uncovering truth and leaving it available to take or leave. If the interlocutor does
not offer their own beliefs to the discussion, if they do not put themselves on the line, if a
conclusion is reached regarding a moral truth, and they are not invested, then they are not
beholden to the answer. If, on the other hand, the interlocutor is honest throughout the
13

discussion, then the revelation of an inconsistency in his beliefs should be, at the very
least, a cause for self-reflection.
The Elenchos in the Gorgias
Following these preliminary stipulations regarding the elenchos in general,
Vlastos proceeds to detail the process of what he classifies as the “standard elenchos”.13
As Vlastos explains, the traditional understanding of an elenchtic dialogue proceeded as
follows: (1) Socrates engages with an interlocutor who claims to possess knowledge or
expertise in a particular field of moral inquiry, eliciting from them a belief they hold (p)
regarding this field. (2) With this first belief p established, Socrates then draws out
additional premises from his interlocutor, q, r, and s. (3) Socrates then proceeds to show
that these new premises, in conjunction with the original posited belief, result in the
negation of p. (4) Thus, the interlocutor is forced to admit that there is an inconsistency
in his beliefs. The result of this exchange as it is stated is not the positive assertion of an
alternative to the interlocutor’s original belief, but rather the exposure of the
inconsistency that exists within the beliefs of the interlocutor.
However, while Vlastos was once a proponent of this model,14 he offers a
substantial amendment by claiming that the elenchos additionally shows the original
belief, p, to be false, and, consequently, not-p to be true.15 In other words, Vlastos claims
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ibid. p. 12. Vlastos explains that an alternative to the “standard” elenchos, i.e., the “indirect
elenchos”, has been suggested by Robinson. (1953) While Vlastos (1983) dismisses the distinction as
Robinson states it, the argument has been taken up by Polansky (1985) and Brickhouse and Smith (1994).
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Vlastos, 1956 – Such an understanding of Socrates, Vlastos argues, serves as the perfect
representation of the “Sophist of Noble Lineage” (Soph. 230a-e) found in the Sophist. We find in that
description (which will be detailed in depth in Ch. II of this dissertation), the description of a figure that
seems to resemble Socrates, albeit one that, despite a lack of his own knowledge, is able to purge his
interlocutors of their false beliefs.
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that the elenchos succeeds in establishing positive moral truths. The impetus for this
change regarding his own position was the inconsistency within the character of Socrates
himself. Put plainly, if the elenchos only succeeded in exposing the inconsistencies
within the beliefs of his interlocutors, how could Socrates justify his own moral
convictions? In other words, if the elenchos does not allow for the establishment of
moral truth, and the elenchos is the only method used by Socrates, then Socrates, in
claiming certain things to be true, would himself be a dogmatist.16
And yet, it is through the “discovery” of a passage in the Gorgias that Vlastos
believes to have solved the “problem of the elenchos”. The “discovered” passage is
found at Gorgias479e:
(T1)

Has it not been proved that what was asserted [by myself] is true?17

For Vlastos, this simple question illustrates Socrates’ belief that via the elenchos he has
proven his thesis to be true. Yet, this claim of certainty is the capstone of one of the most
puzzling arguments in the Platonic corpus, and one that in recent years has been subject
to an immense amount of literature.18
Socrates begins by asking Polus whether it would be better to suffer injustice or
inflict injustice. In response, Polus responds with the following thesis:
p

16

To commit injustice is better than to suffer it.19

Again, that the elenchos is the only methodology used by Socrates is a point of contention. See

footnote 4.
17

οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο. “By myself” (ἐµαυτῷ) added by Vlastos. It should
be noted, however, that while Socrates does suggest here that he has proven what was asserted, Polus
responds in a non-committal fashion, answering only φαίνεται, i.e., “It appears” or “It seems”.
18

See Dodds, 1959: 249, Vlastos, 1967: 454-60, Santas, 1979: 233-46, Kahn, 1981: 84-97, and
Vlastos, 1991: 139-48
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Following this initial thesis, Socrates proceeds on with the elenchos, eliciting from Polus
a number of additional premises:20
q
r
s
t
u
v

To commit injustice is baser (αἴσχιον) than to suffer it. (475c5-6)
Doing injustice is more shameful than to suffer it. (474c7-8)
x is finer than y just in case x is more pleasant than y or x is more
beneficial than y. (475a5-b2)
Doing injustice is either more painful or more evil than suffering
injustice. (475b5-8)
Doing injustice is not more painful than suffering injustice. (475c1-4)
Doing injustice is more evil/worse than suffering it. (475c7-9)

For the purposes of his argument, Vlastos lumps premises r-v into a singular premise r,
and concludes that following the completion of this elenchtic episode, we find Polus
conceding to Socrates that given set {p, q, r}, p is proven to be false, and thus, not-p to be
true. Yet, from the evidence given thus far, it is not altogether clear that Socrates has
proven not-p to be true. In other words, even if premise q is inconsistent with premise p,
why would such inconsistency necessarily require Polus to recognize the falsity of p?
Could he not abandon premise q instead, and admit that it was premise q that was false,
thereby allowing him to maintain his adherence to his initial belief? According to
Vlastos, if this did occur, and the interlocutor backslid on the secondary premises, “he
(Socrates) would have the resources to recoup that loss in a further elenchos.”21 On
Vlastos’s view, the driving force behind the ability of Socrates to expose the
inconsistencies of his opponents’ beliefs is not simply his argumentative prowess, but
further, that Socrates is in possession of certain moral truths. Indeed, in response to Polus
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This is the summary as provided by Benson, 2000: 81, who himself relied upon Irwin, 1979:
157. Further, for Vlastos’ complete analysis of this argument see Vlastos, 1991: 139-148.
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claiming that it would be difficult to refute a thesis issued by Socrates himself, Socrates
responds “Not just difficult, Polus, but impossible: for what is true is never refuted.”22
To support this view, Vlastos turns his attention to arrival of Callicles, who, in
response to the failure of Polus, quickly dispatches with premise q, noting that had Polus
had the courage to admit the seemingly ugly truth regarding the committing of injustice,
he would have won the debate.23 However, despite his clever attempts to escape the
incisive attacks of Socrates, Callicles fails as well. It must be noted that while Socrates
manages to deflate the attempts of Callicles, it does not necessarily follow that Socrates
would always be able to answer future arguments against this position. Could we not
imagine an instance where a new interlocutor, one more skilled than both Polus and
Callicles, manages to defend the position at hand? In other words, while Socrates has
been successful thus far in his elenchtic engagements, without textual evidence to support
the claim that Socrates will always emerge victorious in any given debate, one cannot
rule out the possibility of a future interlocutor emerging that would force Socrates to
admit defeat.
In response to this potential critique, and in an effort to defend the thesis that it is
not merely his argumentative acumen, but rather, his possession of moral truths that
allows for Socrates to always win the engagements with his interlocutors, Vlastos cites
two additional passages from the Gorgias that he believes, when taken in concert, provide
sufficient evidence to support the claim that Socrates does believe himself to be in
possession of such truths, and further, that it is because of this that he will always emerge
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victorious in any debate that would seek to argue against the truth of the Socratic
position. The first of these crucial passages is found at Gorgias 474b:
I believe that I and you and the rest of mankind believe that committing injustice is
worse [for the agent] than is suffering it.
To properly interpret this passage, Vlastos deems it necessary that we acknowledge two
different types of “belief”: Overt belief, which is defined as those beliefs we actively
think about and posit, and Covert belief, which are those beliefs that are entailed by the
positing of our overt beliefs. To use Vlastos’ own example, if I overtly believe that a
given figure is a Euclidian triangle, then I covertly believe that the angles of that triangle
will add up to 180 degrees, even if I have yet to learn about this particular aspect of
triangular shapes. Applying this division of belief to the argument regarding the
suffering of injustice, Vlastos claims that while Polus and Callicles might honestly think
themselves to believe premise p to be true, they hold additional overt beliefs that, when
taken together, result in not-p. In other words, by positing the whole set of beliefs vi, they
are also covertly positing not-p, even if they are unaware of doing so.
With this position established, Vlastos offers his second piece of textual evidence.
We read at Gorgias 482a-b:
Don’t be astonished that I should say these things. My love, philosophy, is the one
you must stop from asserting them. It is she, my friend, who asserts these things
you hear from me, and she is much less unstable than is my other love. For the son
of Cleinias says now one thing, now another, while philosophy always says the
same thing. She says the things you find astonishing; you were yourself present
when they were spoken.
So you must either refute her saying those very things that I was asserting – that to
commit injustice and do so with impunity is the greatest of all evils – or if you
leave this unrefuted, then, by the dog, god of Egypt, Callicles will not agree with
you, Callicles, but will dissent from you your whole life long. 24
24

G. 482a-b
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For Vlastos, this passage suggests that unless Callicles is able to refute the Socratic
thesis, then Callicles will always be in possession of contradictory beliefs, for, as he is
taking as his own the beliefs posited by Polus, i.e., belief set Vi, his currently held beliefs
would necessarily indicate that he is also in possession of the covert belief not-p.25
Further, the resolute nature of Socrates’ claim would indicate that even if the interlocutor
retracts or modifies beliefs other than the one Socrates has shown to create an
inconsistency, e.g., dropping belief q instead of p, Socrates will always manage to refute
their thesis, for, “there will always be others in their belief system which entail the
Socratic thesis.”26
In order to account for the certainty he is attributing to Socrates, Vlastos
controversially posits what he describes as two “tremendous” assumptions:
(A) Whoever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs
entailing the negation of that false belief.
-and(B) The set of elenchtically tested moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given moment is
consistent.27
Looking first to assumption A, Vlastos begins by restating the claim that regardless of
which premise is jettisoned by his interlocutor, as well as whatever new premise is placed
in its stead, Socrates will always be able to build a new argument which would reveal that
25

Granted, one could argue that Callicles is not beholden to the belief of not-p as the belief set vi
is not his but that of Polus. However, such an occurrence is precisely the reason for the “say what you
believe” requirement discussed previously.
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the interlocutor still covertly believes not-p. Yet, if this is true, i.e., if Socrates truly
believes that his elenchtic method is so unequivocally effective, why not argue for proof
of such efficacy? In other words, why would Socrates settle for the mere assumption,
and not simply use the elenchos to prove to his interlocutors that their efforts are futile in
the face of such an effective methodology?
In answer to this concern, Vlastos claims that doing so would be distinctly
uncharacteristic of the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues.28 Whereas the Socrates
of dialogues such as the Meno and Republic does in fact engage in more epistemological
and/or metaphysical lines of inquiry, we find that the Socrates of the early dialogues is
not only seemingly disinterested in such areas of study, but further, is specifically
interested only in matters of morality. As a result of this disposition, questions regarding
the nature of a philosophical method itself would, for the Socrates of the early dialogues,
be of little concern or importance.29 Yet, Vlastos notes, despite lacking the definitive
proof that such an inquiry might yield, Socrates does have, at the very least, empirical
evidence to support assumption A that arises in the form of his consistent success, as he
has always been able to expose the inconsistencies within the beliefs of those individuals
who hold what he perceives to be a false belief.30 And, while his impeccable success
rate may not be able to definitively prove that the beliefs of Socrates are true, given the
28

For a detailed discussion regarding the evolution of the character of Socrates throughout Plato’s
corpus, see Vlastos 1991, 47-49
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On this point I find issue with Vlastos’ position. To explain, if we take Assumptions A and B to
be taken seriously by Socrates, and further, if these assumptions are instrumental to his method’s success in
proving moral doctrine, then, if Vlastos is correct regarding the role these assumptions play for Socrates, it
would appear that Socrates is fundamentally concerned with questions of methodology.
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Richard Kraut 1983, rightly notes that “proof” is reserved only for deductive arguments, never
for arguments of an inductive nature. For Kraut, this becomes problematic for Vlastos if he is claiming, as
Kraut believes him to be, that it is precisely the sort of proof associated with deductive arguments that
Socrates seeks via the elenchos.
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untenable nature of the oppositional beliefs held by his interlocutors, and his own
experience that those who hold and live by the beliefs he does think true are happier than
those that do not, Vlastos sees no reason why Socrates would not make the further
inductive leap regarding the truth of his own beliefs. Finally, if it were the case that
Socrates himself was in possession of a false belief, then, similar to his interlocutors, his
beliefs would eventually be exposed as inconsistent. And, as such inconsistency is never
brought to light, Vlastos posits that it is safe to assume that this consistency is evidence to
the truth of Socrates’ beliefs.31
The take away from this is that the sort of consistency of belief that Socrates
holds to be of the utmost importance has been found to be absent in all others aside from
himself. One might think that this is not a fair claim to make, as it was always the
interlocutors, not Socrates, that were the target of the elenchos, i.e., it was always the
beliefs of others that were subject to Socrates’ incisive questioning. The question arises
as to how Socrates could, having not gone through the rigor of his own interrogation,
positively believe his own beliefs to be true? And, while this claim is not entirely
without merit, according to Vlastos, it is simply not the case that his own views have not
undergone any investigation. We recall that Socrates, by engaging in the elenchos with
others, is subjecting his own views to the very same scrutiny. In discovering that time
and time again the views of others have been exposed as inconsistent on account of their
false beliefs, and additionally, that it is his views, and his views alone, that seem to
maintain consistency despite this exposure to such engagements, Vlastos believes
Socrates has sufficient evidence to make assumption B, i.e., that the set of elenchtically
31

This consistency within the beliefs of an individual is of such great importance for Socrates that
he declares he would rather be in contradiction with others than be cursed with the sort of internal strife that
internal contradictions would cause. See G. 482b-c.
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tested moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given time is consistent. Remember,
however, that for Vlastos, the elenchos is not merely a methodology used by Socrates to
expose the inconsistencies within the beliefs of his interlocutors, but rather, it is one that
allows for the positing of moral truths. And, for Vlastos, this final step arises through the
combination of assumptions A and B. To explain, if it is the case that the belief set of
Socrates has been shown time and time again to be consistent, and further, if the only
belief sets that can maintain such consistency are those that lack any false beliefs, then, if
Socrates can safely assume his own belief set to be consistent (which Vlastos believes he
can), then Socrates would be justified in claiming that his own beliefs are true. Thus, as
it was via elenchtic investigation that Socrates was able to establish the truth of his own
beliefs, Vlastos argues that Socrates is justified in believing the elenchos to be an
effective methodology towards the establishing of moral truths.
The Problem of Consistency
Vlastos on Inconsistency
While I greatly admire the imaginative elegance of Vlastos’ argument, I do have a
number of deep-seated concerns that I believe present insurmountable problems for his
position. The first of these problems I will refer to as the “problem of consistency”. We
recall that, on Vlastos’ view, Socrates is justified in positing his own beliefs as true on
account of the consistency of his own set of beliefs. Yet, I would like to dispute this
claim, as one can find numerous instances of Socrates expressing inconsistent beliefs
throughout the early dialogues.32 Given that Vlastos’ argument depends largely upon
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While incorporating the middle dialogues into this search for inconsistency might have proven
to be fruitful, as Vlastos’ argument is meant to speak only to the Socrates of the early dialogues, we must
limit our search to those parameters. As an additional concern, one might argue that we should not hold
Socrates accountable for such inconsistency on the grounds that he might simply have revised his own
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passages mined from the Gorgias, it is an obvious starting point for our investigation,
and, to be sure, there is one passage in particular that demands our attention:
And when we’ve practiced it together, then at last, if we think we should, we’ll
return to politics, or then we’ll deliberate about whatever subject we please, when
we’re better at deliberating than we are now. For it’s a shameful thing for us,
being in the condition we appear to be at present – when we never think the same
about the same subjects, the most important ones at that – to sound off as though
we’re somebodies.33
Looking to this passage, it would appear that we are confronted with a blatant admission
by Socrates that he does not exclude himself from inconsistency of belief, including
himself in that group of people who “never think the same about the same subjects.”34
To be fair, Vlastos does respond to this potential critique, warning us that readers should
not be fooled by the ironical nature of Socrates’ statement.35 Indeed, according to
Vlastos, we can find many instances throughout the dialogues with similar “ironical
substitution of ‘we’ for ‘you’.” To begin, let us look to the Euthyphro, which contains
the first passage Vlastos cites as evidence:
Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or, if we were right then, we are
wrong now.36

beliefs as a result of various elenchtic encounters. Indeed, Assumption B seems to take this into
consideration, as it claims that Socrates beliefs are consistent “at any given time”. Yet, while this is a
plausible scenario, not only is there a complete lack of elenchtic evidence to support the claim that Socrates
used to believe one thing, and then was persuaded to jettison that belief, there is evidence, specifically in
the Protagoras 372d and 376c, of Socrates expressing uncertainty and inconsistency within the same
dialogue. Therefore, even if we allow for the evolution of Socrates’ beliefs, we still find cause to believe
that Socrates is not entirely consistent regarding his own beliefs.
33
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Vlastos cites Dodd (1959) in support of his claim, who writes on the matter, “This reproach
applies of course to Callicles only…but Socrates politely includes himself.”
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In this instance, Vlastos claims that context reveals to us that this final usage of the “we”
refers only to Euthyphro, and thus, Socrates is excluded from any admission of
inconsistency. To illustrate Vlastos’ claim, we look to the text beginning at 15b:
SOCRATES: So the pious is once again that which is dear to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Most certainly.
SOCRATES: When you say this, would you be surprised if your arguments seem
to move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus
who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful than Daedalus
and make them go around in a circle? Or do you not realize your argument has
moved around and come again to the same place? You surely remember that
earlier the pious and god-loved were shown not to be the same but different from
each other. Or do you not remember?
EUTHYPHRO: I do
SOCRATES: Do you then not realize now that you are saying that what is dear to
the gods is the pious? Is this not the same as the god-loved? Or is it not?
EUTHYPHRO: It certainly is.
SOCRATES: Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or if we were right
then, we are wrong now.
What can be gleaned from this is that the agreement to which Socrates is referring is that
the pious is not the same as the god-loved. Thus, we find that Vlastos is correct in his
claim that this instance is not an example of inconsistency in the beliefs of Socrates, as
Socrates did not offer his own beliefs regarding the nature of piety, but rather, merely
agreed with Euthyphro that the third definition was untenable. This being the case, we
can rightly assert that no inconsistency is present.
Vlastos’ position is further bolstered when we look to his second example from
the Charmides. The moment in question comes at line 175b6-7:
We have admitted that there is knowledge of knowledge although the argument
said “No”.
Vlastos argues here that while Socrates seems to be admitting to the joint assertion that
there exists a knowledge of knowledge, we should bear in mind that it was Critias who
argued this point, while Socrates maintained the contrary. And, when we look to the
24

argument itself in the text, we find Vlastos to be justified by the text once again. Looking
to 169d:
But since his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the
company and he did not wish to admit to me that he was incapable of dealing with
the question I had asked him, he said nothing clear but concealed his predicament.
So I, in order that our argument should go forward, said “But if this seems right,
Critias, let us grant the point that the existence of a science of science is possible –
we can investigate on some other occasion whether this is really the case or not.
We find that it is not the case that Socrates is actually assenting to the position offered by
Critias, but is, in fact, merely allowing the claims of Critias to stand in order that they
may proceed forward with the discussion.
In one final example from the Laches, we find evidence to support Vlastos’ claim
that while Socrates does quite often use the plural 1st person pronouns in his argument,
we should take this as an instance of Socratic irony, and not as evidence that Socrates has
posited any belief of his own that would result in an inconsistency. Looking to Laches
194c, we read:
Come along then, Nicias, and, if you can, rescue your friends who are storm tossed
by the argument and find themselves in trouble. You see, of course, that our affairs
are in a bad way, so state what you think courage is and get us out of our
difficulties as well as confirming your own view by putting it into words.
Prima facie it would appear that Socrates is placing himself within the group of those
who are flustered by the argument regarding courage. However, upon examining the
context within which this statement was made, we find that it was Nicias, not Socrates,
who was struggling through the exchange, so much so in fact that not 12 lines earlier at
194a-b a very frustrated Nicias all but admits defeat to Socrates, claiming that while he
may wish to continue, he is simply unable to define courage in such a way that would
withstand the scrutiny of the elenchos. This is in direct contrast to Socrates, who, as
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Vlastos comically notes, has been “sailing very smoothly” throughout the exchange,
consistently rebutting the attempts of Nicias to the point of exasperation. Given his
comfort and poise, it seems incorrect to suggest that Socrates was serious when he placed
himself within the group of those who had been “storm-tossed” by the debate.
Further Evidence of Inconsistency
With these examples bolstering his position, I would agree with Vlastos that we
cannot simply assume that, given any instance of Socrates’ substitution of the plural
pronoun for the singular, we are to take him at his word and attribute the beliefs posited
as his own. However, while the textual examples cited above may seem to give us reason
to question the seemingly blatant admission of inconstancy we find in the Gorgias, it
does not follow from this that there exists no instances of inconsistencies within the
beliefs of Socrates. However, before we investigate possible discrepancies, I would like
to first revisit the passage from the Gorgias. In his comments on the 1983 version of
Vlastos’ “The Socratic Elenchos,” Richard Kraut suggests that we should take Socrates at
his word in the Gorgias.37 To prove his position, Kraut first looks to other instances
where Socrates seems to profess an inconsistency in his beliefs. We look first to the
Protagoras where we find at 361a-b Socrates to be holding two distinct positions:
(1) That virtue can be taught.
-and(2) That virtue is knowledge.
On Kraut’s view, taken together these claims result in an inconsistency within the beliefs
of Socrates. Indeed, earlier in the dialogue, Socrates first claims that virtue cannot be
taught, only to seemingly waffle on his earlier convictions, and reverse his position.
37
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Further, at 361c-d, Socrates himself admits to this confusion, and urges his interlocutors
to push on with him in order to clear up the troubles they have encountered. And, while
this apparent inconsistency on the part of Socrates could be dismissed as Socratic irony at
work, Kraut believes that such an interpretation is flawed, particularly in the face of
additional textual evidence drawn from the Apology.
To explain, in the Apology we find Socrates consistently denying that he teaches
virtue, and, that those who do claim to do so, “are wise with a wisdom more than
human.”38 We can glean two important points from this claim. First, that Socrates, on
account of his lack of knowledge, could not be teaching virtue, a position that bolsters the
claim that Socrates considers virtue to be a kind of knowledge. Second, that Socrates
believes that those who do claim to teach virtue must be in possession of a wisdom that
he qualifies as divine. And, while we might take this line to be a slight against the truth
of those claims to knowledge made by other sophists of the time, it is telling that this
attack is grounded in the idea that no one could teach virtue, as it pertains to a type of
knowledge that is divine. Thus, on the one hand, in the Protagoras, Socrates asserts
plainly that virtue can be taught, while on the other hand, in the Apology, Socrates seems
to suggest that virtue cannot be taught, for such a task would require the sort of
knowledge reserved only for the gods.39 As a result, it appears as if Socrates is expressing
sincere doubts about the teachability of virtue. As Kraut concludes, “If Socrates is really
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Granted, one could argue that Socrates’ claims here do not necessarily preclude the possibility
of an individual possessing the very sort of divine knowledge required regarding virtue, thus allowing
virtue to be taught. And, while this point is well taken, there is no textual evidence to support the claim
that Socrates has met such a person. Thus, (1) if virtue could be taught only by someone in possession of
divine wisdom, and (2) Socrates is not certain if such a person exists, then the claim that Socrates is
expressing uncertainty regarding the teachability stands.
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doubtful about the teachability of virtue, then he is faced with a dilemma, since (in the
Protagoras) he takes virtue to be knowledge and thinks that knowledge is teachable.”40
As a second piece of evidence, Kraut looks to the Hippias Minor, wherein we find
Socrates arguing with Hippias regarding the nature of voluntary and involuntary acts of
injustice. Looking to 372d-e, we read:
To me, Hippias, it appears entirely the opposite to what you say: Those who harm
people and commit injustice and lie and cheat and do wrong voluntarily, rather than
involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. However, sometimes I
believe the opposite, and I go back and forth about all of this – plainly because I do
not know.
On Kraut’s view, while Socrates is confident that his belief that it is better to do injustice
involuntarily rather than voluntarily is the correct position, he fully admits that he, at
times, “believes the opposite.” Now, to be fair, one could argue that this claim of
Socrates is simply a clever ruse designed to further prove his point, and, given the context
of the argument that follows this admission of inconsistency, it is easy to construct such
an interpretation. To explain, we look to 373b:
EUDICUS: Well, Socrates, I don’t think Hippias will need us to plead with him.
For that’s not what he said earlier; he said that he wouldn’t flee from any man’s
questioning. Right Hippias? Isn’t that what you said?
HIPPIAS: I did. But Socrates always creates confusion in his arguments, and
seems to argue unfairly.
SOCRATES: Oh excellent Hippias, I don’t do that voluntarily, for then I’d be wise
and awesome, according to your argument, but involuntarily. So please be lenient
with me, for you say that one who acts unfairly involuntarily should be treated with
leniency.
Now, given this exchange, one could posit that the earlier admission by Socrates of his
own vacillating beliefs was done purposefully, setting the stage to put Hippias to task
regarding his own beliefs. As the argument would go, by purposefully admitting
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inconsistent beliefs (though untrue), thereby causing unfair confusion in the argument,
Socrates can then claim he did so involuntarily, which would then force Hippias, if
Hippias truly stands by his convictions, to treat Socrates with leniency, which would in
turn, allow Socrates the room to maneuver more easily through the remainder of the
argument.
And, while I admit that this interpretation is appealing, there are a number of
issues that arise. First, simply because Socrates is able to use his confusion against his
interlocutors to help further the discussion, it does not necessarily follow that his
admission of inconsistency is insincere. We recall that it is Hippias who suggests that
Socrates is being unfair in his tactics, to which Socrates responds by using the views of
Hippias against him. The using of one’s claims against them is a common tactic of
Socrates, and one in which he is particularly adept. Given this point, while his admission
of inconsistency could seem to put Socrates at an advantage over his interlocutors, such
circumstance does not require we dismiss his earlier claims as fraudulent.
Further, even if we take the admission of inconsistency at 372d to be simply a setup put into play by Socrates to further his position, he goes on to repeat his inconsistency
regarding the point in question at the close of the dialogue. Looking to 376c, the final
paragraph of the dialogue, we read:
But given the argument, we can’t help having it look that way to us, now, at any
rate. However, as I said before, on these matters I waver back and forth and never
believe the same thing. And it is not surprising at all that I or any other ordinary
person should waver. But if you wise men are going to do it, too – that means
something terrible for us, if we can’t stop our wavering even after we’ve put
ourselves in your company.41
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Faced with this second admission of inconsistent beliefs on the same point, it becomes
increasingly difficult to claim that Socrates’ earlier position is to be taken as an insincere
claim made only to further the discussion. Granted, if the first instance were the only
time Socrates made such an admission, then a healthy dose of skepticism may be
appropriate. Yet, this second claim comes in the final paragraph of the dialogue, thus
precluding the possibility of further discussion between Socrates and his interlocutors. If
it is true that his admission of uncertainty is merely a ruse to further the discussion, then
what purpose would this identical statement serve given its positioning in the dialogue?
Taking this placement and repetition into consideration, it seems plausible that we should
take Socrates at his word.42
Inconsistency and the Daimonion
With this evidence from the Gorgias, Hippias Minor and Protagoras set before us, I
contend that we cannot dismiss Socrates’ professions that he holds inconsistent beliefs as
merely ironic gestures. As further evidence for this position, there also occur more subtle
examples that would cause trouble for Vlastos’ position that manifest themselves through
Socrates’ adherence to the warnings of his daimonion.43 To explain this point, we look
first to the Apology 40a-c where we find Socrates providing a detailed account of his
daimonic encounters:
A surprising thing has happened to me, jurymen – you I would rightly call jurymen.
At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation,
frequently opposed me, even in small matters when I was about to do something
wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one
42
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might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, my divine sign
has not opposed me…Yet in other talks it has often held me back in the middle of
my speaking, but now it has opposed no word or deed of mine…those of us who
believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this,
for it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do
what is right.44
On the face of it, this passage is merely an explanation by Socrates of the
activities of his ever watchful daimon, i.e., his guardian angel that watches over him,
preventing him time and time again from saying or doing the “wrong thing”. Regarding
the case of Socratic consistency, however, this passage is particularly telling, especially
when we take into consideration the Socratic claim that no one would ever willingly do
wrong.45
To explain, we look to the Protagoras, wherein Socrates explains that, “…no one
goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature,
so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of good.”46 In other
words, when one is deliberating about a potential action, one will always do what one
believes to be best at that time. This is no guarantee that the decided on action is in fact
the right thing; however, correctness of action is not the point, but rather the perceived
rightness of the action by that individual. On the Socratic view, if this were not the case,
then individuals would engage in a particular course of action even if they were well
aware of a better method to achieve their goals. This, of course, is absurd according to
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Socrates, and so such errors must be attributed to ignorance, i.e., false beliefs. Given this
claim, it must be the case that, whenever Socrates was to engage in a particular action,
prior to the intervention of his daimon, he falsely believed that action to be the right thing
to do. It was only after his daimon (who, interestingly, is never wrong on Socrates’
account) intervenes that he recognizes the error in his beliefs, changes them, and then acts
in accordance with his new belief on the matter. And, indeed, his beliefs must change,
for if they did not change, then he would continue to think that his originally planned
course of action was the correct one, and given the Socratic thesis that we always act in
accordance with what we believe to be right, he would ignore the advice of his daimon
(which Socrates never does).
With this argument fully fleshed out before us, the problem for Vlastos’ position
becomes clear. If, as Vlastos claims, the beliefs of Socrates are always consistent, then it
would be impossible for Socrates to believe at one moment that performing action x is the
right thing to do (which he would necessarily have to believe at that moment), and then,
after being influenced by his daimon, change his belief on the subject and act contrary to
his original decided on action. And yet, as we read in the passage above from the
Apology, Socrates plainly admits to precisely this chain of events, which, when taken in
concert with the thesis that no one would willingly do the wrong thing from the
Protagoras, suggests that not only is Socrates inconsistent in his beliefs, but that he is
aware of these inconsistencies. And so we recall that, according to Vlastos, the set of
moral beliefs held by Socrates is, in fact, true, and, that the truth of these beliefs is
contingent upon the consistency thereof, and further, that in order for any set of beliefs to
be consistent, it must be void of any false beliefs. However, as the evidence above has
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shown, Socrates was in possession of false beliefs, and therefore, as these false beliefs
preclude the possibility of consistency47, which in turn, precludes the possibility that the
belief set is true, Vlastos cannot rightfully claim, on such terms, to be in possession of
true beliefs.
The Problem of True Premises
It has thus far been argued that, contra Vlastos, Socrates is not always consistent
regarding his beliefs. As has been shown, we find multiple examples throughout the
dialogues of Socrates expressing what appear to be contradictory beliefs, in some cases
within the same dialogue. Yet, as my major point of contention regarding the elenchos as
practiced by Socrates48 pertains to its inability to establish or discover moral truths, it will
be useful to concede the problem of consistency for now in order that we might see how,
even if we concede the point that Socrates is always consistent, the elenchos still does
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not, and cannot, establish moral truth.49 To begin, we recall that for Vlastos, the solution
to “the problem of the elenchos,” i.e., how Socrates is able to establish the falsehood of a
given belief, is contingent upon the truth of the additional premises agreed to by the
interlocutor. Since these additional premises are understood as true, and the conjunction
of these premises and the original thesis result in the negation of that thesis, Vlastos
claims that Socrates is properly able to establish the thesis to be false, and thus, the
opposite of that thesis to be true. For Vlastos, the truth of the additional premises in any
given elenchtic engagement is assured by the fact that Socrates himself believes them to
be true, as opposed to the original thesis, which only the interlocutor, not Socrates,
believes to be true.50 As explained in section one of this dissertation, Vlastos feels
confident in Socrates’s ability to assert this truth claim regarding his own beliefs on
account of the consistency of those beliefs, a consistency which, for Vlastos, is only
possible if the set of beliefs held by a person are, in fact, true.51
As could be expected, an array of critiques have been offered in response to this
claim regarding the perceived truth of Socrates’ own beliefs, an assertion of truth which,
given that these beliefs serve as the premises for his “proof”, Socrates must be able to
account for.52 Richard Kraut, for one, in his commentary on Vlastos’ original 1983
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version of the essay, suggests that Vlastos needlessly creates his “problem of the
elenchos.” On Kraut’s view, when one gives an argument, they need not necessarily
explain the reasoning behind their use of the premises contained within. Drawing from
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics,53 Kraut notes:
“…if arguments contain a finite number of steps, and circularity is to be avoided,
then every demonstration will contain statements for which no explanation is
given…If the only way to prove a proposition is to deduce it from others, then at
some point or other demonstration will have to rest on unproved premises, and it
would be unreasonable to criticize an alleged proof on the grounds that it rests on
undemonstrated premises.”54
Given this position, Kraut suggests that to ask Socrates to prove not only the conclusion
but also the premises would be to ask him to perform the impossible.
Ronald Polansky follows a different path in his critique, making note of the fact
that, despite Vlastos’ arguments to the contrary, Socrates quite often relies upon endoxa
when positing premises. Given Socrates’ consistent concern regarding the ignorance of
the majority,55 it is of no surprise that Vlastos would find any reliance by Socrates upon
public opinion to be fairly hypocritical. Further, Polansky notes, if Vlastos is correct, and
the interlocutors only submit premises that they truly believe, then what possible good
could come from an additional appeal to common opinion?56 On the one hand, if the
interlocutor posits a particular belief p, and that belief coincides with public opinion, then
nothing is gained by appealing to public opinion. On the other hand, if the interlocutor
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posits belief p, and that belief stands in contrast to common opinion, then the individual,
faced with the overwhelming opposition of the majority, might rescind their initial
premise, which would ruin the elenchtic encounter on Vlastos’s view, as the interlocutor
must always say what he believes. In defense of his position, Vlastos goes so far as to
suggest that the only time there is an appeal to common belief it is done by the
interlocutor, not Socrates.57 For example, in the Gorgias, Polus asks, “Socrates, don’t
you think you’ve been refuted already when you say things with which no one would
agree? Just ask any of these people here.”58 As Vlastos argues, Socrates rejects this sort
of appeal entirely, citing G. 472b-c, “If I cannot produce one man – yourself – to witness
to my assertions, I believe I shall have accomplished nothing.”
However, according to Polansky, while the above example may show Socrates
denying Polus in his appeal, such a denial does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Socrates would dismiss all such appeals to common belief. Indeed, it is only one line
later at 474b where, in response to Polus, Socrates himself appeals to endoxa, as he
claims, “…you and I and the rest of the world, believe that doing wrong is worse than
suffering it, and escaping punishment worse than incurring it.”59 Indeed, it is precisely
such appeals to public opinion that fuel the anger of Callicles, who accuses Socrates of,
“…bringing the discussion around to…crowd-pleasing vulgarities.”60 Thus, Polansky
concludes, “even in those contexts in which Socrates questions his interlocutor’s too
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facile reliance upon what is universally believed, Socrates employs premises that gain
acceptance and plausibility precisely because they are in accord with commonly held
views.”61
Now, while Polansky’s critique is well taken, one could counter that while there is
evidence to suggest that Socrates does utilize endoxa to bolster his arguments, if the
appeals to endoxa made by Socrates are in regard to premises that he believes to be true
regardless of public opinion, then Polansky’s critique is easily dismissed. In other words,
simply because a premise falls in line with common opinion, it does not necessarily
follow that the premise in question is untrue. While perhaps not common, it is entirely
within the realm of possibility that Socrates holds beliefs that happen to be endoxa as
well. And, while this alignment of endoxa and the beliefs of Socrates are quite often not
the case, if it were to occur, then on Vlastos’s view, Socrates would be entirely free to
acknowledge this point to further his own argument.62
Now, while the critiques made by Polansky and Kraut are not especially
damaging, that both arguments are directed towards Socrates and his belief that the
premises used in the elenchos are true is quite telling. Following these attempts then, if it
can be shown that Socrates employs premises which he does not believe, then the rigid
position of Vlastos becomes much less tenable.63
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According to Benson, a particularly clear example of an elenchtic episode within
which we find premises that Socrates does not believe arises early on in the Euthyphro.64
Benson reconstructs the elenchos as follows:65
1. If x is god-loved, then x is pious, and if x is god-hated, then x is impious. (7a6-8)
2. The gods fight with, differ with, and hate each other. (7b2-4)
3. The just and the unjust, the fine and the foul, and the good and the bad are the
subjects of difference that make individuals hate each other. (7b6-d10)
4. So, there are some things that some gods consider just, fine, or good and other
gods consider unjust, foul, or bad. (7e1-3)
5. The things one considers fine, good, or just, one loves and the opposite of these
one hates. (7e6-7)
6. So, the same things are hated and loved by the gods. (8a4-5)
7. So, the same things are god-hated and god-loved. (8a5)
8. So, the same things will be pious and impious. (8a7-8)
With this elenchos laid out before us, we now need to determine if Socrates believes each
of the premises to be true.66 To begin, premise (2) emerges as immediately problematic,
as we earlier find Socrates troubled by Euthyphro’s unabashed belief in the stories about
the gods, lamenting to Euthyphro that he, “…finds it hard to accept things like that being
said about the gods.”67 Yet, despite this difficulty, Socrates uses premises 2, 4, 6, and 7.
Now, if it is the case that Socrates must believe each of the agreed upon premises to be
true, then, given his admitted disbelief in the very stories he uses as evidence, it would
arguing for that original thesis, as Vlastos writes, “Here Socrates says in so many words that he has done
what Grote and I had maintained he never did in an elenchtic argument: He says that he has ‘proved’ his
thesis true.” (1983: p. 47). Considering Vlastos’ own revisions, regardless of his original intentions, this
note should be taken as directed only in regard to the original essay.
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not be possible for him to allow those premises which assume the existence of the gods to
stand. As a supplemental point to Benson’s argument, even if we allow this premise to
stand, regardless of Socrates’ expressed difficulty regarding his belief in the gods, we
find that immediately following Euthyphro’s suggestion of premise (2), Socrates pleads
ignorance as to the truth of that premise.68 We are left then with two options, neither of
which favor Vlastos’ interpretation: (1) Socrates allows a premise that conflicts with his
own beliefs regarding the gods, or (2), Socrates admits that he knows not whether the
premise he allows to stand is in fact true. In either case, we find Socrates granting
premises that he does not actively believe to be true.
In addition to the problems that arise from premise 2, Benson also notes that
Socrates actively disassociates himself from premise 4, clearly stating to Euthyphro that
the premise in question is κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, i.e., “according to your (Euthyphro’s)
argument”.69 Socrates then reemphasizes this distancing of himself from the premise,
reiterating the premise but adding the qualifier ὡς σὺ φῄς, i.e., “so you say”.70 Granted,
one could argue that these remarks need not be taken to be attributing premise 4
exclusively to Euthyphro, as it could simply be the case that Socrates wished to make
clear that both he and Euthyphro were in agreement regarding the details of the premise.
However, when taken in concert with the preceding point regarding Socrates’ lack of
belief in the stories from which these descriptions of the gods are founded, Benson
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believes, and I agree, that the evidence clearly suggests that Socrates is disassociating
himself with the view in question.71
In addition to examples such as the above in which Socrates allows for premises
to stand although he has expressed his reservations regarding their alethic status, one can
additionally find examples of elenchtic encounters wherein Socrates, under the guise of
honesty, deceptively posits premises he does not accept. In other words, whereas in the
example from the Euthyphro Socrates plainly, and repeatedly, admits he does not agree
with Euthyphro, we can point to other instances, such as the discussion of courage in the
Protagoras, where Socrates offers no such admission of skepticism, and yet relies upon
certain premises, e.g., (351c2-6) that pleasures are good on account of their pleasantness,
that, given his stated position on the matter in other dialogues, specifically the Gorgias,
he simply could not believe to be true without then admitting contradictory beliefs.72 To
illustrate this point we look to Protagoras 353c-354c2, wherein we find Socrates, through
a series of suggested scenarios, compelling Protagoras to agree that the goodness of any
action or thing is directly determined by the ratio of pleasure over pain that one
71
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experiences via their engagement with that activity or object. And, while in the
Euthyphro Socrates seems to distance himself from particular premises via a healthy dose
of skepticism, in our current example, Socrates explicitly includes himself as sharing
these beliefs. Indeed, looking to Protagoras 353e5, we find Socrates asking the
following:
Does it not seem to you, my good people, as Protagoras and I maintain, that these
things are bad on account of nothing other than the fact that they result in pain and
deprive us of other pleasures?73
This passage, along with other similar admissions, seems to suggest that Socrates is
professing himself to be, at the very least, in agreement with the hedonist perspective.
However, given the substantial amount of evidence to the contrary, specifically his
vehement denial of the hedonistic position in the Gorgias,74 not to mention the ink that
has been spilled by scholars arguing against this position,75 that Socrates might seriously
be considered to be a hedonist seems untenable, let alone that he considered himself one.
Given this evidence, I submit that we must understand Socrates to be arguing dishonestly
in the Protagoras, relying upon subterfuge to achieve his goal of exposing the
inconsistencies in the beliefs of his interlocutors.76 If this is correct, then once again the
requirement that Socrates believe all of his premises to be true reveals itself to be
unsupported by the text.
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The Problem of Establishing Moral Truths
The Euthyphro
It has thus far been argued that two of the conditions of Vlastos’ argument, (1)
that all of Socrates’ beliefs are consistent, and (2) that Socrates must believe all of his
premises to be true77, are not supported by the text. However, as Vlastos’ position
centers around the claim that the elenchos is capable of establishing moral truths, let us
set aside the previously discussed issues in Vlastos’ argument, and turn our attention to
actual elenchtic encounters to determine if the elenchos as utilized by Socrates is capable
of achieving all that Vlastos claims. Granted, there are far too many elenchtic arguments
found throughout the early dialogues to analyze each elenchos in full.78 Thus, on account
of the sheer number of elenchoi, I will limit my analysis to selected arguments I believe
to be paradigmatic examples, each of which adhering to the standards as stipulated by
Vlastos.79
Beginning with the Euthyphro, we recall from our account of the first elenchos of
this dialogue that Vlastos considers this particular elenchos to be of the “indirect” kind,
which, as we recall, on Vlastos view, is, unlike the standard “direct” elenchos, unable to
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establish moral truths. Thus, to be fair to Vlastos’ argument, my first example here will
be the second elenchos of the Euthyphro (10d1-10d14), an argument Vlastos specifically
claims to “prove the doctrine, so fundamental for Socrates’ rational theology, that pious
action is god-loved because it is pious.”80 The complete second argument of the elenchos
proceeds as follows:81
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

X is pious because it is loved by all of the gods. (10d1-2)
X is loved because it is pious. (10d4-6)
It is not the case that X is pious because it is loved. (10d6-7)
X is a loved thing and god-loved because it is loved by the gods. (10d9-19)
It is not the case that x is loved by the gods because it is god-loved. (10e6-7)
“Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the
same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.” (10d1214)
7. The pious is being loved because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being
loved. (10e2-3)
8. “The god-loved …is so because it is being loved by the gods, by the very fact of
being loved, but it is not being loved because it is god-loved” (10e4-6)
9. “If the god-loved and the pious were the same, then if the pious was being loved
because it was pious, the god-loved would also be being loved because it was
god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the
gods, then the pious would also be the pious because it was being loved by the
gods.” (10e9-11a3)
10. “But now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different
from each other: the one is such as to be loved because it is being loved, the other
is being loved because it is such as to be loved.” (11a4-6)
Beginning with claim (6), we find cause for Vlastos to believe that Socrates has been
able to prove Euthyphro’s posited definition to be false, as we find Socrates being rather
clear in his own position:
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“Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the
same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.” (10d12-14)
Indeed, prima facie this passage seems to support Vlastos’ position. Socrates is
seemingly claiming to have undeniably shown Euthyphro’s initial thesis to be false. Yet,
as some scholars have shown, this need not be the case. Hugh Benson, for one, suggests
that while it may seem to be the case that Socrates is examining (and determining) the
truth of Euthyphro’s claim, if we turn our attention to Socrates’ comments immediately
preceding the elenchos in question, we find cause to question the standing interpretation
as given by Vlastos.82 That pivotal line, Euthyphro 9d6-8, finds Socrates responding to
Euthyphro’s inquiry as to what might stand in the way of their modifying the definition
of piety previously posited. In response to this question, Socrates explains:
For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether on your part this proposal
will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised.83
Taking this statement into consideration, we are able to parse out two particularly
important points. First, the opening of the passage has Socrates clearly stating that it is
not he at all that would be preventing the modification of the definition as previously
posited. If the definition in question was to be analyzed for its alethic status, and, as
Vlastos claims, Socrates (and Socrates alone) uses the elenchos to determine the truth of
any given definition, then it seems incorrect for Socrates to distinctly distance himself
from the process. Second, building from this first point, Socrates is clearly requesting
that Euthyphro himself look to the definition now under consideration to ensure that he
(Euthyphro) agrees with its terms. Given this request, it seems that Socrates is ensuring
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that this new definition to be examined is something to which Euthyphro can agree, i.e., it
is a definition Euthyphro believes to be consistent with his own beliefs.84
That this elenchos exposes the inconsistency of Euthyphro’s beliefs is further
emphasized by Socrates in the exchange immediately following the conclusion of the
elenchos. As we read at 11b8-c4:
Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus. If I were
stating them and putting them forward, you would perhaps be making fun of me
and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run
away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions are yours,
however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say
yourself.85
Now, while this passage may further the point that inconsistency is apparent, it is still not
certain that Socrates has not also determined the truth (or lack thereof) of a particular
doctrine. Yet, following Benson’s lead, we might find the evidence required through a
careful consideration of the Daedalus analogy used by Socrates in the above passage. To
explain, Benson notes that reference to Daedalus is not limited to the Euthyphro alone,
but is also utilized by Plato in the Meno. Looking to the Meno, we read:
To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway
slave, for it does not remain but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are
beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions,
as long as they remain, are a fine thing, and all they do is good, but they are not
willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so they are not worth
much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of reason why…After they
are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then remain in place.
That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs
from correct opinion in being tied down.86
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From this passage we find Plato emphasizing the necessity of stability regarding
knowledge, i.e., to claim one is in possession of knowledge, then they must be able to
support their beliefs via reason. Similar to the untied Daedalus statues that run away,
quickly leaving their owner empty handed, unsubstantiated opinion falters under
scrutiny.87 Taking this shared analogy into consideration, it is not necessarily the case
that Socrates has proven Euthyphro’s definition to be false (nor the negation of this
definition to be true), but rather, has simply exposed the inconsistency of his beliefs, for
had they been true, then his beliefs would have, similar to a secured Daedalus statue,
“stayed put”.88
To further the argument against the elenchos’ ability to establish moral truths, let
us take as an additional example the very next elenchos of the Euthyphro (12e5-13d2),
which, prima facie, seems to support Vlastos’ position. Before providing an argument
against this view, however, let us first reconstruct the argument as found in the text:
1. “Piety is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods.” (12e5-6)
2. Care for the gods is the same as care for livestock. (13a1-5)
3. “Care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and benefit of the object
cared for.” (13b6-7)
4. Caring for the gods does not make the gods better. (13c6-9)
5. Therefore, Piety is not the same as caring for livestock, namely, providing benefit
to the object of care. (13d2)
Again, on first glance, this conclusion seems to suggest that Socrates has proven the
thesis offered by Euthyphro, i.e., that Piety is the same sort of care as one would have for
livestock, to be false. Yet, if we look to the text, we find Socrates expressing his concern
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not with the truth of the thesis itself, but rather whether or not this thesis was one that
Euthyphro truly believed. In response to Euthyphro’s agreement that, on second thought,
care for the gods is not the same as care for livestock, Socrates notes in relief, “Nor did I
think that this is what you meant – far from it – but that is why I asked you what you
meant by care of the gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care.”89
According to Benson, this concluding passage provides us with two crucial
insights: First, we find that Euthyphro’s acceptance of premises 3 and 4 seems
incompatible with his accepting of premise 2. To explain, let us take premise 3, i.e.,
“Care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and benefit of the object cared
for.” (13b6-7) While this may be an acceptable way to understand care in regard to
livestock, one could offer an alternative definition of care, e.g., that one cares for cattle in
order to benefit themselves. In other words, while it would behoove the cattle owner to
ensure his cattle are well fed and healthy, their well-being is a means to an end, i.e., the
owner’s own benefit. And, while one might argue that even in this scenario the cattle are
still being afforded the food and shelter required to make their lives better, if this “care”
is implemented only towards their eventual slaughter, it is difficult to maintain the
argument that this care is beneficial for the animal. Thus, we find premise 3 is potentially
incompatible with premise 2.
Second, we find that Socrates once again focuses on precisely what Euthyphro
meant, not on whether or not the premise itself is true or false.90 It is thus not clear that
any truth has been established regarding the definition of piety. And, it is this failure to
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establish any positive moral doctrine that arises as the major problem for Vlastos’
interpretation. To explain, even if we hypothetically grant that Socrates has “proven”
that Euthyphro’s definition of piety is untenable, he nevertheless fails to replace it with a
working definition of his own. If the elenchos was capable of such positive work, then
one must inquire as to why the Euthyphro, not to mention the majority of the so-called
Socratic dialogues, would end in aporia. If, as Vlastos has argued, Socrates91 is entirely
concerned with issues of morality, and further, Socrates believes himself capable of
establishing the definitional knowledge required to answer the very questions he finds
before him, then what reason could he have for leaving them unanswered? Thus, given
the absolute lack of such positive doctrine, not to mention the consistent state of aporia
that is present at the conclusion of these dialogues, Vlastos’ claims regarding the positive
powers of the elenchos become increasingly difficult to defend.
The Gorgias
In addition to the examples above, Benson carefully deconstructs every elenchoi
found within the Euthyphro, Charmides, and Laches. In each case, it is shown that there
is not sufficient evidence to support the position that the elenchos establishes a positive
moral truth. And, while it is not necessary here to further replicate the work of Benson
regarding the elenchoi of these early dialogues, we recall that the entire argument as
given by Vlastos is dependent upon an argument found within the Gorgias, i.e., that it is
better to suffer injustice than commit injustice. Given Vlastos’ dependence upon various
passages from the Gorgias, it is necessary then to determine if his interpretation of the
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text in question is correct. To do so, I will follow closely the argument against Vlastos as
given by Benson, adding detail and correction where I believe appropriate.
To begin, in comparison to the earlier dialogues such as the Euthyphro and
Laches, the Gorgias is not a paradigmatic elenchtic dialogue.92 In the place of the
inquisitive, self admittedly ignorant man of the early dialogues, we find a more assertive
Socrates, one openly declaring particular beliefs that stand in direct opposition to those of
his interlocutors.93 Granted, one could argue that the ignorance displayed in the earlier
dialogues was merely a ruse utilized by Socrates to further his own arguments94,
however, the sincerity of Socrates’ claims to ignorance are irrelevant, as the point is not
whether or not he is sincere in his claims, but that he is making and standing by his own
claims that distinguishes the tone of the Gorgias from the earlier dialogues. Given this
distinction, any textual evidence gleaned from the Gorgias that is used to promote a
theory incorporating the Socratic dialogues as a whole must be taken with a grain of salt.
As Benson explains:
The point here is not that the Gorgias is not an early dialogue or that it fails to
provide evidence for the views, methodological or otherwise, for the Socrates of
the early dialogues. Rather the point is simply that the Gorgias is an unusual early
dialogue. As a result, should these passages compel us to understand Socrates as
believing that individual elenchoi can establish positive moral doctrines, that
maybe due to the special nature of the Gorgias rather than due to what is in
common with the other early dialogues.95
Given the distinct nature of the Gorgias then, if there can be found no passages within the
earlier dialogues that mirror the positive claims made by the Socrates of the Gorgias,
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which I believe, in agreement with Benson, that there are none, then we should not take
the elenchos from the Gorgias, nor the “truth” it seems to establish, as the paradigmatic
example upon which our understanding of the elenchos as a whole is to be understood.96
However, even if we ignore the issue of distinction between the Gorgias and
earlier dialogues, the argument and positive claims that arise therefrom which serve as
the foundation of Vlastos’ argument are cause for further concern. To clarify this, let us
re-examine the argument in question, which, for the sake of ease of reference, I once
again provide here:
p
q
r
s
t
u
v

To commit injustice is better than to suffer it
To commit injustice is baser (αἴσχιον) than to suffer it. (475c5-6)
Doing injustice is more shameful than to suffer it. (474c7-8)
x is finer than y just in case x is more pleasant than y or x is more
beneficial than y. (475a5-b2)
Doing injustice is either more painful or more evil than suffering
injustice.
(475b5-8)
Doing injustice is not more painful than suffering injustice. (475c1-4)
Doing injustice is more evil/worse than suffering it. (475c7-9)

Putting aside the oft-noted issues regarding the controversy of the argument itself,97 the
question arises as to whether or not the argument in question, and the premises upon
which it is constructed, can meet the standards as set forth by Vlastos. In other words, we
recall that on Vlastos’ view, for a particular Socratic elenchos to provide proof for a
moral doctrine, Socrates must believe each of the premises contained within the argument
to be true.98 And, on Benson’s account, this requirement is not met. Benson takes issue

96

This point is somewhat conceded by Vlastos himself in his revised version of his article.
Vlastos 1994, 33-34.
97

For the problems of ambiguity regarding translation, see Irwin 1979, 157. Additionally, for
issues regarding the potentially purposive fallaciousness of the argument, see Dodds 1959.
98

See n. 78.

50

first with premise s, i.e., that x is finer than y just in case x is more pleasant than y or x is
more beneficial than y, a point which Socrates happily seems to accept as an adequate
standing definition of the fine.99 Yet, in spite of this agreement on the part of Socrates to
the truth of the premise in question, whether or not Socrates actually believes this to be
true is not entirely certain.100 According to Benson, the problem arises following
Socrates’ efforts to, “extract from Polus an account of the fine compatible with his dual
claims that doing injustice is better than suffering it (1) and that doing injustice is more
shameful/less fine than suffering it.”101 Further, as we read at 474d1, Socrates elicits
from Polus the additional belief that the “fine” and “good” are necessarily distinct from
one another. Yet, as Benson notes, this additional premise regarding the distinction
between the good and the fine is a premise that Socrates himself is unable to accept, a
position expressed by Socrates in the proceeding passages (474d2-476a1).102 Given this
contradiction, it is not clear that Socrates accepts as true premise s. Thus, according to
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Benson, “… Socrates commitment is open to question, as is his commitment to the
soundness of the argument that depends upon it.”103
As a final, yet simpler point, we find that despite the seemingly powerful claims
made by Socrates regarding the establishment of a positive moral doctrine, multiple
instances arise that would suggest Socrates is not quite as certain as Vlastos would have
us believe.104 According to Benson, a number of such instances exist. (1) In the lines
following 479e8, wherein Socrates claims he has proven his position to be true, we find
Socrates immediately backsliding. As we read at 480a1-2, “All right. If these things are
true, then what is the great use of rhetoric, Polus?” Against Benson, however, one could
argue that the conditional nature of Socrates statement above need not be read as
uncertainty on Socrates part regarding the truth of his own belief. It could be the case
that Socrates, taking into consideration the truth of his own belief, is now delivering a
pointed attack upon rhetoric itself, noting that it is through the elenchos, not rhetoric, that
the truth can be uncovered.
Yet, while I do find Benson’s initial argument to be somewhat problematic, it is
the final two pieces of textual evidence he offers that provide the more compelling case.
First, following Socrates’ claim at 508e7-509a2, where he claims to have built a case that
is “clamped down by arguments of iron and adamant,” we discover Socrates very quickly
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weakening his resolve, stating, “or so at least it would appear so far”.105 And, if this
disavowal of certainty was not quite enough, we find that not two lines later Socrates
reminds his audience of his ignorance of the topic at hand, as he claims to know nothing
regarding the issue at hand.106 As Benson explains, “This (Socrates’ lack of certainty) is
at least odd if Socrates had understood his preceding arguments as establishing or
proving the thesis that to do injustice and not be punished is worse than suffering
injustice. Whatever else Socrates thinks his previous arguments have established he
evidently does not think they established knowledge.”107
To be fair, Vlastos does take this issue into consideration,108 a problem he
believes he resolves through his positing of two distinct types of knowledge: (1)
KnowledgeC, which is to be understood as infallible knowledge of which one is absolutely
certain, and KnowledgeE, or “knowledge” that is acquired through the elenchtic method.
For Vlastos, it is only KnowledgeE that Socrates would avow. So, on Vlastos’ account,
when Socrates claims to know, for instance, that it is better to suffer injustice than to
commit injustices, such “knowing” is of the elenchtically provable variety, whereas more
profound knowledge, e.g., the definition of the “fine,” would be classified as knowledgeC,
which, for Socrates (and Vlastos) would be, if not impossible to truly obtain, at the very
least held to much more rigorous standards.
However, I take issue with this distinction as given by Vlastos, for, when we take
into consideration the type of knowledge that would seem to fall under the category of
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KnowledgeC, i.e., moral doctrine and definitional knowledge of the virtues, we find
textual evidence that would prove troubling for Vlastos. To explain, looking to the
Apology 20d-e, we recall that Socrates states that any claiming of knowledge regarding
issues of virtue are claiming a kind of knowledge that is beyond human understanding,
i.e., divine. And, considering the issue at hand in the Gorgias is without question one
that pertains to virtue, to say that such knowledge is to be classified as KnowledgeE is
problematic, as it is not altogether clear how such knowledge would not be categorized as
the sort reserved for KnowledgeC,
Thus, at best it appears that the “proof” established regarding the suffering of
injustice is nothing more than an agreement between Socrates and his interlocutor
regarding their justified belief on this particular issue. As the issue at hand concerns the
suffering of injustice, such a proof would first require that Socrates produce a proper
definition of Justice itself. Given Socrates’ lack of definition regarding the basic
principles of Justice, it does not seem possible for Socrates to then prove as true in the
sense of KnowledgeC that inflicting injustice is always worse than suffering it.
The Problem of Induction
In addition to the issues argued above, there remains one final issue that must be
addressed, and that is the problem of induction. According to Vlastos, Socrates is able to
posit his own belief set as consistent because never in all his years of questioning has any
interlocutor been able to expose inconsistencies therein, in fact quite the contrary. As a
result of this perceived consistency, “…he has evidence – as before, inductive evidence –
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for a further assumption,” i.e., to believe his own beliefs to be consistent.109 In other
words, Socrates’ confidence regarding the consistency of his beliefs is derived entirely
from his own experience of never having his beliefs proven inconsistent by an
interlocutor.110 However, if this is true, and Socrates is only able to establish the
consistency of his beliefs via induction, then a number of additional problems arise.
First, we are faced with the somewhat obvious issue of uncertainty. To explain,
we recall that according to Vlastos, the beliefs of Socrates are in fact true on account of
their consistency,111 which itself is dependent upon the beliefs of Socrates never being
exposed as inconsistent via an elenchtic engagement. And, while it may be the case that
up until a certain point Socrates has never been refuted by an interlocutor, previous
victories in these engagements do not guarantee that tomorrow a particularly skilled
interlocutor might not rise to the occasion and expose Socrates’ beliefs as inconsistent.112
In other words, while the many previous victories may indeed allow Socrates to be
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justified in his belief that his own belief set is true, it in no way actually “proves” the
objective truth of his beliefs.113
Second, we recall that, according to Vlastos, the Gorgias provides us with textual
evidence to support the claim that the elenchos is able to prove moral doctrines. And,
while we already discussed a number of problems with this interpretation from a textual
level, if we ignore these inconsistencies for now, we find that the appeal to induction
creates problems of its own. To explain, if, as Vlastos claims, Socrates is able to gain
evidence for the truth of his beliefs only through induction, then Vlastos is forced to
admit that single elenchtic arguments do not prove positive moral truths (a point he does
concede). In other words, if Socrates must rely upon numerous encounters to posit any
particular truth, then the argument found in the Gorgias, and the “proof” gleaned from it
must be no exception. Therefore, it is not the particular arguments from the Gorgias that
result in the positing of the truth in question, but rather this particular encounter in
concert with multiple previous encounters. However, if this is the case, and the “proof”
of the Gorgias is entirely dependent upon previously held elenchtic encounters, then how
could the particular argument in the Gorgias be considered proof of anything as Vlastos
seems to argue? Again, the consequence of this is that the evidence found in the Gorgias
results only in Socrates being justified in his belief that his own belief set is true at that
moment, a position which, again, considering the future possibility of a particularly
skilled interlocutor exposing Socrates’ inconsistencies, arises as deeply problematic for
Vlastos.
To explain, the conviction with which Socrates espouses his own beliefs seems at
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odds with the explanation provided by Vlastos, i.e., that Socrates is justified in believing
his beliefs to be true on account of his previous encounters failing to expose
inconsistencies. Given the distinct possibility of a future encounter proving Socrates
wrong, not to mention Socrates failure to prove any positive moral doctrine throughout
the early dialogues via the elenchos, it would seem that something more would be
required to explain the firm conviction with which Socrates expresses his beliefs. And,
while it is true that the dialogues provide no evidence of Socrates being exposed as
inconsistent, it is not the elenchos that is explicitly considered infallible in the eyes of
Socrates, but rather, it is his daimon that he finds to unfailingly guide him towards the
truth. Given Socrates’ recognition of this point, as well as the failure of the elenchos to
establish any positive moral doctrine, it is perhaps not through the elenchos alone, but
rather the elenchos in concert with divine dispensation that Socrates is able to stand so
firm in his convictions. It is this possibility that I will explore in the remainder of this
dissertation.
Conclusion
As I have argued, on its own the elenchos is, contra Vlastos, unable to establish
positive moral doctrine. Faced with these inadequacies, as well as Socrates’ unexplained
claims to knowledge, determining how Socrates could avow knowledge requires an
investigation into new possibilities. In an effort to take up this challenge, in the
remaining chapters I will investigate the relation between Socrates and sophistry, as well
as the role that divine inspiration plays for both Socrates and Plato.
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Chapter 2: Socrates and Sophistry in the Late Dialogues
As I have argued in the previous chapter, Socrates is not able to achieve
knowledge through the elenchos. Given this fact, coupled with Socrates’ consistent
disavowal of knowledge, the question arises as to how Socrates is able to excel to the
point of supremacy in his encounters and debates with others. In other words, if Socrates
had knowledge, then his ability to dominate any argument would make sense, as his
questions would thus be guided by the truth. However, as this is not the case, his ability
remains a mystery. As a possible explanation to this phenomenon, some scholars have
concluded that Socrates must therefore be considered as a kind of sophist, one skilled in
the art of appearing to be wise, when in fact they themselves lack such wisdom.1 And,
such claims are not entirely unfounded, for, if we look to Plato’s Sophist, his major work
on the subject of sophistry, we find that, amongst a variety of possible definitions of the
sophist, one definition seems an almost perfect description of Socrates. This point,
coupled with the fact that in the Sophist, as well as other later Platonic dialogues such as
the Statesman and the Laws, the character of Socrates takes a back seat to the Eleatic and
Athenian strangers, has driven some scholars to argue that, at the close of Plato’s life, he
no longer considers his mentor to meet the standards of the philosopher.
The goal of this chapter, then, is to argue against this claim. In the following I
will argue that, despite the apparent similarities between the sixth definition of the sophist
as found in the Sophist and Socrates, we should not, and cannot, consider Socrates to be a
sophist. However, while my aim is to save Socrates from sophistry, I will further argue
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that he also cannot be considered a philosopher in the unqualified sense. On my
interpretation, while Plato did, at one point, consider Socrates to be a philosopher, he
came to realize that, given the failures of the elenchos, a new methodology was required.
I will thus argue that this new methodology of division is, if not the methodology of the
philosopher, at the very least a necessary component of philosophy. And, as Socrates
was a not a practitioner of this new method, he does not meet the standards that Plato sets
for philosophy in the later dialogues.
Defining the Sophist
Looking first to the Sophist and Plato’s attempts to define sophistry, we find that
Socrates has taken a back seat to the Eleatic Stranger, an individual that Theodorus
introduces as “very much a philosopher.2 Given the task of defining sophistry, the
Eleatic Stranger employs a methodology wherein, through a series of subsequent
divisions, he is able to further narrow the field of inquiry until the term in question is
adequately defined. Yet, as the Stranger is set to begin his investigation into the
definition of the sophist, he expresses his concern regarding the difficulty of the task at
hand. Thus, in order to ease into the analysis, he suggests to Theaetetus that it would
serve them well to first use a model, i.e., an angler, as a starting point for their inquiry.3
As explained by the Stranger, it is decided to begin with the example of the angler, for
not only is it an easily recognizable profession, and thus, easily definable, but it is also a
profession which, similar to certain conceptions of sophistry, pertains to “hunting”.4 The
2

Soph. 216a3

3

Soph. 218c7-e1. See also Gill (2012, 140) – Gill adds that here in the Sophist the example of the
angler is used for its everydayness, i.e., the ease with which the student would be able to follow the
divisions as well as the conclusions drawn. This practice is also utilized in the Statesman, with the weaver
used as a model for the Statesman.
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similarities between the two would thus allow for an easy transition into the primary
agenda of defining the sophist.
With the model decided upon, the Stranger begins by positing angling as a type of
expertise. From this position, the stranger divides expertise into two broad categories:
productive and acquisitive. Recognizing that the art of angling does not deal with
production, the stranger divides the acquisitive branch, making further divisions down the
line until he is able to isolate angling from all other types of expertise.5 Thus, through
this method of division, the Stranger was able to discover a precise definition of the
angler.6
With the definition of the angler now firmly established, the Stranger begins his
search for the definition of the sophist by attempting to determine to which sort of
expertise sophistry might pertain7. As with the angler, the Stranger first determines that
sophistry is a sort of acquisitive art, specifically engaged in the “hunting of rich,
prominent young men.”8 However, while we might agree that this first definition of the
sophist as a sort of hunter seems plausible, we quickly discover that our object of inquiry
is not so easily defined. To explain, if we retreat back up the branches of division as

4

Soph. 218e-219a

5

For a wonderfully concise model of the divisions see Gill, (2012, 142).

6

Soph. 221b2-c3 – “Within expertise as a whole one half was acquisitive; half of the acquisitive
was taking possession; half of the possession-taking was hunting; half of hunting was animal hunting; half
of animal hunting was aquatic hunting; all of the lower portion of aquatic hunting was fishing; half of
fishing was hunting by striking; and half of striking was hooking. And the part of hooking that involves a
blow drawing a thing upward from underneath is called by a name that’s derived by its similarity to the
action itself, i.e., it’s called draw-fishing, or angling – which is what we were searching for.”
7

Interestingly, while both Theaetetus and the Stranger agree at the outset that sophistry, similar to
angling, requires expertise, as the dialogue comes to a close and the sophist is finally defined, precisely
what expertise the sophist has, if any, is called into question. See Gill (2012, 143).
8

Soph. 223b
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given by the Stranger, we discover that the sophist could be seen not merely as (1) a
hunter of young men, but also as (2) one who deals in the commerce of exchange, i.e., a
traveling salesman selling his wisdom to those that would pay for his services.9 This kind
is then divided into two further kinds of salesman: (3) the stay at home retailer who sells
goods of his own, and (4) the salesman that sells goods purchased from others.10 For the
fifth definition we find the sophist defined as (5) a combatant, constantly engaged in
discussions of justice, and makes money doing so.11
Moving on to the sixth and seventh definitions, however, we see a break from the
mold, positing the expertise of sophistry not as an acquisitive art, but instead as a
separative and productive art, respectively. With these additional definitions, we begin
to see the problem that has arisen in the Stranger’s attempt in defining sophistry, i.e., the
multitude of definitions that are not individually dismissed as erroneous, thus adding to
the confusion as to whom the sophist truly is, and how it is that we might recognize him.
As Mary Louise Gill explains, the problem is twofold12. First, unlike the angler, whose
activity is easily observable, i.e., one could easily witness the angler fishing with a hook,
the activity of the sophist is somewhat complicated, as he seems to engage in a wide9

The second definition thus reads at 224c-d “We’ll say that the expertise of the part of the
acquisition, exchange, selling, wholesaling, and soul-wholesaling, dealing in words and learning that have
to do with virtue – that’s sophistry in its second appearance.”
10

Soph. 224a-d. See also Brown (2010,152). Socrates here is of course exempt from the charge
of traveling salesman (as he has practiced his art only in Athens, a point he makes explicit in the Crito via
his refusal to escape into exile to philosophize elsewhere). Interestingly, as to being a salesman of goods
purchased from others, while Socrates is similarly exempt from this charge on account of his never
charging for his services, there are occasions that Socrates does use the teachings he has acquired from
others, e.g., the account of love given to him by Diotima in the Symposium, as well as Aspasia’s funeral
oration he recites in the Menexenus,
11

Soph. 225c - This seems to resemble Socrates quite a bit, particularly in reference to the
discussions found in the Crito and the Republic Book I. However, as Taylor (2006) yet again rightly notes,
the combatant referenced here by the stranger is still compensated for their efforts.
12

Gill (2012, 144).
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variety of activities. As a result, it would seem that at the end of each “definition” we
are left not with the “essence” of the sophist, but only with what appears to be a singular
aspect of his various activities. Second, not only is the essential activity of the sophist
difficult to observe, but precisely what that activity would be is up for dispute, for, as is
evidenced by the seven varying definitions, there exist a multitude of opinions
concerning its nature.
And, for Gill, this problem comes to the fore with the addition of the sixth
definition, which, unlike the preceding definitions, places the art of sophistry not under
the acquisitive branch, but rather as a “separative” art form. As the Stranger notes, this
sixth definition defines the sophist as an individual who is able to purge others of their
false beliefs. We read:
They cross-examine someone when he thinks he is saying something though
he is saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these
people will easily scrutinize them. They will collect his opinions together
during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with
each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things
and in the same respects. The people who are being examined see this, get
angry at themselves, and become calmer towards others. They lose their
inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter
to hear or has a more lasting effect on them.13
Given this description, one is immediately reminded of Socrates and the elenchtic
method. And, while I will return to a more detailed analysis of the relationship between
Socrates and this definition later in this chapter, what is important to note here is the
impact that this wildly different definition has upon the attempts to pin down the sophist.
We have seen the sophist as a hunter, a salesman, and now a cleanser of souls. Given
these disparate definitions, a realization is made by the Stranger and Theaetetus that they

13

Soph. 230b3-c2
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have ultimately failed to recognize a crucial aspect of the sophist’s talent, one that
enables him to appear to be an expert in so many fields.
In response to this concern, the Stranger proposes the seventh and final definition
of the sophist. To do so, the Stranger inquires not into the nature of the activity itself, but
into the object of that activity. Specifically, the Stranger notes that the Sophists present
themselves to be wise in all lines of inquiry. However, as is made clear in the discussion,
to possess knowledge of everything is simply impossible.14 Therefore, the skill of the
sophist is not the possession of all knowledge, but the ability to produce the appearance
of wisdom as such.15 In effect, the sophist is merely an imitator of the wise man. Yet,
with this seventh definition a problem arises that requires addressing: As the techne of
the sophist seems to be the production of false appearances, how is such a production
possible?
The Seventh Definition and the Production of False Appearances
Non-Being as Difference
Regarding the production of false appearances, we find that the problem is as
follows: If the Sophist is defined as an individual who produces false appearances, then,
in effect, the sophist produces that which is not. Yet, it would seem to be the case that if
one is producing something, then they must be producing something that is. Thus, we are
seemingly presented with a contradiction, for how could something that is not, be
something that is?16 As the above conclusion seems to reduce to an absurdity, the

14

Soph. 233a-234b

15

Soph. 233c

16

Soph. 237e “Therefore don’t we have to refuse to admit that a person like that speaks but says
nothing? Instead, don’t we have to deny that anyone who tries to utter that which is not is even speaking?”
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Stranger is faced with the task of explaining how the Sophist is able to produce
something that is not.
As a possible answer to this concern, we turn to the recent work of Mary Louise
Gill.17 According to Gill, the Stranger explains that in instances of negation, e.g., “I am
not hungry,” the negation is in reference to the predicate term, not the subject.18
Understood in this manner, negation is not indicating the non-being, i.e., non-existence,
of the term in question, but rather as an indication of difference. Looking to the text of
the Sophist, we find the following explanation:
It seems then that when we say that which is not, we don’t say something contrary
to that which is, but only something different from it…It’s like this. When we
speak of something as not large, does it seem to you that we indicate the small
rather than the equal...So we won’t agree with somebody who says that negation
signifies a contrary. We will only admit this much: When “not” and “non-“ are
prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names,
or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are
applied.19
Understood in this way, negation is not to be considered an assignment of non-existence,
and as a result, we can avoid the Parmenidean problem of non-being20. To explain, if
negation is understood to imply opposites, then when we say that something is-not, we
are implying the thing’s non-existence, an implication that would result in the absurd
conclusion noted above. However, if negation is merely an indicator of difference as the
Stranger now suggests, then the negation is not in reference to the existence of the thing

17

Gill, M. (2012) Philosophos, Oxford: Oxford University Press

18

See Gill (2012: 158)

19

Soph. 257b3-c4. As is pointed out by Olga Alieva (2010: 87), this argument as made by Plato is
a precursor to Aristotle’s own argument against the Parmenidean problem of non-being.
See Sophistical Refutations 166b37-a7.
20

DK28B2 – Here Parmenides makes clear that he believes being and non-being to be opposites.
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itself, but rather, as an indication that the subject in question is different from the
predicate attached to it. In a sense, difference applied in this way serves as a sort of
categorizing tool, distinguishing various aspects of the subject in question, e.g., size,
shape, temperature, etc.21
To help clarify this understanding of difference, we look to the example as given
by the Stranger, i.e., the not-beautiful. According to the Stranger, when we are
discussing the not-beautiful, we are pointing to a thing that is different from the
beautiful.22 As the stranger explains:
Isn’t it in the following way that the not beautiful turns out to be, namely, by
being both marked off within one kind of those that are, and also set over against
one of those that are…Then it seems that the not beautiful is a sort of setting of a
being over against a being…Then, according to this account, is the beautiful more
a being than the not beautiful?23
The point being put forth by the Stranger here is that when we are discussing the notbeautiful, we are not expressing a form of non-existence, but rather a thing in and of
itself, i.e., the not-beautiful, as set against that from which it is different. In other words,
both the beautiful and not-beautiful “equally are.”24 For example, when we say, “The
Painting is not beautiful,” we are not merely distinguishing it from the Beautiful, but we
are further establishing that it has its own distinct qualities within the realm of

21

And, while the discussion of difference as non-being is here being investigated by the Stranger
to justify the final definition of the sophist as the producer of false-appearances, we find that this
understanding of non-being as difference serves another purpose, one absolutely essential to the new
methodology of collection and division itself, as it allows for the very distinctions between categories
required for division. See Morgan (1993, 100)
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Soph. 257d9-11
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Soph. 257e1-10
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aesthetics.25 Given this explanation, we can now see how non-being in the form of
difference does not imply the non-existence of that thing in question, but rather, implies
merely a difference from, albeit a difference within a specific field.26
The Making of False Statements
Thus far the stranger has managed to show the possibility of speaking of that
which is not, specifically in the form of difference. However, we recall that it is not
through the speaking of things that are not in general that defines the sophist, but rather
his ability to make false statements through the production of appearances, specifically
his ability to produce the appearance of wisdom. To account for this, we must first
investigate the possibility of making false statements.27 To begin, we admit that, in the
simplest of terms, insofar as someone is making a statement, they are making a statement
about something. And, we find that for Plato, in their most basic form all statements
consist of (1) a subject, that which the statement is about, and (2) a predicate, which
makes a claim regarding the subject in question.
Further, as the Stranger explains, if we merely list subjects in a row, e.g., “lion
stag horse”, or similarly list predicates, e.g., “walks runs sleeps,” we would be uttering
nonsense; words strung together void of any meaning. Thus, we must properly weave the
verbs with nouns,28 and it is only through this weaving of subject with predicate that we
produce meaningful speech. Thus, for Plato, to “say something” requires more than
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Gill (2012: 160-161).
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It should be mentioned that Gill (2012) pushes this line much further into an investigation of the
metaphysical implications of these conclusions. However, this line of argument is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.
27

This very succinct account is borrowed from Gill (2012, 167-168)
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Soph. 262d4.
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simply uttering words, but rather it requires organizing these words in such a manner that
they produce meaning. Thus, to reiterate the initial point, to speak is to speak about
something.
If we take this to be true, i.e., that all statements are necessarily about something,
then the question arises as to how it would be possible to make a false statement.29 In
other words, if one is to make a false statement, would it not be the case that such a
statement, being false, would necessarily be making a claim about that which is not?
Yet, as discussed above, to state that which-is-not is not as absurd as it may first appear,
especially when we recognize, as Plato has established, that any reference to that whichis-not is need not be a reference to non-existence, but rather as an indicator of difference
regarding the subject of the statement in question. So, to use the Stranger’s example
from the Sophist, if I were to say “Theaetetus sits,” we find that the assigned action of
“sitting” does correspond rightly to the subject “Theaetetus”. Thus, I would be making a
statement that is true, that is.
If, however, I were to say “Theaetetus flies,” we would find that the statement is
false, as, according to Gill, “flying specifies something different from what is the case
about Theaetetus (namely, sitting).”30 To fully unpack this point, we must revisit our
earlier discussion of negative predication, as it is here, in the discussion of false
statement, that its importance becomes most apparent. To begin, we note that for both
statements, i.e., “Theaetetus flies” and “Theaetetus sits,” we do have predicates and

29

For an exceptionally detailed account of false statements in the Sophist, see Hestir, (2003).
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Gill (2012, 167) Italics added. See also Crivelli (2012, 249-252). Here Crivelli takes a similar
line to Gill. He writes, “Plato’s solution assumes that a person who speaks falsely says what is not in that
he or she says about something what is not about it to be.” In other words, it is to say something about the
subject that is different from those things that are true of the subject.
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nouns to which these predicates are assigned, and further, both statements are making
claims, thereby meeting the requirements for speech as stipulated by the Stranger.
However, we find that, on the Stranger’s account, statements such as “Theaetetus sits”
are true because the predicate properly describes a singular action associated with the
subject. On the other hand, statements such as “Theaetetus flies” are false because the
predicate is not associated with the subject in any way, i.e., flying is a sort of action that
is different from the entire set of actions engaged in by Theaetetus. In other words, while
true statements need only reflect individual aspects of the subject to which they
correspond, when it comes to false statements, it must be clear that the claim being made
is universal, i.e., the claim made is entirely different from those things that are in relation
to the subject. 31
The Production of False Appearances
Having established non-being as a form of difference, a position which
consequently allowed for the possibility of false statements, all that remains for the
Stranger to address regarding the seventh definition of the sophist is the sophist’s ability
to produce false appearances.32 He begins by returning to their initial division of copymaking into two distinct types: likeness-making and appearance making. And, while
earlier attempts concerning where to place the Sophist resulted in confusion on account
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This distinction is an important one. See Frede (1992, 420) “Only thus can Plato say that the
false statement says, speaks of, something other than any of the things that are, that is, something other than
any of the things that are in relation to the given subject. For it is clear that it will not do simply to say of
false statement that it speaks of something other than it is. To be false it has to speak of something of any
of the things that are, namely in reference to the given subject.” For a contrary view on the issue of
universality of false statements, see David Keyt, “Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,” in Exegesis and
Argument, Phronesis, Supplementary Volume I, A. Mourelatos and R. Rorty, eds. (1973, 295), and J. M. E.
Moravcsik, “Being and Meaning in the Sophist,” Acta Philosophical Fennica 14 (1962, 69).
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Soph. 264c. We find here the Stranger noting that such a task should not be too troublesome,
especially considering the work they have just completed regarding the nature of statements and non-being.
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of issues regarding the possibility of falsity, with these issues now put to rest, the
investigation into the Sophist as a producer of false appearances can finally begin.33
First, however, we must focus on precisely what the Stranger means by an “appearance”.
Looking to the dialogue we find that the Stranger makes clear a connection
between two distinct types of judgment, i.e., our ability to affirm or deny. The first,
doxa, refers to the affirmation or denial of a particular statement silently thought of
within our own minds.34 Such judgments are rightly classified as our beliefs. Yet, as the
Stanger notes, there is another sort of judgment, phantasia, one that occurs not
exclusively internally, but in concert with sense perception.35 Thus, the stranger
concludes:
So, since there is true and false speech, and, of the processes just mentioned,
thinking appeared to be the soul’s conversation with itself, belief the conclusion
of thinking, and what we call appearing the blending of perception and belief, it
follows that since these are all the same kind of thing as speech, some of them
must be false.
In other words, just as we make judgments regarding the veracity of our own beliefs,
so too do we make judgments in matters of appearance, i.e., we affirm or deny the
truth of those things that appear to us, often times mistaking certain appearances as
true that are in fact not. So, just as when walking through the desert one might
mistakenly judge there to be water on the horizon (when in fact it is merely an
optical illusion), so too might one mistakenly deem statements made by others to be
wise, when in fact, quite the opposite is true.
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Given this understanding of the production of false appearances, the seventh and
final definition of the sophist finally comes into view. After once again utilizing the
method of collection and division to distinguish the sophist from other sorts of
appearance makers, the final definition is given as follows:
Imitation of the contrary speech producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the
appearance making kind of copy making, the word juggling part of production that
is marked off as human and not divine. 36
Put plainly, the sophist is the individual that, via the imitation of the wise man, produces
the false appearance that he himself is wise.
Critiques of the Seventh Definition
Considering the Sophist abruptly ends with the positing of this seventh definition
of the sophist, one could argue that Plato intended us to take this as the definitive
definition, thereby relegating the preceding six divisions as failed attempts to define a
notoriously slippery figure. Yet, as the positing of such a definitive answer to the chosen
line of inquiry is particularly uncommon for Plato, many scholars are reluctant to accept
this conclusion at face value. Granted, there are many differences worth noting between
the early so-called “Socratic” dialogues and those dialogues that make up much of Plato’s
later works, such as the Sophist or Statesman. For one, we find in the latter that Socrates
no longer holds sway in the discussion. In his place we find other characters, such as the
Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist and Statesman, or the Athenian Stranger of the Laws,
taking center stage.37 And, it is perhaps this Socratic absence that allows for another
36

Soph. 268a-c
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This point is especially interesting when we take into consideration that in the Theaetetus, the
dialogue immediately preceding the Sophist, with Socrates leading the conversation, the discussion ends in
aporia. It is only when he is replaced by the Stranger in the Sophist and Statesman that more conclusive
results are achieved. Given the connection between these dialogues, both thematically and dramatically, I
believe this distinction is indicative of a major shift for Plato regarding his understanding as to the
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major stylistic shift for Plato, for, while earlier works, e.g., the Euthyphro or Laches,
conclude in aporia, as we come to the close of Plato’s canon, we are presented with, at
least on the surface, conclusions resembling more definitive answers to the proposed
inquiries.38 Taking the Sophist again as our example, we find that the final exchange
between the Stranger and Theaetetus consists of the seventh definition of the sophist as
given by the Stranger followed by a resounding, single word of agreement from
Theatetus.39 Yet, despite this apparently conclusive ending that would seem to suggest
that we take this seventh definition to be the true definition of sophistry, many scholars
have taken issue with this claim, offering critiques against this line of thinking. And, as
the seventh definition plays heavily into my argument regarding how we are to
understand Socrates in the eyes of Plato, it is necessary to address these concerns in turn.
Different Sophists or Different Aspects?
One of the most compelling cases against the view that the Sophist provides us
with a viable definition of the sophist comes from Lesley Brown, who, in her article
“Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist,”40 poses the question as to whether the seven
definitions presented are intended as separate, but correct, definitions of the sophist41, or,

limitations of the Socratic method, and the importance of developing a methodology that produces positive,
as opposed to merely negative, results.
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One could argue that even in these later dialogues, we are still to take the conclusions given as
ironical, i.e., given to us plainly as to encourage rebuttals. However, given the slow shift we find over the
entire canon from the strictly aporetic conclusions of the early dialogues to the more definitive conclusions
(in particular those found in the Laws), more evidence would have to be given to support such an
interpretation.
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Brown, L. (2010) “Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist.” D. Charles (ed.), Definition in
Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 151-171.
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See Moravcsik, J. M. E. (1973), ‘Plato’s Method of Division’ in J. M. E. Moravcsik
(ed.), Patterns in Plato’s Thought , Dordrecht. P. 173
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are they to be viewed as a collective assessment, each individual definition gleaning
insight into a particular aspect of the sophist?42 Beginning with the latter, we find that
according to Brown, those that would argue in favor of the collective assessment model
of definition do so by claiming that just as there are “unique ways of identifying the
number two, so also with sophistry.”43
As a means of clarifying this point, we might take as our example the idea of a
“professor”. Granted, the idea of “professor” might be most readily identified with one
who conducts research. However, one might also think of the professor as a teacher, or
perhaps a mentor, etc. Through this example we might see that each of these
characterizations are properly associated with being a professor, albeit distinctly different
from one another. Yet, while examples such as these might make this view appear
viable, Brown, in my view, rightly notes that to say that Plato accepts the idea of
disparate, yet correct, characterizations of any term, let alone sophistry, would seem
contrary to his entire project up to this point. Indeed, we need only look to any dialogue
that precedes the Sophist to find evidence that would suggest that Plato’s understanding
of definitional knowledge requires that we find the essential characteristic; the defining
nature of the object of inquiry. Returning then to our example of “professor,” I would
argue that while it is true that the professor as a researcher is distinctly different from the
professor as a teacher insofar as, in these particular roles, they have entirely different

42

See Cornford, F. M. (1935), Plato’s Theory of Knowledge , London. And Notomi, N. (1999),
The Unity of Plato’s Sophist , Cambridge.
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Brown (2010, 158). See Moravcsik (1973, 166) “The existence of a plurality of divisions is in
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responsibilities,44 if we dig deeper (as Plato would have us do), we find that there must be
some essential characteristic that cuts to the heart of what it means to be a professor qua
professor, and it is that singular trait that should stand as the unifying aspect which unites
the supposedly disparate characterizations.
Yet, as I have made clear above, the Sophist is an atypical dialogue for Plato.
Given the drastic change in methodology, as well as Socrates’ absence, one could argue
that perhaps we should take these changes as signs that Plato’s own views of definition
have changed as well. However, even if we were to examine the Sophist in isolation
from the rest of the Platonic corpus, such a view remains untenable. The problem, as
Brown explains, arises as a result of glaring inconsistencies between the various
definitions.45 Now, one might make the case that the existence of inconsistencies
between the definitions does not preclude the possibility of each distinct definition
rightfully holding the title of sophist. Indeed, as the argument would proceed, each of the
seven definitions is not intended to define the sophist, but rather one of many aspects of
sophistry. Thus, on this view, the inconsistencies are not a detriment to understanding,
but rather necessary if we are to truly understand the breadth of the sophistic spectrum.
To limit ourselves to one single definition at the exclusion of others is to deny ourselves
complete knowledge.
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And, while I can appreciate the merits of this line of reasoning, it is ultimately
undone due to lack of textual evidence. We once more look to Brown, who explains
precisely how, despite appeals to the contrary:46
…Definitions 1–5 locate sophistry within acquisitive techne, while the seventh
proclaims it to be a branch of productive art. If, as the evidence suggests, all
divisions are intended to be exclusive, even where not exhaustive, it follows that
sophistry cannot be truly characterized both as a branch of acquisitive art and as a
branch of productive art….But are divisions intended to be exclusive?…the
evidence in the Sophist and Politicus strongly suggests that Plato envisages that one
and the same kind cannot appear on both sides of a given division. Consider, for
instance, the initial division of technai into acquisitive and productive. The very
definition of acquisitive art at 219c1–8 includes the clause ‘does not produce
(demiourgei) anything, but. . . . ’ In other words, to be acquisitive is to be not
productive.47
Thus, following Brown’s argument, once a division is made and followed, such as
placing the seventh definition in the productive branch as opposed to the acquisitive
branch, then we must see those kinds in the alternative branch as entirely distinct from
the kinds in the productive branch. To make clear the importance of maintaining this
exclusivity between branch divisions, we need only take the simpler example of defining
a particular species of animal, e.g., a dog.
To begin, one of the earliest divisions we must make in our efforts towards
defining a dog is whether or not the animal in question, in this instance a dog, is a
mammal or reptile or fish, etc. Upon concluding that a dog, based upon particular traits,
properly falls into the branch of mammal, it would be rather odd indeed to suggest that
there is also an equally correct characterization of a dog that is a reptile. As being a
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mammal precludes the possibility of one being a reptile, we can see more clearly that
Plato intends these divisions to indicate exclusivity. Indeed, if we were to end up with a
definition of “dog” that was situated within the reptilian branch, such a positioning
should alarm us to a mistake that has been made on our part, i.e., in our haste or
misunderstanding we failed to make the proper divisions.
Returning then to the issue of the inconsistencies between the varying definitions
of the sophist, we find that given Definitions 1-5 are situated in the acquisitive branch,
and definition seven is in the productive branch, and further, that any specific kind cannot
rightfully be located in two branches of the same division, it is not possible that Plato
could hold the position that each of the seven characterizations rightfully defines
sophistry. Thus, as Brown pithily concludes, “However tricksy a character the sophist is,
sophistry cannot have incompatible properties.”48
Given the problems that arise for the aspect model of the seven divisions, Brown
suggests that perhaps it is the case that each definition is not to be understood as various
aspects of sophistry, but rather as seven distinct definitions of those individuals who have
historically been labeled as a sophist. And, considering the cast of characters labeled as
such throughout Plato’s works, we find that this proposed theory is not without merit.
For example, Protagoras was labeled a sophist on account of his charging a fee in
exchange for his “knowledge” (Definition 4), whereas the battle-ready, combative
Thrasymachus from Book I of the Republic seems to perfectly embody the sophist of
Definition 5. Indeed, even Socrates seems to fit the mold of sophist under this multiple
definition interpretation, for upon first glance, Definition 6 seems perfectly modeled after
the Socratic method. Given these disparate characters all being branded with the title
48
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“sophist,” it stands to reason that each definition should be taken as its own distinct, yet
correct, definition of a type of sophist.
Despite the attractiveness of this interpretation, upon investigation we find once
again that it lacks textual support. To explain, we return to our original example of the
angler. We recall that in the attempt to pin down the precise definition of the angler, the
Stranger began with the most general field regarding professions, i.e., techne, which was
then divided into two respective branches, productive and acquisitive, with angling
falling into the latter. After following eight additional divisions down the branch, we
finally land on the angler, a specific definition that arose as a result of a branching
downward from the most general of categories. And, the same pattern has consistently
followed for each attempt at defining the sophist. And so, while it is true that the
Stranger began with the intention of defining the sophist at the outset, he did not begin
the process of division with “sophist” at the top, dividing down to discern the different
types that exist under that particular heading. As Brown notes, “…sophistry is
consistently treated as the endpoint of a division, as something to be divided down to, not
as a generic kind whose branches are to be discerned.”49 To say otherwise would be to
misunderstand the nature of the method of division itself, a mistake that would result in
the listing of generic possible descriptions of those individuals who could be called a
sophist, as opposed to a definitive conclusion to our inquiries regarding the definition of
the sophist.
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Considering these issues, I would suggest that a more plausible solution to the
problem of the multiple definitions can be found through an examination of the text
itself,50 for, if we look to 232a, we read:
Well then, suppose people apply the name of a single sort of expertise to someone,
but he appears to have expert knowledge of lots of things. In a case like that don’t
you notice something’s wrong with the way he appears? Isn’t it obvious that if
someone takes him to be an expert at many things, then that observer can’t be seeing
clearly what it is in his expertise that all of those many pieces of learning focus on—
which is why he calls him by many names instead of one?”51
In other words, the mistake is not in the division process, but in our own haste in
labeling. To be sure, each of the original six definitions concluded with “the sophist” as
the endpoint. However, each of these definitions could also be labeled in other ways,
such as a hunter (Def. 1), a salesman (Def. 2 -4), a Combatant (Def. 5). As such, we
have not yet gotten to the heart of sophistry in these definitions, for we have not yet
found that one thing that it possesses as set against all other things.
This interpretation, i.e., that the multitude of definitions is the result of human
error, is further bolstered by the very nature of the subject whom they seek. To explain,
if we can take the seventh definition as the true definition of the sophist, i.e., that the
sophist is that individual who is, through the production of false appearances, able to pass
himself off as a wise man, then, would it not be the case that, given his “talent” of
presenting himself as that which he is not, we might have trouble distinguishing what it is
that he is? Put plainly, of all the individuals we might attempt to define, would it not be
the sophist, by his very nature, who would emerge as the most difficult to pin down?
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The Seventh Definition as the Correct Definition
Are we then to take the seventh definition as the “true” definition of the sophist?
Such a view is favored by a number of scholars, in particular Cornford (1935) and
Notomi (1999).52 And, while I am inclined to accept this view, those who favor this
interpretation vary widely in their approach, and thus, a quick overview is warranted.
Beginning with Cornford, we find that while the seventh definition will ultimately
emerge as the true definition, he argues that the preceding six divisions are not to merely
discarded as failed attempts towards definition, but rather as an essential step towards the
success of the final division. Cornford suggests:
…these first six definitions actually, though not formally, serve the purpose of a
Collection preliminary to the seventh. They bring us before the types to be
surveyed before we can fix upon the really fundamental character of Sophistry.
The name Sophist has been loosely applied to various classes…The early Divisions
analyze and characterize each of these types and so provide a survey of the field
within which we must discover the really fundamental trait, the generic form that
will finally yield the correct definition of Sophistry.53
Thus, as the Stranger realizes that the word “sophist” has been used to describe a wide
range of persons and/or activities, and, if the effort towards proper definition is to be
achieved, it is important to examine each of these different sorts of persons, as it is only
when this task is achieved that one would be in the proper position to discover the
unifying trait which remains subtly hidden under the surface. And, as we move through
each of the definitions, we find that each seems particularly pointed towards particular
individuals within the Platonic corpus. In Divisions I- IV, those divisions that associate
52
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sophistry with the hunter or salesman, we are reminded of those caricatures of Protagoras
and Gorgias, men who, despite their fame and fortune, are ridiculed and belittled by
Socrates in the dialogues that bear their names. Division V, the contentious disputer,
once more reminds us of the likes of Thrasymachus, the man who joined the discussion
of justice not to discover the truth (as perhaps was Glaucon’s intention following his
departure), but rather simply to win the day.54 Division VI, of course, points towards the
practice of elenchos, and thus, to Socrates, which, for Cornford does not present a
problem, for again, these preliminary definitions are not necessarily true attempts towards
definition, but merely an effort to round-up, as it were, all those that have been labeled as
such. Cornford thus concludes, “Division VII is the only one that goes to the heart of the
matter and starts from the right genus. It defines, not any particular class of persons, but
a whole tendency of thought, the essence of sophistry.”55 For Cornford then, while the
six divisions leading up to the final definition are necessary to the goal of identifying the
sophist, we should not take their individual traits to be seen as a part of sophistry itself.
Notomi (1999), for his part, while essentially in agreement with Cornford
regarding the truth of the seventh definition, presents a more subtle interpretation, one
which takes a sort of middle-ground between Cornford and those whose viewed
Divisions 1-5 as integral parts of sophistry itself.56 On Notomi’s view, while the seventh
definition should be taken as the “true appearance” of the sophist, “each of the first five
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definitions remains a true appearance seen from a certain viewpoint.”57 In other words,
the earlier definitions are, in a sense, connected to the art of sophistry. Notomi explains
this position as follows: If an individual is not trained in the method of division, then they
are not in the proper position, i.e., they do not have the proper point of view to see things
clearly. As a result, a particular thing may appear to them to be similar to something
else, e.g., a hunter of young men to that of a sophist, and yet, given their disadvantageous
point of view, they mistake the appearance for the thing itself. In simpler terms, on
Notomi’s view, each of the first five definitions is “true” only from a certain perspective,
though not, as is the seventh definition, true in an unqualified sense.
And, as evidence to this position, Notomi recalls the discussion on the appearance
of beauty from 236b4-7, which reads:
Now, what do we call the thing which appears to be like a beautiful thing, because
it is not seen from a beautiful viewpoint, but is not like what it is said to be like, for
those who can see such a large thing properly? Since, while appearing to be like it,
it is not really like, don’t we call it an apparition?
Drawing from this, Notomi concludes, “Although an apparition appears beautiful to
those who see it from a bad viewpoint, those who have good sight can tell its apparent
likeness from the true likeness.”58
Yet, it seems to me that in using this passage as evidence, Notomi hoists himself
on his own petard. To explain, Notomi’s argument as I understand it unfolds as follows:
(1) The majority is not properly trained in the method of division, and as a result, cannot
properly discern apparent similarities, or likeness, from true likeness. (2) Just as it is
difficult to clearly make out the objects in a room that is not well lit, a lack of dialectical
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training puts individuals at a disadvantage in their ability to properly identify kinds. (3)
The activities described in Def. 1-5, i.e., the hunting of young men, selling of
virtue/knowledge, and combative argumentation, are all activities that the sophist
potentially engages in. (4) From this disadvantaged point of view, the “appearances of
the sophist” in Def. 1-5 appear true in a certain way, as they each “represent at least some
aspects of the sophist’s art.” (5) Thus, while the appearances of Def. 1-5 remain “true”,
only the seventh definition is the “true appearance” of the sophist in the unqualified
sense.
If my reading of Notomi is correct, however, I find it to be particularly
problematic, especially when we take into consideration the textual evidence he himself
supplies to support his conclusions. To explain, when examining the passage at 236b4,
we find the Stranger explaining that the thing in question, which is not beautiful, is only
seen as beautiful because it is not seen from the proper viewpoint. In other words, the
thing appears to be beautiful, when in fact it is not. Thus, the appearance of beauty is
false. If this is true, then I cannot see how Notomi can claim that the appearances of the
sophist in Def. 1-5 are true.
As Notomi argues, the appearances of the sophist in Def. 1-5 are true, but only
from a “certain viewpoint.” Further, this “viewpoint” as Notomi describes it, is the view
taken by those who are untrained in the dialectic, i.e., who are not properly equipped to
discern similarities between kinds. Thus, if (1) the appearances of the Def. 1-5 are true
only if they are taken from a “certain viewpoint,” and (2) this “viewpoint” is, by
Notomi’s own admission, the view seen by the person who is unable to properly assess
that which they are surveying, then, would the result not be the same as the untrained
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person who believes the thing to be beautiful when in fact it is not? In other words, if the
“truth” of the appearances of Def. 1-5 is dependent upon the observer analyzing the
appearance from an admitted position of ignorance, then how could those appearances be
considered true? At best, it would seem to me that one could claim that, given the limited
point of view, such appearances might be true, and that, with proper training, this truth
could eventually be determined. However, as Notomi makes the much harder claim in
asserting that they are true, his position remains problematic.59
Thus, once again we find that any attempt to include definitions 1-5 into a
working definition of sophistry ultimately fails, nuanced as it may be. As a result, it
would appear as if the seventh definition of sophistry should be taken as Plato’s final
view on the matter, understood in isolation from all previous definitions.
The Problem of Sophistry as a techne.
In the above treatment, I have argued that any attempt to include the original five
divisions in a working definition of sophistry is untenable, including Notomi’s hybrid
interpretation. Further, if the seventh definition is the correct definition, and the sophist
is that individual who produces false appearances, then it would stand to reason that he
would appear to us as so many things that he is not. In fact, it would be his very nature to
do just that.60 However, despite the strength of this position, one additional problem
arises for this interpretation that is difficult to overcome, i.e., the problem of expertise.61
As Gill expresses the problem, “The final definition seems complete but is marred in a
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crucial respect, because the sophist has the mere appearance of expertise.”62 To explain,
we recall that the seventh definition of sophistry is the end result of numerous divisions
that begin with the division of techne itself. And, as each species derived must be a part
of the genus above it, as well all preceding divisions on the branch, placing the seventh
definition within the productive branch of techne would be to claim that sophistry as such
would itself be a techne.63 The question then arises as to whether or not this seventh
definition meets the standards of techne as given by Plato.
Gill, looking back to the discussion of techne in the Gorgias, concludes that such
a definition of sophistry cannot meet the rigid standards Plato sets for techne. Recalling
the discussion on whether oratory64 is a craft65, we find Socrates explaining to Polus that
he does not believe oratory to be a craft at all, but rather a “knack” (tribe). He continues
on to say it is a sort of flattery, a method used to appease those that would listen, lulling
them into satisfaction, which, in turn, makes them amenable to suggestion. And, yet,
while the orator speaks as if he knows what is best for his audience, for Socrates it is
precisely knowledge of this sort that he lacks. We read at Gorgias 465a:
…because it guesses at what’s pleasant with no consideration for what’s best. And
I say that it is not a craft, but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of
whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it is unable to state the
cause of each thing. And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a
craft.
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The problem for the seventh definition then, as Gill notes, is that in the 5th branch of the
division66 the Stranger distinguishes between those who know what they are imitating,
and those who imitate out of ignorance. Given that the seventh is a species that falls
under the branch of the ignorant imitator, the question arises as to how this individual,
one who does not know that which they imitate, and thus, does not meet the requirements
Plato places upon the possession of a craft, could rightfully be situated as a species of the
productive techne.67 Given his proposed ignorance, it would seem that he should be
disqualified entirely from the very branch in which he is placed.
A further critique against positing sophistry as a craft arises from Brown, who
adds that in addition to the possession of an account, any craft must also be goal
oriented.68 For instance, the goal of the ship builder is to build a ship, just as the goal of
the doctor is to promote health in their patients. And, on Brown’s view, sophistry lacks
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such a goal. To explain this point, we must recall that we are looking for that essential
characteristic, the singular thing that distinguishes sophistry from all other technai. Yet,
if we comb through the preliminary definitions: Definition 1, the hunter, Definitions 2-4,
the salesman of his wares, Definition 5, the argumentative combatant who seeks glory or
fortune, in none of these do we find a goal that is unique to sophistry. In fact, with all
save Definition 5, the goal is singularly the acquisition of money, with Definition 5
differing only in that we must add the desire for glory as well.
Turning our attention then to the seventh definition, Brown argues that similar
issues arise. We recall that, according to the final definition, the sophist is the individual
who produces false images, specifically the beliefs instilled in his audience that he is
wise. However, Brown writes:
“…producing deceptive images is not his goal. His goal is not, de dicto, to create
false beliefs; rather it is to create a belief in his own wisdom. That the belief is a
false one follows from the fact the sophist is a sham wise person. Deception is the
means to his goal, but not his goal. Once this is spelled out, it becomes clear why
sophistry is not a genuine techne.69
To fully illustrate Brown’s position here, let us look to the counter example of the
medical doctor. The medical doctor is in possession of a particular kind of knowledge,
specifically how to promote health. Further, the goal of medicine is to promote health in
individuals. This example thus illustrates that for any activity to be considered a techne,
the knowledge must properly align with the goal. Granted, there can be additional
benefits, such as wages, that one receives for their efforts, but, as we read in Rep. 345d15, we need to distinguish such additional benefits from the craft itself. Looking to the
text:
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Then this benefit, receiving wages, doesn’t result from their own craft, but rather, if
we were to examine this precisely, medicine promotes health, and wage-earning
provides wages; house building provides a house and wage-earning, which
accompanies it, provides a wage; and so on with the other crafts. Each of them
does its own work and benefits the thing it is set over.
The point here is that Plato is quite clear that each techne must be associated with a
particular goal unto itself. Any additional goals must be considered as external to the
craft itself. So, (1) while medicine might carry with it compensation in the form of
wages, and, (2) while the individual who seems to be practicing medicine might do so for
those wages, in doing so he is acting not as a doctor, but as a wage earner. To practice
medicine in the true sense is to do so for the health of the patient.
With this evidence in place, Brown’s argument appears quite compelling. If we
are to take the seventh definition of sophistry as the true definition, then, Brown argues, it
cannot be considered a true techne since it fails to meet this requirement. To explain, the
ultimate goal of the sophist of definition seven is to be perceived of as a wise man.
However, his “skill” is that he is able to produce the false appearance that he is in fact
wise. To accomplish his task, he utilizes deception, fooling his audience into believing
him to be something that he is not. Thus, Brown notes, “Deception is the means to his
goal, but it is not his goal.”70 If his goal were strictly to deceive his audience, then
perhaps this point would be moot. However, as his goal is not to deceive, but rather to be
considered wise, Brown argues that we must consider his skill set as a means to another
end, and just as the person practicing medicine only for money is not truly practicing the
craft of medicine, Brown argues that we must similarly disregard sophistry as defined in
Definition 7 as a true techne.
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Yet, while I agree with Brown that expertise as defined by Plato does require a
proper goal, I ultimately find issue with her argument, specifically regarding her view
that the activity of sophistry is not properly aligned with the correct goal. To explain, we
recall Brown’s claim that, “His goal is not, de dicto, to create false beliefs; rather it is to
create a belief in his own wisdom….Deception is the means to his goal, but it is not his
goal.”71 Thus, on Brown’s argument, the goal of the sophist is to produce the belief in
others that he is a wise person, accomplishing this through the production of false
appearances, specifically in the form of false statements. Granted, his goal is not, as
Brown notes, to create false beliefs in general, but to create the very specific belief that
he is wise.
However, the problem with Brown’s argument is that the sophist as described
does not deceive his audience with general false statements, but rather specifically
tailored false statements designed for him to appear wise and thus to promote the belief
that he is wise. It is important to remember here that, according to this definition, the
sophist of Definition 7 knows he is not wise.72 Considering this awareness, he is not
producing false appearances in order to produce the true appearance that he is wise, as
such a true appearance would have to be true. And, considering the sophist knows that,
or at the very least fears that, he is not wise, his goal is still to produce the false
appearance that he is wise, doing so through the production of false statements
(appearances) that make him appear to be something that he is not, i.e., the wise man. As
such, while I am largely in agreement with Brown’s general argument regarding the
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definition of sophistry, I do not find her argument regarding the failure of the seventh
definition to be compelling.
Yet, despite the weakness of Brown’s case, I do agree with Gill that, (1) given the
admitted lack of knowledge the sophist of Definition 7 is professed to have, coupled with
(2) Plato’s requirement that all those with an expertise be able to provide an account
thereof, it seems to be the case that Definition 7 cannot rightly be situated under the
genus of expertise. In response to this dilemma, I would still contend that we should take
the seventh definition of the sophist as the true definition of sophistry. I make this claim
for the following reasons: (1) As has been shown, all attempts to include any of the other
definitions into an amalgamate definition have failed, including Notomi’s more nuanced,
hybrid attempt. (2) While Gill’s point regarding expertise requiring an account is one
that admittedly presents considerable difficulty, we might perhaps take this to be Plato
subtly showing us, (without directly telling us), that, similar to his views from the
Gorgias, sophistry is not a techne, and yet, the very trouble with sophistry, and perhaps
its most dangerous quality, is how closely it resembles one.73 Indeed, if the seventh
definition is correct, and the sophist is the person who, like the magician, produces the
appearance of that which is not, would it not stand to reason that, given their ability, we
would be likely to mistake sophistry as a techne? Indeed, this is precisely the danger of
sophistry. And, given this danger, the need for philosophy is imperative, for, if we
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ourselves are not wise enough to recognize the imposter, then how could we ever know
for sure that we are not being fooled?74
Is Socrates a Sophist?
I have thus far argued that we should consider the seventh definition of the sophist
to be Plato’s true definition of sophistry. With this argument in place we are now ready
to ask the question laid out at the beginning of this chapter: Is Socrates a Sophist? As
many scholars have noted the similarities of many of these definitions to the character of
Socrates, the question demands to be addressed. And while I ultimately conclude that
Socrates is not a sophist, others have taken the contrary position. To prove my position
then, I will look to confront the work of C.C.W. Taylor, who strenuously argues that the
Sophist offers evidence to suggest that Plato did consider Socrates to be a sophist, albeit
of the sort unique unto himself.75 Proceeding then through the seven definitions once
again with Socrates in mind, we begin with the Definition 1, which, we recall, describes
the sophist as the hunter of prominent young men. Taylor notes that while this may be
construed as a nod towards figures such as Protagoras,76 we recall that in the very
dialogue that shares Protagoras’ name, it is Socrates who is accused of precisely this sort
of hunting!77 And, while accusations by unnamed characters78 should not be blindly
taken as evidence, if we turn our attention to the Theaetetus, we find Socrates himself
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inquiring to Theodorus about those “young men that are thought likely to become
distinguished.”79 And so, while Socrates is portrayed as a hunter of young men, he is so
portrayed in a qualified sense, namely, that he is interested not in their money, but rather
their intellect.80
It must be noted that this distinction is paramount, for as we recall in the
Stranger’s account of definition one, the sophist as the hunter of young men does so not
for their intellect, but for their money.81 And, while Taylor argues that the professional
aspect of a particular skill, i.e., whether or not one is paid, is irrelevant to the activity
itself, in this instance I must disagree. To explain, I do agree with Taylor that in certain
examples, e.g., playing the guitar, whether or not one is paid does not impact the activity
of playing the guitar itself. So, on Taylor’s view, since both Socrates and Protagoras
engage in the activity of hunting prominent young men, that one is paid and the other is
not does not provide sufficient evidence to exclude Socrates from the charge of sophistry
as such.82 Yet, while Taylor is correct in this sense, what he fails to recognize is that
sophistry is being defined here as a techne, which, as I have argued above requires both
an account (knowledge), as well as the proper goal. And, in the description of the
sophist of Def. 1, we find that wage earning is not merely an ancillary characteristic, but
the final division. It is that he hunts for money that distinguishes him from all other
kinds. We read at 232a:
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Stranger - “But does not the kind of wage earning that actually earns money,
though it claims to deal with people for the sake of virtue, deserve to be called a
different name? What name? Try and tell me.”
Theaetetus – “It’s obvious. I think we have found the sophist.”
Therefore, (1) Given the goal of the hunter of Def. 1 is money, whereas for Socrates it is
the acquisition of knowledge, and (2) the goal of any techne is essential to its definition,
contra Taylor we absolutely can distinguish Socrates from the sophist of Definition 1.
In his examination Def. 2-4, Taylor again speculates on the similarities between
Socrates and the sophist as depicted therein, though, again, given that these definitions
explicitly depict the sophist as a merchant, Taylor seems more willing to admit the
inherent discrepancy between such individuals and Socrates. Similarly, Taylor admits
that Def. 5, the oral combatant, resembles Socrates insofar as he is typically associated
with such activity. However, once more, Taylor readily admits that despite the
similarities between the sophist of Def. 5 and Socrates, given the former is paid for his
services, whereas Socrates is not, we must distinguish Socrates accordingly.
Following the brief dismissal of the preliminary definitions, Taylor finally moves
on to the infamous 6th definition.83 As this definition is one of great importance for my
argument as a whole, we see it again below in its entirety:
They cross-examine someone when he thinks he is saying something though he
is saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these
people will easily scrutinize them. They will collect his opinions together
during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with
each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things
and in the same respects. The people who are being examined see this, get
angry at themselves, and become calmer towards others. They lose their
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It should be noted that Taylor’s numbering of the definitions differs from my account (which
follows the ordering of Gill (2012) and Brown (2010), amongst others). In Taylor’s text, there are only two
types of merchants, not three, thus explaining the numerical differences. For the purposes of this paper,
however, I will refer to the definitions as discussed by Taylor in the order I have prescribed.
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inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter
to hear or has a more lasting effect on them.84
Given this description, we need only recall any of the exchanges between Socrates and
his interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues to recognize the similarities between this
description and the individual who practices the elenchos. These obvious similarities,
coupled with the more positive outlook on the practice described85, leave little doubt that
this sixth definition is meant as a direct nod to Socrates.86 Perhaps in recognition of this
similarity to the revered figure of Socrates,87 the Stranger is quick to reassess the figure
described, noting that such sophistry does not deserve to be associated with such a person
as described by the sixth definition. Yet, when faced with the similarities between this
individual and sophistry as understood thus far in the discussion, the Stranger reluctantly
acquiesces, but not completely, noting that such a practice is, “nothing other than our
noble sophistry.”88
Given this labeling, Taylor concludes that the sixth definition, one which clearly
depicts the Socratic elenchos, is:
…properly conceived as sophistry of a kind; a very different kind, clearly, from
that practiced by Protagoras or Prodicus, but a kind of sophistry for all that. That is
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Soph. 230b3-c2
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Taylor draws our attention to the cleansing aspect of the definition, in particular the care for the
souls of others, a characteristic unsurprisingly lacking in all other definitions.
86

While there is a fair level of scholarly dispute regarding whether or not the 6th definition is to be
taken to mean that Plato considers Socrates to actually be a sophist, most scholars generally do agree that,
at the very least, the sixth definition is referring to Socrates. For arguments against the view the Def. 6 is in
reference to Socrates, see G.B. Kerferd (1954), and the response to Kerferd by Trevaskis (1955). While I
ultimately side with Trevaskis, Kerferd’s argument is intriguing to say the least.
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And, while it would be humorous if this reassessment of the sixth definition as “noble” was
made by the Stranger only out of politeness to Socrates (considering he is supposedly still standing
amongst them), I highly doubt such is the case.
88

Soph. 231b7
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to say, when it comes to classifying the activity of sophistry, it is more illuminating
to place it on the sophistic side than on the philosophical. 89
Before attempting to justify this claim, Taylor first moves on to the seventh and final
definition, an individual that Taylor likens to a magician; a description that seems to fit
quite nicely for the individual that, through the production of false appearances, produces
the false beliefs in the minds of his audience. Taylor also asks that we pay special
attention to the particulars of the sophist of Def. 7, specifically that he, “uses short
speeches in private conversation to force the person talking to him to contradict
himself.”90
With this established, Taylor posits that for Plato, this method of argumentation,
i.e., the exposure of inconsistencies in belief via the elenchos, is one of the distinctive
marks of sophistry, and, as such, Plato’s argument, “must be that ‘noble sophistry’ is
more like sophistry tout court than it is like philosophy, since it shares one of the most
distinctive marks of sophistry…while it does not share the most distinctive mark of
philosophy.”91 Immediately following this claim, Taylor admits that he does not know
with certainty what the “distinctive mark of philosophy” is. Thus, he suggests that:
…the answer must be that philosophy is comprehensive knowledge of the nature of
reality, which, the practitioner of purgative elenchos depicted in the dialogues, i.e.,
Socrates, by his own confession lacks.92
Yet, as Taylor asks, if Socrates is not a philosopher, then how, if he lacks the necessary
knowledge, is he able to excel in the purging of the false beliefs of others? In other
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Taylor (2006: 164)
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Soph. 268b2-3
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Taylor (2006, 166-167)

92

Taylor (2006, 167)

93

words, for Socrates to determine which beliefs are inconsistent, would he not need some
knowledge? Given Socrates’ consistent disavowal of knowledge, that he is so successful
in this practice is mysterious, to say the least. In answer to this puzzle, Taylor posits that
Socrates is to be considered a magician, i.e., “someone possessed of unaccountable
powers”.93
Thus, Taylor concludes:
Socrates’ success in guiding self-critical thought to the elimination of false beliefs
had then to be ascribed not to philosophy as he had previously believed but to a
special sort of ‘divine dispensation’. Socrates is then a magician, an individual with
an unaccountable power of divining the truth and leading others to it, and by the
same token no longer, by Platonic standards, a philosopher, but a very special, and
very noble, sophist.94
Saving Socrates from Sophistry
Socrates is not a Sophist
While I find Taylor’s argument to be fascinating, I ultimately cannot agree with
his conclusion that we must consider Socrates to be a sophist, regardless of how “special”
we are to consider him as such.95 Many objections to this argument are three-fold: First,
given the argument against the problem of an amalgamate definition I have constructed
above, that Taylor takes the 6th and 7th definition in concert raises concern. Second, I
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Taylor (2006: 167) See also Nehamas (1998: 85-91)
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Taylor (2006: 168) See Also D. Frede (1996: 223). Frede notes that the sixth definition “seems
to represent something like Plato’s last word on Socrates.” And, it is this image that forms the basis of her
argument regarding Socrates in her article on the character of Socrates in the Philebus. This will be
discussed in Sect. 2.5.2.
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I should also note here that I do agree with him on other aspects of his conclusion, specifically
that Socrates’ ability is bestowed upon him by “divine inspiration”. However, I believe that Taylor, along
with Burnyeat (1977) (who also made similar intimations), do not push this line far enough. The 4th
chapter of this dissertation will thus pick up where I believe they left off, offering a full defense of the idea
that Plato, in the later dialogues, attributed this “unaccountable” ability of Socrates to divine inspiration. If
I am correct, then, while his ability may be “unaccountable” in the Platonic sense, it is not left
unexplainable.

94

have also argued that for Plato, the definition of any kind is not determined by multiple
unessential characteristics, but rather a singular essential trait. As a result, even if we
allow the association of definitions, it must be one trait that links them all as sophists, not
multiple characteristics, as Taylor suggests. Third, Taylor’s argument hinges on the point
that Socrates is closer in kind to the sophist than philosopher on account of (1) the
elenchos being one of the “distinctive marks of sophistry,” and, (2) that the distinctive
mark of philosophy is a “comprehensive knowledge of the nature of reality”96 On this last
point, I will first acknowledge that a major goal of the Sophist is to distinguish between
sophistry and philosophy, and, as such, these considerations on the nature of philosophy
could and should contribute to our understanding of sophistry. However, considering
Taylor’s labeling of Socrates as a sophist is dependent upon these “distinctive marks”
that sophistry and philosophy bear, his lack of an account regarding his position on
philosophy is particularly problematic.
While I will take each of these objections in turn, I will note that, considering that
I have addressed the first two objections in detail leading up to Taylor’s position, these
initial objections will be brief. That said, let us address first the problem of multiple
“sophists”. As we recall, it is not possible that there be multiple accounts as to what it
means to be a sophist, as each of these kinds represented in the varying definitions, while
similar in certain aspects (hence their mislabeling), also exhibit contradictory qualities.
And, the problem of inconsistency is particularly problematic in this instance, for, unlike
Def. 1-5 which all stem from the acquisitive branch of techne, the 6th and 7th definitions
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A point which Taylor posits with no argument. Granted, he does indicate that he is not certain
as to what philosophy is in a definitive sense, however, considering his labeling of Socrates as sophist is
dependent upon these “distinctive marks” that sophistry and philosophy bear, his lack of an account is
particularly problematic.
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are entirely disparate in that they fall under the separative and productive branches,
respectively. And, while this may at first seem inconsequential, if we take a different
example, for instance, the difference between a wolf and a komodo dragon, the severity
of the problem becomes clear.
To explain, for both animals, we begin by dividing down from the original
category of “Animal”. Upon doing so, we find that the very first division distinguishes
between “mammals” and “reptiles,” with wolves falling under the former, and kimodo
dragons under the latter. And, while it could be argued that, at the end of our divisions,
there are a lot of similarities, e.g., both animals are quadrapeds, both animals have lungs
(as opposed to gills), both animals are hunters, etc., considering our goal was to define
“wolf,” not “4 –legged animals that hunt,” to say that we should consider a komodo
dragon to be of the same species as wolf is preposterous, regardless of their similarities.
Taking this into consideration, we must apply the same standards to the sophist. And,
given the disparity between the separative branch (Def. 6) and the productive branch
(Def. 7), it is simply incorrect to say that they are both sophists, despite the similarities
that may seem apparent.97
A similar critique could also be offered for my second objection, i.e., that the
sophist would have multiple “distinctive marks”. To explain, I will concede that any kind
will, of course, have a variety of aspects and traits that we could rightly attribute to that
kind in question. Returning to the example above, wolves do exhibit behavior that is
characteristic of being a wolf. Wolves hunt in packs (unlike panthers), each wolf pack
97

See Soph. 219c1-8. I will also add that, at the very least, it is incorrect to say they are both
sophists using the evidence as given by Plato. In other words, if we were to define sophist under a
particular genus, we could, possibly, then divide that definition further into types. However, since Plato
has the sixth in seventh definition in different branches of the genus of techne, such an option is not
available.
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has a mix of males and females (unlike lion prides, which have only one male per pride),
etc. However, while these aspects could correctly be used to distinguish wolves from
other animals in a very general sense, these characteristics are not what define a wolf as a
Wolf. As argued above, definitional knowledge in the Platonic sense does not allow for
different kinds of the thing in question in the unqualified sense, as such openness would
lead to a level of relativity. So, while we might say that there are different kinds of
wolves in the qualified sense, e.g., Grey wolf, Timber wolf, etc., we must recognize that,
for Plato, that these different sorts are still called wolves is dependent upon each distinct
kind of wolf sharing in the essential trait of what it means to be a Wolf, whatever that
trait may be.
Returning then to the problem of the sophist and the allowance of multiple
“distinctive marks,” the problem presents itself clearly. On the one hand, if we say that
there is no essential trait to sophistry, but rather a collection of distinctive traits that allow
for proper identification, then would this not open the door for false-positives regarding
who is a sophist? In other words, returning to the example of the wolf, if we are not
depending upon an essential characteristic to determine what is or is not a wolf, then how
would we ever determine the difference between a wolf or a dog?98 On the other hand, if
we admit that there must be a essential quality that defines sophistry, then it matters not
how many similarities Socrates shares with the sophists, for, as long as he lacks that
essential trait that makes a sophist a Sophist, just as a dog is not a wolf, neither could
Socrates be a sophist.99
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See Soph. 231a5. Plato himself discusses the difficulty of determining between these two types,
and the importance of distinguishing between the two.
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See Soph. 264d9-265a1
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The Problem of Philosophy as Knowledge.
In addition to the problems listed above, I find further issue with Taylor’s
exclusion of Socrates from the practice of philosophy, a feat accomplished through
Taylor’s defining of philosophy as the possession of a “comprehensive knowledge of the
nature of reality.” Now, to begin, I must first admit that I am in agreement with Taylor
that, at this stage of Plato’s thought, Socrates cannot be considered a philosopher in the
unqualified sense. However, before I give my argument in defense of this point, I must
first address the problem with Taylor’s definition of philosophy, which, I will argue, is
untenable and thus cannot be used in his argument against Socrates.
We recall that Taylor defines philosophy as having a comprehensive knowledge
of the nature of reality. And, to be sure, such a definition would seem to fit into a
traditional Platonic understanding as to the goal of philosophy.100 The problem with
Taylor’s claim, however, is that his definition of philosophy requires that the philosopher
be defined solely on the basis of his possession of knowledge.101 The problem with such a
limited definition in this context is that Taylor does not indicate how the philosopher
obtains such knowledge. Such an omission of the philosopher’s methodology is of
particular significance when we consider that it was on account of Socrates’ methodology
that Taylor labeled him a sophist. In other words, if it were the case that Taylor labels
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Indeed, if we look to the divided line of the Republic (509d-513), it would seem that the
ascension to the understanding of the Forms would be the bar of success against which we measure the
philosopher.
101

As an aside, it must also be noted that, even if the person in possession of knowledge was a
proper definition of the philosopher, that such a person could attain comprehensive knowledge is itself
problematic. Not only do we find at Soph. 233a the Stranger dismissing the possibility of a person
knowing everything (the problems of which could be extended to knowing everything about any particular
subject), but further, considering the topic in question, i.e., the nature of reality, that knowledge of such sort
is even knowable is a point of contention. For discussion on the distinction between human and divine
knowledge, see Vlastos (1995, 61-63).
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Socrates a sophist on account of his lack of knowledge regarding the nature of reality,
then it would make more sense to juxtapose against this definition of sophistry the
requirement of such knowledge if one is to be considered a philosopher. However, as
Taylor uses the methodology of Socrates as the determining factor in his sophistry, for the
accusation of sophistry to stand, he needs to equally give an account of the philosopher’s
method as well.
To explain, we recall that philosophy, on Taylor’s view, requires only that the
individual possess knowledge on the nature of reality. As such, the question of
methodology is of critical importance here, for, if the philosopher is measured only on his
comprehensive knowledge of the nature of reality, then one must ask: What title do we
give to those who are on their way towards the acquisition of such knowledge? Given
Taylor’s use of methodology to condemn Socrates, he seems to believe that there is, at
the very least, a wrong way to achieve such knowledge. Given this implied statement, it
would stand to reason that there must then be a right way, i.e., a correct methodology that
is used by the individual on their way to becoming a philosopher.102 However, as Taylor
makes no such claims regarding the correct methodology that must be used towards the
attainment of the required knowledge, then it is not possible for him to say conclusively
that any method, including the elenchos, could not, given enough time and skill,
eventually allow for the procurement of this knowledge. And, while I have argued
extensively against the ability of the elenchos to acquire such knowledge, since Taylor
sets no such limitations, he is unable to disqualify Socrates as a philosopher on such
grounds, as he leaves open the possibility that Socrates could, via the elenchos,
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I find this problem particularly Ironic then, as Taylor himself makes special note of Socrates’
unaccountable talent for discerning what is false, without himself knowing what is true!
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eventually obtain knowledge pertaining to the nature of reality.
Is Socrates a Philosopher?
Yet, despite the problems that arise from Taylor’s interpretation of Plato’s
conception of philosophy, with the possibility of Socrates being a sophist now undone,
the question does remain: Does Plato consider Socrates to be a philosopher? While we
may be inclined to answer in the affirmative, since the promised dialogue on the subject
of the “philosopher” was never delivered,103 Plato’s later standards for philosophy remain
frustratingly uncertain. As a result of this uncertainty, a rigorous scholarly debate has
emerged regarding Plato’s understanding of philosophy. And, given the attention paid by
Plato in the later dialogues to the method of division, it is of no surprise that this debate
centers around the role this new method plays (if any) in the work of philosophy.
On the one hand, there are those who believe that the advent of this methodology
indicates a sea change in Plato’s thought regarding philosophy itself, suggesting that this
new tool introduced to us by Plato is to be considered the method of the true
philosopher.104 On the other hand, there are those who make a softer claim,
acknowledging the importance of the new method of division, while also recognizing that
it is not the method of the philosopher, but part of the philosophical process to be used
with other methods such as the elenchos or the dialectic of the middle dialogues.105
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Soph. 217b2 – Gill (2012, 5) suggests that this omission on Plato’s part in not accidental. By
withholding the final piece of the puzzle, by denying us the “answer,” Plato continues on as he always has,
showing us the way without simply handing us the answer. As Gill writes, “Plato uses the devious strategy
I have attributed to him because, by making his audience work very hard to dig out his meaning, he fosters
in them (and us, his modern readers) a skill in reading and a competence in using dialectical techniques and
developing new ones.” See also, Frede (1996, 150).
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See Morgan (1990, 99)
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Finally, there are those, such as Gilbert Ryle, who argue the contrary, dismissing the
method of division as nothing more than a rudimentary tool designed, “for the special
benefit of the philosophically innocent novices who were at that moment getting their
freshman’s training in the ABC of thinking.”106 And, while I cannot help but admire the
zeal with which Professor Ryle unabashedly rejects of the method of division, given the
evidence to the contrary, I cannot agree with his conclusion. Therefore, since we must
consider the method of division to be, at the very least, a necessary component of Plato’s
later understanding of philosophy, when we consider Socrates’ lack of engagement with
the method of division, Plato could not have considered him to be a philosopher in the
unqualified sense.107
Defending the Method of Division
In order to defend the thesis that we must consider the method of division as a
necessary component of philosophy as understood in the later dialogues, I look to the
work of J.L Ackrill, who, in his article, “In Defence of Platonic Division,” takes on the
method’s most vocal opponents, Gilbert Ryle.108 And, while I must commend Ackrill on
105

Gill (2012), Ackrill (1997) It should be noted that determining precisely what the “dialectic” of
Plato’s middle period entails is a matter of debate for scholars. For recent work on the issue, see Benson
(2016).
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Ryle (1966, 139)
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I am inclined to make this softer claim here, agreeing with Morgan (1990) that perhaps we
must distinguish between “proper philosophy” and “philosophy in general.” It is only the former, however,
that could rightfully be called the method of a true philosopher.
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Ackrill (1997), Ryle (1939) and (1966) - Ryle’s full objection summarized by him as
follows: “First of all it can only be applied to concepts of the genus-species or determinable-determinate
sort, and it is not concepts of this sort that in general, if ever, engender philosophical problems. And,
next, most generic concepts do not subdivide into two polarly opposed species; usually there are
numerous of a genus or subspecies of a species. And the question whether a sort divides into two or
seventeen sub-sorts is, in general, a purely empirical question. So nearly any case of a philosopher’s
operation by division could be upset by the subsequent empirical discovery of sorts lying on neither
side of the philosopher’s boundary lines. And finally, there is room for almost any amount of
arbitrariness from the selection from the ladders of sorts en route for the definition of a given
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his thorough response to Ryle’s many objections, for our purposes here I will focus on
Ryle’s most pressing objections which can be paraphrased as follows: (1) That the
method of division forces dichotomous division upon kinds.
(2) As the method of division is limited to genus-species determinations, it cannot be
applied to philosophically interesting problems.
Beginning with Ryle’s first objection, i.e., that the method forces dichotomous
divisions, we find that there is a significant stock of evidence to the contrary of this
claim. Granted, the majority of the divisions we have seen thus far in the Sophist do
seem to follow a pattern of bifurcation. However, we need not look far at all for evidence
to the contrary to this, e.g., the division techne into three distinct branches: acquisitive,
separative, and productive. Yet, despite this immediate (and prominent) example, as well
as other similar examples to be found in the Philebus,109 the Phaedrus,110 and others,
Ackrill notes that we also find textual evidence that Plato does not demand dichotomous
division, but rather recommends it for the purposes of clarity. Looking to the Philebus
16d, we read:111
We ought, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and
concept….there are many tolerable and no perfect ways of defining most of the sort-concepts that we
employ.
A chain of summa genera, genera, species, sub-species and varieties is not itself a chain of
premises and conclusions. But what is more, it cannot in general be deductively established or
established by reduction ad absurdum. The work of a Linnaeus cannot be done a priori. How could
Plato who knew exactly what question-answer arguments were really like bring himself to say, if he did
say, that the philosophically valuable results of such arguments are kind-ladders?” (136)
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Phil. 16c2-3 – Sound is divided into three kinds
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Phaed. 238a-c – Madness is divided into multiple kinds.
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Ackrill additionally points to less direct evidence from the Phaedrus (265e), which Ackrill
suggests, “stresses the crucial importance of following the natural articulation of the item under
examination. However, upon examination of this passage in particular, while I agree with Ackrill that there
is no explicit demand that the divisions be dichotomous, the examples Socrates gives do seem to suggest
such bifurcation. E.g., that body parts “naturally come in pairs,” and that we ought to “cut up each kind
according to its species along its natural joints,” which, would seem to suggest dividing by two. As such,
while I agree with Ackrill’s argument in general, this evidence in particular is somewhat troublesome.
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search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then if we have laid hold of that,
we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of their being two,
otherwise three or some other number of forms.
Furthering this point, Ackrill draws from additional evidence in the Statesman 287c:
It is difficult to cut them into two…so since we cannot bisect, let us divide them as
we should carve a sacrificial victim into limbs. For we ought always to cut into the
number as near as possible to two.
Thus, while it is indeed the case that the majority of divisions are dichotomous, we can
clearly see that there is no requirement that they be as such. However, as the goal of the
method of division is to define a kind in the most precise way possible, it would make
sense that we ought strive to make as few divisions as possible, for, as Ackrill explains,
“a slapdash division into a lot of species will very probably cause important similarities
and groupings to escape notice.”112
In contrast to his first critique, Ryle’s second objection, i.e., that the method of
division is not equipped to handle philosophically interesting problems, presents a more
pressing challenge. For Ryle, we need only look to the Sophist as evidence to this claim,
for, once the method of division has failed to capture the sophist, the Stranger halts the
process, recommending that the need to first determine if false-statements are possible, a
determination which required the discussion of non-being as discussed in section 1 of this
chapter. Given the discussion of non-being is not undertaken by the method of division,
and, given the importance that the concept of non-being plays for Plato’s larger
metaphysical system, Ryle argues that, when it comes to truly important philosophical
concepts, the method of division simply falls short.113
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While I agree with Ryle that the division would seem ill-equipped to handle the
problem of non-being as discussed in the Sophist, such shortcomings do not seem to me
to be grounds for dismissal for the method as a whole, let alone evidence that it is unable
to handle important philosophical problems.114 To suggest this is to have an
exceptionally narrow, and perhaps even anachronistic, understanding as to what would
qualify as “philosophically important” for Plato. To explain, when we look back to
dialogues such as the Gorgias, Protagoras, Menexenus, Republic, or even as far back as
the Apology, we are inundated with warnings about the trappings of sophistry. One
consistent theme that rings true in each of these dialogues is that the sophist is not only
dangerous, but cunning as well. And, this latter quality makes him all the more
dangerous, as it is through this crafty charm that he is able to convince others that he is
wise; that he knows what is right.115 Given the harm that such individuals can inflict, that
we should be able to recognize them is of the utmost importance, as such individuals pose
a direct threat to the success of the polis. So, while defining the sophist for what he is
may not share the grander metaphysical or epistemological ramifications as discovering
the form of non-being, to say that such a determination is unimportant is to say that Plato
did not consider matters of politics to be philosophically important. And, while there is
an argument to be made that Plato’s interests shifted over the course of his life,116 given
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Ackrill offers an alternative critique than my own here, suggesting that Ryle does not take into
consideration the fungible nature of many Platonic terms.
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See Men. 235a-c - “Each time, as I listen and fall under their spell, I become a different man
– I’m convinced that I have become taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden...And this high and
mighty feeling remains with me more than three days. The speaker’s words and voice sink into my ears
with so much resonance that it is only with difficulty that on the third or fourth day I recover myself and
realize where I am…This is how clever our orators are.”
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the consistent attention given to politics throughout the entirety of the Platonic corpus,117
it is entirely anachronistic to suggest Plato thought otherwise.
This is not to say that Ryle’s objections should be entirely dismissed, for, I would
allow that there are certain philosophical problems that are perhaps better handled by
other methodologies, and, to be sure, we might take the discussion of non-being in the
Sophist as evidence to this claim. However, despite its ineffectiveness in certain areas,
Plato provides ample evidence to support the claim that he came to consider it to be an
essential part of philosophy as a whole.
However, while I do admit that Plato does, on occasion, resort to varying
methodologies depending upon the direction of the discussion, it does not then follow
that Plato considers the method of division as unable to handle more metaphysical
inquiries. Indeed, we find an ample supply of compelling evidence in the affirmative
position taken by Plato regarding division. Beginning with the dialogue that has
occupied much of our discussion here, the Sophist, we find the Stranger describing the
method of division as follows:
And what name shall we give to this science? …Have we stumbled unawares upon
the free man’s knowledge and, in seeking for the Sophist, chanced to find the
Philosopher first?
THEAETETUS – How do you Mean?
STRANGER – Dividing according to Kinds, not taking the same Form for a
different one or a different one for the same – is this not the business of Dialectic?
… and the man that can do that discerns clearly one Form everywhere extended
through many, where each one lies apart, and many Forms, different from one
another, embraced from without by one Form; and again one Form connected in a
unity through many wholes, and many Forms, entirely marked off apart. That
means knowing how to distinguish, Kind by Kind, in what ways the several Kinds
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A point made all the more clear when we consider the Laws.
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can or cannot combine.118
Following this thorough description of the method of division, the Stranger concludes
that we should, “assign this dialectical activity only to someone who has a pure and just
love of wisdom,” and further that, “…We’ll find that the philosopher will always be in a
location like this…”119 Given this evidence, it is difficult to see how Plato could not
have associated division with dialectic. Further, as we can see from the laudatory
remarks issued by the Stranger, the description of this method is one very closely
associated with the determination of what is, or, in other words, Being itself.120
And, while the praise for the method as found in the Sophist is perhaps not as
effusive in other dialogues, we do indeed find evidence in the Statesman as well.121
Looking then to that text, we read:
But what most people, I think, fail to realize is this: some of the things there are
have sensible likenesses, easy to recognize, and these can be indicated without
difficulty when anyone wishes in reply to a request for a logos of such a thing to
avoid trouble and indicate them easily without a logos. But the greatest and most
important things have no images fashioned with clarity for men; to content the
enquirer’s mind there is nothing to show which can be fitted to a sense perception
as to give adequate satisfaction. This is why we must practice the ability to give
and receive a logos of each thing. The incorporeals, the finest and greatest of
things, are clearly shown only by a logos and in no other way; and it is for the sake
of them that all our present discussions are taking place.122
As we can see from this passage, it is clear that Plato intends for the method of division
118

Soph. 253c-e. Cornford’s (1935) translation as used by Ackrill (1997)
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Soph. 254a7 - The Stranger notes that the individual described, ”uses reasoning to stay near the
form being.” See also Gill (2012, 241)
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Ackrill also draws from both the Phaedrus 265d-e, and Philebus 16b-17b for further evidence
to support his argument. In both instances, we clearly see Socrates praising the method of division, in both
instances attributing a divine element to the methodology.
122

Statesman 285d-286b – Italics added for emphasis.
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to be utilized for the “greatest and most important things”. Granted, we do find the
Stranger recommending that division be used on easier examples, e.g., weaving.
However, as Ackrill notes, the reasoning behind this recommendation is to prepare the
budding dialectician for those matters that are of greater importance, inquiries that, as we
have found, are significantly more challenging in scale.123 Once again we find that, based
upon textual evidence to the contrary, Ryle’s argument that division need be excluded
from philosophy on the grounds of its ineffectiveness falls flat.
Conclusion
Drawing from the evidence above, I would argue that we must conclude that the
method of division needs to be considered a necessary part of philosophy as understood
by Plato in the later dialogues. Thus, while we have saved Socrates from sophistry, if we
are to make the claim that he is a philosopher, then we need to show that Socrates not
only practiced this method, but did so successfully.124
To begin, we recall that in these later dialogues, Socrates has largely been
removed from view, taking a back seat to the Stranger, and, it is the Stranger that guides
us deftly through the complicated process of division in both the Sophist, as well as the
following Statesman. Yet, if we turn our attention to the Philebus, we find Socrates once
again at center stage, not only guiding the discussion, but doing so with a “new”
methodology, one which Socrates refers to as the “divine method”. And, in his
123

Ackrill (1997, 98) I would add that we see this notion at work in the Sophist, as the Stranger
begins with the Angler, which is only done to prepare Theaetetus for the investigation into Sophistry, a
difficult task, to be sure, and one that carries significantly more philosophical import.
124

Theoretically, anyone could use the method of division. However, as was evidenced in our
discussion of the Sophist, only the true dialectician, one trained properly in the methodology, will be able to
use it properly. And, it is only this person, the individual that is, “capable of adequately discriminating a
single Form spread out all through a lot of other things,” (Soph. 253d4-7) that can rightfully be called the
Philosopher. (253e3-5)
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description, we find Socrates not only professing his love for this efficient methodology,
but further confessing that it, “has often escaped me, and left me behind, alone and
helpless.”125 And, while admissions of ignorance or perplexity are nothing new for
Socrates, scholars such as Dorothea Frede have argued that the context of this admission
in particular carries a deeper meaning.126 To explain, we find that when faced with the
challenge of differentiating between various types of pleasures and knowledge, Socrates
suggests that such a task is best tackled through a new method which, recalling an earlier
passage I have cited above, Socrates describes as follows:
We ought whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and
search for it, for we shall find it there contained; and if we have laid hold of that,
we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being two,
otherwise for three or some other number of forms: and we must do the same again
with each of the ‘ones’ thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one
that we started with is a one and unlimited many, but also just how many it is.127
As we can clearly see, this method that Socrates describes as a “gift from the gods” is in
fact the method of division as we find in the Sophist. Yet, as Frede notes, despite the
praise he has bestowed upon it, Socrates very quickly abandons the new methodology,
explaining that they need not continue on in such fashion, as he has been struck with
divine inspiration, gifted by the gods with new information that will allow them to move
forward in their discussion of pleasure and knowledge.128 This bizarre turn of events
rightly prompts Frede to question Plato’s motives here, for, if Plato was to have the
discussion move forward not through the division process, but from Socratic inspiration,
why would he go through the trouble of having Socrates not only introduce the method,
125

Phil. 16b6-7

126

D. Frede (1996, 232).
Phil. 16d

127
128

Phil. 20b3-5. This point will be addressed in significant detail in Chapter. 4 of this dissertation.
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but clumsily attempt to use it as well?129 And, according to Frede:
The answer must be that Plato is very concerned with clearly demarcating what
Socrates is not doing here. Although he is following some of the injunctions of
dialectic proper, he is not going to treat the problem in the way that a real expert
would have to deal with it. He is not presented as a master dialectician.130
Further, not only does the Philebus present Socrates as lacking the skills necessary to
properly engage in division, when Socrates does contribute to the progress of the
discussion, he does so through borrowing ideas from others,131 or simply stating ideas as
facts while asking Protarchus to approve as verification132 Given this evidence, just as the
Sophist went through great pains to distinguish the sophist as set against the philosopher,
I would argue that we must similarly understand the Philebus to be Plato’s attempt to
distinguish Socrates from his new understanding of the true philosopher.
Yet, if this is true, if the Philebus serves the double purpose of expressing Plato’s
view that Socrates can no longer be considered a philosopher, then what are we to make
of Socrates? In answer to this question, in the final chapter of my dissertation I will
present the argument that, as the skill of Socrates cannot be accounted for by philosophy
or sophistry as defined in the late dialogues, Plato must have attributed his ability to
divine inspiration.
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D. Frede (1996, 229-232)
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D. Frede (1996, 233)
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Phil. 44c

132

Phil. 31b8 – See also D. Frede (1996, 38 n. 38) Frede notes that on account of these varied
measures, “It is impossible to show in detail the means by which Socrates brings about his results.”
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Chapter 3: Socrates and Divine Inspiration in the Early Dialogues
The Problem of Socratic Piety
While I have argued that the elenchos ultimately fails in the establishment or
uncovering of the definitional knowledge, we find that such failures do not faze Socrates.
Instead he remains steadfastly committed to the utilization of reason to accomplish the
very goals that elude him.1 Yet, while Socrates’ unflinching faith in the rational process
is not in question, it is also quite clear that Socrates was not averse to accepting help from
more unconventional sources2, i.e., divine influence. To the modern eye, this distributed
reverence for both reason and the divine may seem problematic, as religion and reason
are most often set in diametric opposition.3 For Socrates, however, religion and reason
are not at odds, but rather emerge as two sides of the same coin, seamlessly working in
tandem towards the acquisition of knowledge.4 And, looking to the early dialogues we
are indeed presented with an array of evidence in support of this position: (1) Socrates’
1

Vlastos (1991, 157) cites Cr. 45b. “Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man
who is persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which appears to me to be the best when I reason
about it.”
2

Interestingly, given the religious climate of the time in Athens, an appeal to the divine would be
entirely conventional. For an account of religion in Socratic Athens, see Vlastos (1991: 157-78),
Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 182-87), and McPherran (1996, 19-28). Vlastos however, suggests that the
religious views of Socrates are distinctly unconventional, as Vlastos argues that Socrates invents a new
understanding of the divine, one of benevolent, omniscient gods as opposed to the more
anthropomorphized fallible gods of the Homeric/Hesiodic tradition. For a counter argument to Vlastos, see
Wildberg (2002). While Wildberg agrees with Vlastos that Socrates’ conception of the divine is distinct
from the traditional view, such an understanding of the gods predates Socrates.
3

While the list of philosophers who express antagonistic views of faith and religion is perhaps too
long to list, we find support for this hostile dichotomy from the religious perspective as well. For example,
we might look to the works of Kierkegaard, notably in Fear and Trembling, wherein it is clearly expressed
that reason stands in the way of faith. Considering Kierkegaard’s position that it is through faith alone that
one is able to experience freedom, such a hindrance is especially problematic.
4

On Vlastos view (1991, 157 n. 3), Socrates must understand religion and reason to be in “perfect
harmony,” a point that has merit considering it was precisely in adherence to divine command that Socrates
began to practice philosophy in the first place. See Ap. 33c.
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consistent reference and acquiescence to the instruction of his daimonion, referred to as a
divine voice5 or sign,6 one which consistently warns him against performing actions that
would be to his detriment, (2) his adherence to the commands of the gods received via the
oracle, an obligation he equates with the duties of a soldier standing a post,7 and (3) his
recognition of the divine gifts as exhibited in other individuals, specifically divinely
inspired artists who seem to have access to the truth, despite being unable to provide an
account for such abilities.8
Yet, despite this evidence, some scholars are quick to dismiss these more
fantastical leanings of Socrates as instances of irony, i.e., tongue-in-cheek references to
the supernatural designed to appeal to the irrational minds of the majority.9
Interpretations in this line see Socrates as a staunch atheist, a hyper-rationalist entirely
void of any religious feeling or belief.10 Martha Nussbaum, for one, argues that Socrates
is so dismissive of religious belief, that his claim that the “unexamined life is not worth
living” can be seen as a condemnation of religion in its entirety, for, as religious lives

5

Ap. 31d1-3 and Phdr. 242c2

6

Ap. 40b1; Eud. 272e2; Phdr. 242b9.

7

McPherran (1996, 209) See Ap. 33c4-8; 23b; 37e-38a

8

See Ion 534a, as well as Laws 719c.

9

Nussbaum (1985, 234) See also McPherran (2005: 14) McPherran notes that even Aristotle fails
to mention Socrates’ daimonion, not the sincerity he attributes to the prophetic nature of dreams. He
further notes that Rhetoric 1419a6-19 is evidence that Aristotle would have been aware of the daimonion.
From Aristotle we read, “For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods,
asked whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went
on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again
said yes, Socrates rejoined, ‘Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without
at the same time admitting that the gods exist?’”
10

For the arguments on this position, see Nussbaum (1985, 234-235) and Nehamas (1987, 304-

305).
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“lack a rational basis,” then such lives are not worth living.11 Further, in response to
Socrates’ consistent appeal to his daimonion, a Socratic practice that would seem to
undermine her anti-religious position, Nussbaum suggests that in these moments Socrates
is not appealing to a god in the proper sense, but to reason itself, explaining that, “what is
really happening is that reason itself is being made a new god…” and that any reference
to the daimonion is but an, “…ironic way of alluding to the supreme authority of
dissuasive reasoning and elenctic argument.”12 And, according to Nussbaum, this
supplanting of the gods with reason is so obviously true, that Meletus or “any Athenian”
would immediately recognize Socrates’ not-so-hidden agenda. On Nussbaum’s
interpretation then, Socrates is indeed guilty of the charge of impiety, for, in declaring
reason as the divine, he would not only be denying the gods of Athens, but of all divine
entities.
Alexander Nehamas, for his part, offers a different line of critique, arguing
against Socrates’ acceptance of the perfection of divine wisdom. For Nehamas, while
Socrates does unquestionably listen to his daimonion, he exhibits uncertainty in other
matters, specifically the message given to him via the oracle.13 For instance, while it is
true that Socrates attributes his mission’s provenance to the god’s command, he does not
accept the oracle’s message blindly, and instead proceeds to investigate the veracity of
the oracle’s claim that he is the wisest of the Athenians.14 As Nehamas explains, “It is

11

Nussbaum (1985,234)

12

Nussbaum (1985, 234)

13

Nehamas (1987, 304-306) – Here Nehamas is directly critiquing Kraut (1981: 549) who claims
the contrary, i.e., that Socrates exhibits absolute submission and obedience to the god.
14

Ap. 21c1
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only after his many conversations with the politicians, the poets, and the artisans that
Socrates came to see that the god might have been right to proclaim him wise on the
grounds that he, at least, was aware of his ignorance.”15 Thus, Nehamas concludes, while
we may be presented with the appearance of Socrates’ adherence to divine command,
when carefully examined we discover that, despite appearances, Socrates only does what
he has determined, through reason alone, to be right.
The result of the arguments above is that of a secularized Socrates. However,
while such a religion-less figure may be appealing for a contemporary worldview,16 one
which quite often pits philosophy and religion at odds with one another, such an
understanding of Socrates is not only anachronistic, but is also not supported by textual
evidence, a point of contention which has not gone unnoticed in recent scholarship.17
Stefan Buttner, for one, notes that when we look to the disciples of Plato, e.g., Philip of
Opus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle, they “refer to Plato’s statements on enthusiasm without
a suggestion that there is any doubt about their seriousness.”18 This consistent lack of
dismissal regarding issues of inspiration by contemporaries of Plato ought encourage us
to be cautious when asserting our contemporary views upon these classical works.
15

Nehamas (1987, 305)

16

McPherran (2005, n.7) McPherran notes that there have only been twelve records regarding the
daimonion in the Philosopher’s Index from 1940-2004. See also, Todd (2001) and Joyal (2000)
17

See Vlastos (1991, 158), as McPherran (1996, 6). Upon examining the religious climate of 5th
century Athens, one wherein religion is inextricably interwoven into every aspect of life, to suggest that
Socrates would be so absolutely and obviously dismissive of this, despite his words and actions suggesting
the contrary, is extremely problematic. While a detailed account of the religion in 5th century Athens is
beyond the scope of this paper, for a detailed account see McPherran (1996: 19-28, 144-160) as well as
Dodds (1951).
18

Buttner (2005, 112) – Buttner supports his claim through the following evidence: (1) On Philip
of Opus and Xenoncrates see Heinze (1892: 92-96), (2) For Aristotle see EE 8,2 as well as Maritou (1994,
83-100) and Schirren (2005). (3). On Xenophon see Berry (1940, 42-48) See also McPherran (2005,14)
Xenophon Mem I 5-9, wherein we find Socrates depicted as sending his student enthusiastically to oracles.
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Gregory Vlastos, as well, argues vehemently against those who would oppose the idea of
a religious Socrates. For Vlastos, given the extensive evidence in support of Socrates’
acceptance of the supernatural, to ignore these references to the religious affinities of
Socrates would be akin to a, “surgery which kills the patient.” In other words, the
religious aspect of Socrates is so ubiquitously interwoven into Plato’s representation of
the character as a whole, that to deny this is to deny the entirety of Plato’s testimony on
the life of Socrates.19 On Valstos’ view, the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues
“subscribes unquestioningly”20 to a belief in divine beings, entities with power and
wisdom that far exceeds our own.21 In fact, it is precisely because of this unabashed
belief that Socrates has dedicated himself to a life of philosophy at all. We read in the
Apology:
To do this (philosophy) has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means
of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever
ordered a man to do anything. This is true, gentleman, and can easily be
established.22

19

Vlastos (1991, 158) also adds that such excision of the religious would also preclude our use of
the testimony of Xenophon as well. And, this point is well taken, especially when considering evidence
such as is found at Mem. IV.8.1, wherein we find that Socrates’ daimonion not only warns Socrates what
not to do, but further, providing positive information as well. Thus, we find in Xenophon a presentation of
Socrates that lends even more credibility to the wisdom of the gods, let alone their involvement in Socrates’
life. See also McPherran (1996, 8) and Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 177-179).
20

As Vlastos (1991, 158 n. 6) notes, never once in the Socratic dialogues (or the works of
Xenophon, for that matter) does Socrates question the existence of the gods.
21

Indeed, the gap between human wisdom and divine wisdom is a point of consistent concern for
Socrates, as, on Socrates view, only the gods are truly in possession of wisdom. (Ap. 23a5-6) And, given
Socrates belief that the wisdom is directly linked to virtue, if the gods possess true wisdom, then it follows
that they must be truly virtuous. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 179). Vlastos (1991, 164) argues that
the assignment of infinite wisdom does not necessarily lend itself to virtue. As Vlastos explains, “It may
only lead one to conclude that god transcends the difference between good and evil, and, with Aristotle
(Nic. Eth. 1178b8), that to ascribe moral attributes to god is to demean him.” Vlastos attributes Socrates’
association of wisdom with right action as a product of his singular focus upon practical knowledge, a
narrow view that allows for such oversight on Socrates’ part.
22

Ap. 33c4-8
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In this evidence, we thus find a direct link between philosophy and religion, as it is only
because of the latter that Socrates claims to engage in the former.
Further, if we take these explicit moments of reverence for the divine as ironical,
as Nussbaum insists we must, a more serious problem arises. As Mcpherran rightly
notes:
…to reread them all as sly tongue-in-cheek verbal pandering or as simply
allegorical in intent would be to employ a principle of interpretation that, once
loosed upon the texts, would no know end, rendering every Socratic utterance
fatally indeterminate.23
Granted, the excision of the religious side of Socrates would result in a cleaner, easier to
understand individual, one that fits squarely into the philosopher’s box. Yet, Socrates is
not clean24, nor simple, nor easily understood.
Thus, if we are to avoid the slippery slope McPherran warns us against, we must
accept Socrates as he is presented, i.e., a man who values reasoned argument but also
acknowledges the superiority of divine wisdom. In the following then, I will argue in
favor of this thesis, doing so through an analysis of Socratic theology and Plato’s account
of divine inspiration throughout the early dialogues. In doing so, I aim to prove that we
must recognize Socrates as an individual who not only acknowledged the validity of
divine revelation, but as one who utilized such dispensation, in concert with reason, as an
effective, if not necessary, aspect of his philosophical inquiries.25

23

Mcpherran (1996, 7)

24

A point which can similarly be applied to his physical appearance as well. We need only think
of Symposium 215b, wherein Socrates is described as a resembling a Satyr, a mythical beast that is as far a
cry from beauty as one could imagine. See also Theaetetus 143e.
25

McPherran (1996, 9-10, and Ch. 4)
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Socratic Theology
Socrates as a Religious Skeptic
If Socrates is in fact guilty of the charge of atheism, then any reference made to
matters of divine intervention are, at best, allusions to reason itself veiled in religious
phrasing26, or, at worst, empty gestures, i.e., mere trickery used as a ploy to convince the
ignorant masses.27 Thus, before we investigate the specifics of divine inspiration in the
early dialogues, as my argument is contingent upon Socrates taking such divine
intervention seriously, it is necessary to first prove that Socrates was in fact religious, or,
at the very least, was not an atheist.
To begin, we recall the introductory remarks of this chapter, wherein it was noted
that contemporary depictions of Socrates quite often hail him as a champion of reason,
i.e., an individual who epitomizes the philosophical life, always seeking the truth even
under pain of death. Indeed, one could argue that Socrates applies this doubt to religion
as well, as he often does not seem to fit the standard of the devoutly faithful Athenian
citizen.28 We need only look to the Euthyphro, wherein he is depicted as a critic of the
Homeric tradition. For example, we find that, when responding to Euthyphro’s
description of the gods as capable of violent and vengeful action, Socrates notes:
26

Nussbaum (1985, 234)

27

One might argue that we find evidence of this dishonest hand-waving in the Apology 26a-d,
wherein we see Socrates manipulating Meletus to alter the charge of “not honoring the gods of the state” to
atheism. For Vlastos (1991, 166 n.41), Socrates orchestrates this manipulation of the charges to insulate
himself from facing the original charge, of which, on Vlastos’ view, he is unequivocally guilty. See also
Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 184) and McPherran (1996, 130-142).
28

Again, there existed a variety of religious sects and influences in Athens at the time, including,
but not limited to the Homeric tradition, the practices of Eleusian cults, Orphism, and Pythagoreanism. See
McPherran (1996, 26-27) And, while the existence of these varying traditions do complicate the matter of
understanding the traditional religious practices/beliefs of 5th century Athens, for our purposes here, we
need only concern ourselves with the charges Socrates faced, i.e., failing to honor the gods of the city,
and/or atheism.
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Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why I am a defendant in the case, because I
find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods, and it is likely the
reason I shall be told I do wrong.29
Yet, while this admission of uncertainty may appear as direct evidence that Socrates has
issue with the traditional gods, held on its own this uncertainty does not require that we
consider Socrates to be offering a critique of religion as a whole. In fact, given Socrates
singular interest in matters of ethics,30 such a critique would be beyond the scope of
Socrates’ philosophical purview, a point Plato himself makes quite clear in the
Phaedrus.31 In response to Phaedrus’ inquiry as to Socrates’ belief in the myth of Boreus,
Socrates replies as follows:
Actually it would not be out of place for me to reject it, as our intellectuals do. I
could tell a clever story: I could claim that a gust of the North Wind blew her over
the rocks where she was playing with Pharmaceia…Now, Phaedrus, such
explanations are amusing enough, but they are a job for a man I cannot envy at all.
He’d have to be far too ingenious and work too hard—mainly because after that he
will have to go on and give a rational account of the form of the Hippocentaurs, and
then of the Chimera; and a whole flood of Gorgons and Pegasuses and other
monsters…Anyone who does not believe in them, who wants to explain them away
and make them plausible by means of some rough ingenuity, will need a great deal
of time.32
Now, to be sure, if we look only to this first half of Socrates’ response, one could
interpret such a reply as Socrates mocking the myth as a whole, pointing out the

29

Euth. 6a4-6

30

See Aristotle, Metaph. 987b1-2 “But Socrates, occupying himself with ethical questions, and
not at all with nature as a whole…”. For an extensive argument in favor of (1) the necessary distinction
between the Socrates of Plato’s early period and the Socrates of Plato’s middle period, and (2) that the
Socrates of the early period is solely interested in matters of ethics, see Vlastos (1991, Ch. 2, 3, and 4).
31

See Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 188-189) While I agree with Brickhouse and Smith that
caution must be exercised when using middle and late dialogues to justify claims in the early dialogues,
given the context of this passage, i.e., that it is direct relation to similar critiques made in the Euthyphro
regarding his trouble accepting certain aspects of Homeric mythology, I believe such use to be appropriate
here.
32

Phdr. 229c5-e4.
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impossibility of providing a rational account of such inventive fantasy, thus once more
seeming to belittle those that would believe such foolishness. However, if we push
forward to the conclusion of Socrates’ response, we find that it is difficult to maintain
such an interpretation. Returning to the text, Socrates concludes:
But I have no time for such things; and the reason my friend, is this. I am still
unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me
ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. This is why I do
not concern myself with them. I accept what is generally believed, and, as I was
saying, I look not into them but into my own self…33
From this final passage, we can glean two important points: (1) That Socrates clearly
admits to unquestionably accepting, at the very least, various aspects of mythology that
are generally believed by the people of the polis, and (2) that he does not have time,
inclination, nor ability, to properly critique them. Thus, Socrates as depicted here is a far
cry from the so-called “philosopher” that militantly mocks religion and its followers. Far
from holding such disdain, we are presented with a Socrates who consistently professes
to have a strong belief in the gods, and, importantly, a belief that extends beyond the
scope of his own reason.
What Socrates Believed
Yet, even with this evidence of Socrates’ belief set before us, the question arises
as to precisely what it is that Socrates believes regarding the gods. In answer to this
question, we find that, first, and perhaps most importantly, Socrates claims that the gods
are unquestionably wise.34 And, given Socrates’ belief that there is a direct correlation
between knowledge and right action, as the gods have perfect knowledge, it follows that
33

Phdr. 229e2-230a3. Italics added for emphasis.

34

Ap. 23a4-b2. See Brickhouse and Smith (1994: 179-181), Vlastos(1991, 162-166), and
McPherran (1996, 133-144)
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they are also perfectly moral.35 Thus, unlike the gods as depicted by Homer, gods who
exhibit vengeful action upon those who fall out of their favor, the gods of Socrates can do
no harm.36 Evidence for this is expressed quite clearly in the Republic, where we read:
Now, a god is really good, isn’t he, and must be described as such?...And surely
nothing good is harmful, is it?...And can what isn’t harmful do harm?...Or can what
does no harm do anything bad?...And can what does nothing bad be the cause of
anything bad?...Morever, the good is beneficial?...It is the cause of doing
well?...The good isn’t the cause of all things, then but only good ones; it isn’t the
cause of bad ones... Therefore, since a god is good, he is not—as most people
claim—the cause of everything that happen to human beings but of only a few
things, for good things are fewer than bad ones in our lives. He alone is
responsible for the good things, but we must find some other cause for the bad
ones, not a god.37
Given this understanding of the divine, one which posits the gods as perfectly
knowledgeable, and thus perfectly moral, it is perfectly logical that Socrates would hold
the commands of the gods in such high esteem. Had he not truly believed in the gods’

35

On this point I agree with the argument given by Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 68-72).
However, there admittedly exists healthy disagreement between scholars on how one should interpret
Socrates’ belief in the unity of virtues. For a summary of these oppositional views, see Brickhouse and
Smith (1994, 68 n. 52 and n. 52, as well as 179 n. 5 and n. 6). Vlastos (1991, 163-164), for his part, while
in agreement that the gods are omnibenevolent, argues that this is not a necessary result of omniscience.
According to Vlastos, “To allow one’s gods infinitely potent intellect is not of itself to allow them
flawlessly moral will. It may lead one to conclude, with Heraclitus, that god transcends the difference
between good and evil.” Thus, on Vlastos’ view, the conclusion drawn by Socrates regarding the gods
benevolence is the result of Socrates’ personal belief that the highest form of wisdom is not theoretical, but
rather, practical. Given this caveat, Socrates, and the fact that Socrates “could not have tolerated a double
standard of morality, one for men, another for the gods,” Socrates concludes that Reason is consistent
across the board for all beings, human and divine.
36

This follows logically from Socrates views on the harm of retribution as found in the Cr. 49b10c1. As is rightly noted by Brickhouse and Smith (1994), this logic provides insight into Socrates’ disbelief
as expressed to Euthyphro regarding the depiction of the gods as constantly disagreeing with one another
(Euth. 6a6-8). If the gods truly have knowledge of the good, and this knowledge is shared by all gods, then
it would not be possible for such disagreements to occur.
37

Rep. 379b1-c6. Again, as the Republic is a middle dialogue, caution should be exercised when
using passages such as these as evidence for interpreting the early dialogues. For example, while the
reasoning as laid out in the passage above will lead to the banishment of the poets, as their affinities for
Homeric myth affirms the possibility of malicious divine action, the Socrates of the early dialogues never
calls for such censorship (See Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 181). However, with this difference taken into
consideration, I contend that, given the consistency between the early dialogues and the Republic regarding
the perfection of divine wisdom, this evidence is acceptable.
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perfection, let alone their existence, then why would he so unwaveringly heed the advice
of his divine sign, a protective agent that never provides the reasons behind its suggestive
force? Given the fact that Socrates faces the death penalty on account of his unending
line of questioning everything, to suggest that he would blindly listen to the command of
a god if he did not thoroughly believe in the superiority of that god’s wisdom, let alone
it’s existence, is absurd.
The Problem of Divine Creation
While the set of beliefs as given above would appear to save Socrates from the
charge of atheism, the issue is not entirely resolved as a problem remains that still
requires our address, namely, Nussbaum’s claim that all references to the divine should
be taken as instances of Socratic irony.38 This suggestion39 by Nussbaum hinges on the
premise that, as the religion of Athens at the time, and those that would follow it, would
not be entirely rational, the fact that Socrates is positing a divine entity that is itself
perfectly rational would amount to the creation of a “new god,” which, as Nussbaum
makes clear, is not meant to be understood as a divine entity, but rather as an allusion to
reason itself. Under this interpretation, it would make sense for Socrates to always obey
the dictates of his daimonion, as doing so would be to follow the dictates of reason,
which only Socrates is able to recognize clearly. Thus, if Nussbaum is correct in her
38
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reasoning, then despite the direct appeals made by Socrates to the divine, all such appeals
were merely veiled references to reason itself. Socrates would thus be an atheist, and all
mention of the divine, even his appeal to the daimonion must be considered as instances
of irony.40 As will be shown, however, this position is untenable once subjected to more
rigorous analysis.
To begin my response against Nussbaum, it must first be noted that many scholars
have offered similar, though not identical, accounts of Socrates’ and his “creation of new
gods”. For Vlastos, this issue regarding the creation of new gods is so pressing that
Socrates himself is concerned about this specific charge levied against him, i.e., that he
disbelieves in the gods of the state and creates new ones.41 And, to an extent, Socrates
seems to accept as true the former of the two charges, for, as Vlastos suggests, when
challenged by Meletus on the charge of impiety, Socrates cleverly manipulates his
accuser to change his charge to atheism, doing so to avoid addressing the original charge
of not honoring the city’s gods, for which he is surely guilty.42 Thus, on Vlastos’ view at
least, the moral gods of Socrates discussed above seem to be completely at odds with the
traditional gods of Homeric and Hesiodic mythology.
Yet, does this posited difference in kind between the gods of Homer and the
Socratic gods provide reason enough to justify Nussbaum’s claim that, given these
differences, Socrates must be alluding not to gods but to reason itself? In other words,
Nussbaum’s critique is based on the notion that the Socratic view of the gods is so
40
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radically distinct from the traditional gods, that to suggest that Socrates is referring to
such gods is implausible. The question thus arises: Are the moral gods of Socrates so
radical as to be unrecognizable from the accepted gods of 5th century Athens? If it can be
shown that Socrates’ views are not quite as radical as Nussbaum (and to a lesser extent,
Vlastos) would suggest, then her claim that all Socratic reference to the divine are
instances of irony begins to fall.
In answer to this question then we turn first to the work of Mark McPherran, who
notes that it is important to first recognize that “religion” in 5th century Athens is
distinctly different in kind than modern/contemporary religious practice and belief.43 The
most important distinctions are as follows: (1) Greek religion did not have a standard
text, e.g., the Bible. (2) Greek religion did not have an organized church. (3) There did
not exist a standard set of religious practices that were strictly enforced by religious
clergy. Given the lack of these more regulatory aspects of religion, McPherran notes, it is
not a belief in specific doctrine that qualifies one’s piety, but rather, “correct, timely
observance of ancestral tradition by maintaining and participating in a host of
activities.”44 Drawing from these distinctions, it is important to note the following two
points: First, that while a belief in the existence of the gods was required, there was no
universal standard in place regarding the essence or activity of those gods. Second, that
so long as one consistently followed the practices and traditions, coupled with a belief in
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the existence of the gods, they would, for all intents and purposes, be considered pious in
the eyes of the state.
Given these conditions, that Socrates would openly criticize the gods as depicted
in the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition would not have been as shocking as some scholars
have claimed, as it would have been entirely common for beliefs regarding the gods to
vary.45 Further, McPherran notes, there is little to no evidence that anyone was ever
prosecuted for exhibiting skepticism regarding the veracity of Homer’s account of the
gods. Indeed, the “common” conception of religion had been subject to consistent
criticism by the likes of Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Pindar, and Heraclitus.46 As the
Homeric tradition and the gods depicted therein was not left wanting for criticism, it
seems odd that the positing of perfectly moral gods would be so entirely radical as to
warrant persecution.47 Indeed, had the moralization of the gods been as shockingly
revolutionary as many scholars have claimed, would not we have found evidence in the
text to support this view?
To answer this question we might look to the work of Brickhouse and Smith,
specifically their reading of Plato’s Euthyphro. On their reading, when confronted with
Socrates’ uncertainty regarding the veracity of Homeric myth on account of the Homeric
gods’ lacking perfect morality, Euthyphro is not only unfazed, but even concedes
Socrates’ point, recognizing the difficulty such issues cause.48 And, while it is necessary
to take Euthyphro’s reaction with a grain of salt given he too is a character created by
45
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Plato utilized to serve specific purposes within the context of that dialogue,49 if we turn
our attention to the Apology, a dialogue focusing directly on the charges levied upon
Socrates, nowhere do we find any attention given specifically to the issue of Socrates’
positing of perfectly moral gods. Now, to be sure, Socrates is charged with failing to
honor the gods of the city. Yet, when directly asked by Socrates to clarify precisely what
this means, Meletus explains that the charge of impiety is actually the result of Socrates’
alleged atheism.50 While some scholars have suggested that this revised charge was the
result of clever manipulation on the part of Socrates,51 if it were the case that the original
charges came to be as a result of Socrates’ creation of new, perfectly moral gods, then
why would no one, Meletus, Anytus, Lycon, or even the jurors present, make any
mention of this?52 Admittedly, this point does carry with it a great deal of speculation,
however, if the moralization of the gods was so egregious as to warrant the charge of
impiety, that it would never be mentioned at all, by the accusers or even Socrates himself,
seems unlikely.
Despite the unlikeliness of such omissions going unnoticed at the actual trial, we
must once more note that Plato, as author of the Apology, cannot escape his own biases.
However, while the works of Plato may present problems of positive prejudice, surely
49
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those writers who manifested disdain for Socrates would not omit such damning details.
And yet, when we look to the account of Aristophanes, perhaps the most famous of all of
Socrates’ critics, we again find no mention of the problem of the moralization of the
gods.53 Instead, Aristophanes’ caricature of Socrates in the Clouds presents him as an
atheist, directly associating him with the so-called “natural-philosophers”. Again, had the
issue been the moralization of the gods, why would Aristophanes, an individual who was
not only not apologetic, but critical of Socrates, fail to bring this to light?54 Thus,
according to Brickhouse and Smith, this lack of attention to the moralization of the gods
on the part of Socrates’ accusers and detractors, coupled with Socrates’ own consistent
reference to his own beliefs on this point at his trial (which, again, go unchallenged or
flagged by his accusers),55 provide evidence to suggest that such beliefs were of no real
concern in the legal sense.
As a final point on the matter, many scholars have additionally argued that
Socrates’ moralistic conception of the gods were not only not unique, but gaining in
popularity.56 McPherran, drawing from the Phaedrus (229c), states that not only was it
becoming quite commonplace to doubt the Homeric tradition, but further that there were,
“…also affirmations of the justice and morality of the gods, gods with such appellations
as ‘Zeus Meilichios,’ ‘Zeus Xenios,’ and ‘Delphic Apollo who cannot lie.’”57 This
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position is echoed by Gerd Van Riel, who argues that throughout the 5th century BCE, we
find that the common conception of the gods had evolved away from the more conflict
ridden gods of Homer, and towards gods possessing of upright character and virtue.58
Finally, we might also look to the work of Christian Wildberg, who, through rigorous
analysis, argues that the moralized conception of the gods is not, as Vlastos argues, born
from Socrates alone, but rather, is present throughout the literature of 5th century Athens,
most notably in the works of Sophocles.59 Following from this evidence, we find the fact
that Socrates would grant the gods the attributes of perfect reason and morality is not
altogether shocking, nor uncommon. As a result, Nussbaum’s claim that such attribution
of perfect reason would require that Socrates be referring to reason itself, as opposed to
actual divine beings, is significantly weakened.
Yet, while the above argument does well to prove that the Socratic conception of
the gods was not as revolutionary as has been suggested, it does not completely solve the
original problem posed by Nussbaum. Indeed, one might argue that simply because the
rest of the population is willing to take seriously the positing of perfectly rational or
moral gods, this acceptance by the populace does not necessarily guarantee that Socrates
truly accepts this. Thus, it is still not yet certain that we ought take Socrates seriously
regarding his reference to the divine. To accomplish this task, I will investigate both
Socrates’ daimonion, as well as other forms of divination, Socrates understanding of
poets, diviners, and oracle-givers. Through this analysis, it will be made clear that not
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only must we take Socrates’ reference to the divine sincerely, but further, that such divine
inspiration plays a fundamental role in his quest for knowledge.
Preliminary Remarks on Inspiration
To begin this defense regarding the sincerity with which Plato recognizes divine
inspiration, it is necessary to first lay some basic groundwork. As it is the task of this
analysis to refute the claim that all references to divine inspiration need be taken as
ironic, I will follow the lead of Stefan Buttner, who explains as follows:
(The) essential criterion for taking a passage of Plato which refers to enthusiasm as
being free of irony is that the passage is integral to a context of which one can
assume that it represents authentic Platonic teaching. It is then probable that the
statement concerning enthusiasm is intended to be serious, above all when
statements occur in more than one dialogue in comparable contexts.60
As such, in what follows then, I will take care to make note of the context of each
passage to ensure that the mention of divine inspiration is sincere.
The Problem of the Oracle and Inspired Dreams
Before delving into the problem of Socrates’ daimonion, I want to begin with an
account of other instances of divine inspiration removed from Socrates own internal
divine sign. While it may seem odd to put aside the more obvious example of inspiration
for later review, we recall that Nussbaum’s suggestion that we need to take all instances
of Socratic reference to the divine as ironic is directly linked to her assertion that such
reference to the “divine” is in reality a winked reference to reason itself. Under
Nussbaum’s interpretation then, it would not be too far a stretch to suggest that the
daimonion is not at all considered by Socrates to be an actual divine spirit, but rather
nothing more than a veiled reference to reason, disguised as such to appeal to the
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religious sentiment of the mob.61 To avoid this pitfall, I will start with Socrates’
recognition of instances of divine inspiration removed from the personal nature of the
daimonion. The purpose of this account will be to show that Socrates clearly
distinguishes between reason and divine inspiration, a distinction that is deeply
problematic for Nussbaum’s position.62
To begin, we first revisit the oft-cited passage from the Apology, where we find
that, in response to questions regarding his need to philosophize, an endeavor for which
he now faces the death sentence, Socrates explains:
To do this (philosophize) has, as I say, been enjoined upon me by the god, by means
of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever
ordered a man to do anything. This is true, gentlemen, and can easily be
established.63
Looking to this passage, it is important to note two items: (1) Socrates is confident in the
necessity of his philosophical mission on account of its provenance arising from the
command of the god. (2) Socrates expresses confidence in the ability of oracles and
dreams to delineate the truth.
Given Socrates consistent disavowal of knowledge, whether feigned or not, that
Socrates would so brazenly assert his confidence in his duty to philosophize on account
of the command by the god should strike the reader as a bit out of character. Note, in his
explanation to the judges, Socrates does not say that, despite his initial befuddlement by
61
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the message received by the oracle, he has managed via his own rational process of
elenchtic testing to determine that he has a duty to philosophize. Rather, he asserts
clearly that his duty to philosophize is in fact the truth, a point that he confidently asserts
on account of its connection to divine command.64 Further, he is so absolutely assured of
the moral justification for his actions, which, again, is due to their divine sanction, that he
remains committed to that duty despite the threat of death.65
Yet, while the evidence from the Apology is of particular interest to my argument,
the most compelling evidence regarding Socrates’ confidence in dreams and oracles as
being capable of revealing the truth is not found in the Apology, but rather, the Phaedo.66
At Phaedo 60d8-61b8, we read:
…but I tried to find out the meaning of certain dreams and to satisfy my conscience
in case it was this kind of art they were frequently bidding me to practice. The
dreams were something like this: The same dream often came to me in the past,
now in one shape, now in another, but saying the same thing: ‘Socrates, ‘ it said,
‘practice and cultivate the arts.’ In the past I imagined that it was instructing and
advising me to do what I am doing, such as those who encourage runners in a race,
that the dream was thus bidding me to do the very thing I was doing, namely to
practice the art of philosophy…But now, after my trial took place…I thought that
in case my dream was bidding me to practice this popular art, I should not disobey
it but compose poetry. I thought it safer not to leave here until I satisfied my
conscience by writing poems in obedience to the dream.67
From this passage we can glean a number of important points: (1) We once again find
Socrates taking seriously the messages to be decoded from dreams. Indeed, in this
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example in particular, Socrates likens the message of his dreams to that of commands that
one need obey. (2) We find Socrates speaking with a sense of urgency regarding that
obedience. He explains that while he thought he was already doing the dream’s bidding
by philosophizing, following the unfortunate events that have transpired in his trial and
present circumstances, he is now uncertain he was correct in his interpretation. As a
result, as he believes the dreams may have been bidding him to perform a different art
form, he has decided to write poetry as he awaits his death, a decision made, in part, to
guarantee his safety. What we find here is a level of consistency between this passage
and those found in the Apology as to Socrates’ consistent adherence in his belief that we
must stand in obedience to the gods.
And, it is this final point that I find most striking for two reasons: (1) It illustrates
the seriousness with which Socrates recognizes the importance of obeying the gods, i.e.,
that even while facing death, he is writing poetry out of fear that he had misinterpreted
the god’s original command. This grave concern with properly following the god’s
command is quite telling. 68 (2) Such an attempt to appease the god is one that is done
contra Socrates’ originally conceived conclusions. To explain, if one were to take up
Nussbaum’s position, one could argue that when Socrates says that he has a duty to
philosophize on account of the god’s command, he does not mean this literally, but rather
that it is by his own understanding of reason itself that he recognizes the necessity of
philosophizing.69 In other words, given the logical conclusions he has drawn through
68
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rational processes and arguments, he has come to the irrevocable conclusion that he must
philosophize.70
However, if this were true, and all mention of his divinely decreed duty to
philosophize was merely a dressed up metaphor for following the dictates of reason itself,
then how could one explain Socrates’ actions and frame of mind as depicted in the
Phaedo? In the passage above, we find Socrates admitting that he thought that he was
doing as the god commanded. In fact, over time he was able to provide, at the very least,
a limited account as to why such philosophical questioning is necessary. However, in the
Phaedo, we find Socrates admitting that he now does not truly know what the god
wanted, and so he is now lending his hand at poetry in a desperate attempt to appease the
god should that have been his true command.
Note, Socrates admits no understanding aside from recognizing the obligation to
comply with the will of the gods, whatever that may be. The point here is not to suggest
that Socrates understands the will of the divine, but rather, that he follows those
commands even if devoid of understanding.71 Granted, more often than not, the
revelations received from dreams and the oracle are subject to reflective rational
assessment. And, further, given the perfect nature of the divine, that command will
always, of course, be perfectly rational. However, in this instance, Socrates professes to
not have a full understanding of the god’s will. Thus, that Socrates would attempt to
follow the command of the god without such grounded understanding makes it difficult to
assert that Socrates does not truly believe in the distinction between reason itself and
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those divine beings in possession of it. What justification would Socrates have to act in
this manner if not faith in the reason of the god?
Put simply, if Nussbaum is correct, and there is no actual deity external to
Socrates that possesses perfect wisdom whose commands Socrates would obey on
account of such perfection, then it would follow that Socrates would only act in
accordance with reason as understood by himself. In other words, if, as Nussbaum
claims, Socrates recognizes that (1) wisdom, as opposed to ignorance, as the root from
which all action should arise, and, (2) there exist(s) no perfectly moral god(s), then (3)
when Socrates says that he acts in obedience to the will of the god, he is actually acting
by the dictates of reason itself. Thus, when he claims that he knows certain things to be
true, e.g., that his mission to philosophize is obligatory, he knows these things through
reason, i.e., he would understand them as true.
However, given his admitted lack of understanding in the Phaedo, this position
becomes problematic. To explain, we recall that Socrates is now writing poetry due to
his own lack of understanding of the divine command. Thus, under Nussbaum’s model,
Socrates would be acting according to “reason” for reasons that he does not understand.
If this is true, from where does the certainty arise? What justification would Socrates
have for these actions if he does not understand why he is doing them? Would there not
need to be a belief in some entity in possession of perfect understanding, and it is through
a deferment to their judgment that Socrates derives his confidence? It would seem to me
then, given the evidence from the Phaedo seen in concert with those passages from the
Apology, Nussbaum’s position that we must consider all references to the divine as
ironically veiled references to reason itself cannot hold. Thus, we find Socrates clearly
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distinguishing between reason itself, and the sort of knowledge only accessible through
divine dispensation.72
The Problem of the Poets and Diviners
The need for this distinction between the sort of knowledge Socrates himself can
claim to know, and the sort of truth he receives from divination is clearly illustrated in his
account of others who themselves have experienced divine inspiration. Looking first to
the Apology once more, we read at 22b8-c4:
Regarding the poets, I soon realized that it is not by wisdom that poets do what they
do, but by some natural talent and by inspiration, like the diviners and oracle
givers, who also say many fine things, but know nothing of what they say.73
In reading this passage, it could be interpreted as a condemnation of those mentioned,
belittling them through the exposure of their ignorance.74 Indeed, Gregory Vlastos, in
favor of this interpretation, writes,
For Socrates diviners, seers, oracle-givers, poets are all in the same boat. All of
them in his view are know-nothings, or rather worse: unaware of their sorry
epistemic state, they set themselves up as repositories of wisdom emanating from a
divine, all-wise source. What they say may be true; but even when it is true, they
are in no position to discern what there is in it that is true. If their hearer were in a
position to discern this, then he would have the knowledge denied to them; the
knowledge would come from the application of his reason to what these people say
without reason.75
Note, Vlastos is correct that those who are divinely inspired would be unable to properly
claim to be in possession of knowledge, as such a claim would require the individual
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provide an account of that knowledge, which, as their insights were gifted to them by the
gods, they simply cannot do. So, in this sense, it is true that such individuals “know”
nothing about that which they speak. However, this lack of knowledge in the strict sense
does not preclude the possibility of revealing the truth, as Vlastos himself seems to
suggest. In other words, there seems to be recognition on the part of Socrates of those
individuals who are somehow able to glean and express the truth (even if incomplete),
regarding beauty, love or even the divine itself, all the while failing to provide any
rational account as to how they have come to “know” such things.
As evidence to this, let us look first to the Ion, where we read at 534b1-c7:
For of course poets tell us that they gather songs at honey-flowing springs, from
glades and gardens of the Muses, and that they bear songs to us as bees carry
honey, flying like bees. And what they say is true. For a poet is an airy thing,
winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and
goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him. As long as a human
being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make
poetry or sing prophecy. Therefore, because it is not by mastery that they make
poems or say many lovely things about their subjects, but by divine gift, each poet
is able to compose beautifully only for that which the Muse has aroused in him.76
To be sure, this passage once more reveals that the poets lack knowledge, a point that has
led many scholars to condemn divine inspiration as the antithesis to the Socratic search
for wisdom. However, while I do not deny that Socrates, and by extension Plato, does
find issue with those who claim to have knowledge when in fact they do not, a point
which is clearly represented in the above passage from the Ion, what is of greater interest
is that in this very same passage where Socrates denies the poets knowledge, he also
admits that what they say is true. In other words, that the poets can provide no rational
account of what they are saying does not rob those expressions of the truth that they
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represent. And, again, these insights into truth are derived directly from divine
inspiration, a moment wherein the person’s intellect is “no longer in him.” They are, in a
sense, possessed by the gods, their body a mere conduit for the expression of the wisdom
of the divine.77
And, this point, i.e., that divine inspiration is akin to momentarily losing one’s
mind, is positively echoed in other dialogues as well, namely the Phaedrus 244a6-d5
wherein we read:
There’s no truth to that story that when a lover is available you should give your
favors to a man who doesn’t love you instead, because he is in control of himself
while the lover has lost his head. That would have been fine to say if madness
were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best things we have come from madness,
when it is given as a gift from the god.
Here again we find Socrates praising the revelations brought about through divine
revelation. In fact, it is precisely because the person is mad, i.e., void of reason, that they
are able to produce such truths78. Given the limitations of human wisdom and the
superiority of divine wisdom,79 that the divinely inspired, having been lost of their own
reason in those moments of divine inspiration, are thusly able to reveal the truth is of no
surprise to Socrates, nor should we suspect him of believing otherwise.80 Thus, again,
when passages such as these are applied to Nussbaum’s suggestion that all references to
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the divine are ironic, we find a problem of incompatibility, as it is precisely because the
inspired individuals are “out of their mind” that they are able to access these deeper
truths. Again, I do concede that this does not grant them knowledge in the purely
Platonic sense. However, this is precisely the point. Through these passages we clearly
see an absolute distinction between inspiration and reason for Socrates: In the moment of
inspiration, the individual is outside of oneself, and thus, not accessing truth through their
own rational capacity. They did not come to any realization on their own, nor can they
provide an account of it after the fact. Given this incompatibility, it is difficult to see
how one could claim that they are, in Socrates’ mind, one and the same thing.
The Problem of the Daimonion
With the stage now set before us, we turn our attention to the most infamous
example of divine inspiration in the works of Plato, Socrates’s daimonion. We begin with
some basic foundational points of reference. We recall that Socrates’ daimonion is
described as a divine voice81 or sign.82 We also learn that this divine sign has frequently
appeared to Socrates since childhood,83 and has since then offered him consistent, though
by no means regular, guidance in the form of apotreptic warnings.84 Never in the early
dialogues do we find an instance where the daimonion has ceded to Socrates any kind of
positive knowledge, nor the reasoning behind its admonishments regarding the course of
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Ap. 31d1-3 and Phdr. 242c2
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Ap. 40b1; Eud. 272e2; Phdr. 242b9.
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Ap. 31d2-2
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Ap. 31d3-4, Eu. 3b-c

136

action that Socrates should avoid.85 Further, these warnings always feature a predictive
power that far exceeds the capacity of human reason.86 Finally, it appears as though
Socrates has an absolute faith in the soundness of the warnings given by the daimonion, a
point which could be drawn not only from his belief regarding the absolute wisdom of the
gods as discussed above, but further, upon his own reflection regarding the outcomes and
consequences that followed from his heeding of this advice.87
With this foundation in place, the next task before us is to establish that Socrates
considers the daimonion to be of legitimate epistemological value. As evidence for his
claim, we look once more to the work of McPherran, who first turns his attention to the
Apology 31c4-32a3, wherein we find Socrates discussing his reasoning for avoiding a
career in politics.88 As Socrates explains, the reasoning for his daimonion’s opposition
against Socrates engaging in politics, while unknown to Socrates at the time of it
warning, is, through the use of basic reasoning, not only proven to be correct, but also
quite obvious. Given Socrates affinity for questioning, as well as his distaste for any
instance of injustice large or small, it is quite clear that had Socrates engaged in public
life, he most assuredly would have met an early demise at the hands of those he would
speak against.89 Thus, McPherran notes, upon examination of the passage, Socrates does
not merely accept the admonishment of his daimonion, but, following the instance of the
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McPherran (2005, 16) Yet, while the daimonion fails to provide Socrates with the certain moral
knowledge he seeks, he is, on McPherran’s view, advised on “nonexpert moral knowledge,” such as which
students he would be ill-advised to take on. See Tht. 150e1.
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McPherran (2005, 17) See Ap. 31, Euthd. 272e-3a
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See Vlastos (1991, 229-232)
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McPherran (2005, 17)
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Similar, of course, to the current circumstances of his trial!
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warning, reflects back upon it, subjecting it to the elenchos to determine why an activity
such as politics, one which was not only obligatory, but further, was a possible
opportunity for Socrates to engage in the sort of just activity he sought, would be so
adamantly, and consistently, rejected. Socrates is thus able to discover that the advice of
his daimonion is, upon review, perfectly in line with reason, and not, as could be the case,
randomly beneficial. Given this consistency between the advice of the daimonion and
reason, we find a relationship between the two emerging, one which serves as further
evidence towards Socrates on convictions regarding the divine.
As an additional piece of textual evidence, we look to Apology 40a3-c3. Here,
after having been issued a death sentence, Socrates argues sincerely that this outcome
must be for the best, as his daimonion had not warned him during his preparation for his
trial, nor during his actual defense that his strategy was against his best interest.90 Indeed,
Socrates notes that the silence of his divine voice in this matter should be recognized as
“great proof”91 that his actions are not only justified, but also morally virtuous. Note that
this example differs in that Socrates not only recognizes the warnings of the divine sign
regarding potentially damaging action, but further, recognizes the silence of the
daimonion as confirmation that his own reasoned decisions were in fact beneficial or
virtuous. What we glean from this is that the assurance that Socrates feels regarding the
outcome of his trial (or any action for that matter) arises not from his own deliberation,
but from the affirmation, whether by interjection or silence, of his daimonion.
Finally, McPherran provides additional evidence in support of this point by
drawing from the Euthydemus 272e1-3a3. We read:
90
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As good luck would have it, I was sitting by myself in the undressing room just where
you saw me and was already thinking of leaving. But when I got up, my customary
divine sign put in an appearance. So I sat down again…
It is important to note here that prior to the arrival of the divine sign, Socrates had, after a
period of deliberation, decided to leave. Then, with the arrival of the divine sign, this
decision to leave was reversed. Here again, it was not the case that after deciding to
leave, Socrates realized that he should stay due to his own deliberative process and
reconsideration. His decision to stay was based solely on the presence of his divine sign,
which, as explained above, never provides Socrates with the reasoning behind the
warnings. And yet, despite this lack of understanding the benefit that he would
eventually incur from his staying, Socrates trusts in the daimonion. Granted, Socrates
does have reason to trust the daimonion, for (1) not only has it never led Socrates astray,
but (2) when he reflects back upon those decisions, e.g., his avoidance of politics, he
comes to the reasoned conclusion that he made the right decision.92 As such,Socrates is
justified in making the inductive leap that he should always heed the warnings of his
divine voice. However, the point here is that, in the moment of the warning, Socrates is
left wanting for the rationale behind the warnings issued. Thus, if it is true that all
references to the daimonion are merely references to reason itself, we are once again left
with the bizarre circumstance wherein Socrates would be claiming that he, through
reason, realized that he should avoid a particular action without understanding the
reasons for doing so. The alternative, much more plausible scenario, would be that
Socrates does actually believe in the existence of perfectly wise gods, i.e., his daimonion,
and it is this belief that allows him to act confidently in accordance with the warnings and
messages issued therefrom.
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McPherran (2005, 18)
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3.4.2 – Objections and Replies
As has been discussed at length, the prominent critique levied against the
legitimacy of divine inspiration as a source of epistemological value arises in the form of
the reducing of all divine reference to more rationalized phenomena. And, in the case of
the daimonion, this critique once again comes to the fore. Gregory Vlastos, who himself
has argued extensively in favor of recognizing the legitimacy of religious belief and
sentiment in the case of Socrates, surprisingly offers a view of the daimonion that seems
to severely diminishes its role in the philosophical process of Socrates.93 Speaking on the
nature of his encounters with his “divine sign” Vlastos explains:
Socrates has a “hunch” – a strong intuitive impression – that a certain belief or
action is correct without being able to articulate his grounds for it at the moment.94
Drawing from the Theatetus, Euthydemus, and Phaedrus, Vlastos highlights three
passages that he believes firmly support his position.95 Beginning with Tht. 151c, when
asked how he is able to determine which students are worth his attention, Socrates
responds, “…the daimonion which comes to me forbids it in the case of some, allows it in
that of others, and they are the ones that make progress.” Thus, Socrates, without fully
understanding how, is able to properly choose which students to avoid and which to focus
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For the full account of Vlastos’ critiques of the epistemological role of the daimonion see
Vlastos (1991, 223-232 and 280-286). For replies see McPherran (1991, 190-208) and Brickhouse and
Smith (1991, 191-194) and (2005, 44-55).
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Vlastos (1991, 283) – It should be noted that Vlastos does distinguish between two types of
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able to immediately recognize the rationale behind the daimonion’s warning. Instances of such encounters
on Vlastos’ account include Ap. 31c-32a, wherein Socrates is told to avoid politics, as well as Ap. 40a-c,
wherein the silence of the daimonion serves as an affirmation of Socrates’ actions.
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I agree here with Brickhouse and Smith (2005, 44) that the selection of passages is odd on
Vlastos’ part, considering he consistently warns against using passages from later or middle dialogues as
evidence towards claims regarding the Socratic dialogues. See Vlastos (1991, Ch. 2 and 3) and Vlastos
(1994, Ch. 1).
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on. And, Vlastos explains, these “hunches” are, for Socrates, “convincing enough to
justify action.”
Vlastos also posits similar accounts for Socrates decision to stay in the palaestra
in the Euthydemus 272e, as discussed above, as well as his decision to stay and atone for
his first speech about love in the Phaedrus 242b-c, wherein Socrates explains:
As I was about to cross the stream the customary divine sign came to me – it holds
me back from doing what I am about to do on each occasion – and I seemed to hear
a voice, forbidding me to leave the spot until I had made atonement for some
offense to the god.96
On this last point, Vlastos explains that while Socrates does recognize that he does have
good reason to atone as indicated, at the time of the daimonion’s admonition, “those
reasons had not yet been clearly articulated in his mind…(and) became articulate only in
retrospect.”97
And, while this interpretation may not appear immediately problematic for my
position, such an interpretation seems to belittle the power of the daimonion, as it seems
to belittle its epistemological force. As McPherran rightly warns, this interpretation
“…has Socrates ‘accepting the supernatural’ in little more than name only.”98 Thus, to
maintain my position that Socrates considers divine inspiration with the utmost sincerity,
it must be demonstrated that the daimonion is not merely a “hunch,” nor simple moments
of “rational intuition,” but rather is of such great epistemological significance that it is
able to rightly challenge secular reasoning.
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Interesting, too, that here Socrates not only heeds the warning of his daimonion, but also shows
a recognition that he had offended the god, an act that, on his own view, required his repentance.
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Vlastos (1991, 285)
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McPherran (1996, 194) Which is surprising on Vlastos’ part considering his argument against
those that would seek to detach Socrates from sincere religious belief.
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For McPherran, we first find evidence against the reductionist account insofar as
there exists not a single instance where Socrates ignores the warning of the daimonion.
The reason such perfect consistency regarding the daimonion is so detrimental to the
reductionist account is that we find Socrates not only doubting the assumed “knowledge”
of all of his interlocutors, but further, his own beliefs, beliefs which he does not carry
lightly.99 Indeed, that he takes these warnings as “certain” would indicate that Socrates
holds this information in a significantly higher regard than he would any other source of
knowledge. The question thus arises as to how this could be justified if, as Vlastos and
others have claimed, he considers these warnings as mere “hunches”?
In answer to this concern, McPherran suggests that this certainty on the part of
Socrates is justifiable on Socrates’ part due to, “…(his) full confidence that the
daimonion is always caused by a divinity that would never purposefully mislead him; i.e.,
it would never warn him away from an action that is not wrong, harmful, or
unbeneficial.”100 And, this absolute confidence is evidenced by Socrates absolute
consistency in heeding the command or warning of the daimonion. Never once does
Socrates ignore the call of his divine sign, nor does Socrates ever stop first to subject the
warning to elenchtic testing before following its advice. Instead, Socrates always
assumes that the daimonion is correct, an uncharacteristic assumption that is made based
upon his absolute belief in the perfect wisdom and morals of the god.101 Given Socrates’
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For instance, his own consistent disavowal of knowledge. Also, Socrates doubts other forms of
revelation as well, e.g., Phd. 60d8 , wherein he believed his mission in life was to philosophize, only to
come to doubt his own interpretation. This last example is of particular importance given it came to him
initially through revelation. Thus, we find that it is only the warning of the daimonion that Socrates accepts
unquestioningly.
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caution regarding certainty of knowledge, not to mention his proclivity towards
questioning, had these warnings been recognized by Socrates as mere “hunches” one
would expect Socrates to have, at the very least, approached the issue with a healthy dose
of skepticism.
Yet, this is not the case. McPherran notes that not only does Socrates not ever
question the warnings of the daimonion, but further, Socrates never even questions
whether or not such encounters are in fact with the divine. It would seem then that
Socrates belief that he is truly the recipient of divine knowledge is never in question, a
point which again lends explanation to his lack of concern regarding the veracity of the
content of that message. Again, however, despite this certainty in the truth of the
message, Socrates can still not claim knowledge, as he recognizes that the messages
received are still subject to his own interpretation, which, given his fallibility as a mortal,
would necessarily dilute the purity of the knowledge. And, on McPherran’s view, it is
because of this potential fallibility of interpretation that goads Socrates to subject the
warnings to elenchtic testing, though again, always after he obeys the command. Thus, it
is not because Socrates doubts the certainty of the wisdom of the god, but rather he
doubts his own interpretive skill, and as a result, investigates to the extent his rational
powers allow to ensure as great a degree of certainty as is possible.102
Thus, McPherran suggests that we understand the daimonion as follows:
(1) After some prior deliberation (or without), Socrates forms the intention to perform
some action-token x (e.g., Leaving the marketplace)
(2) Prior to or while engaged in x, Socrates receives a daemonic message similar to “No,
don’t do x,” which he takes as certainly deriving from an all-wise authority.
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In this way we gain insight as to how Socrates could appear to honestly disavow all knowledge,
while, at the same time, appear to “know” things with such apparent certainty.
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(3) From this, he infers that “doing x would be unbeneficial,” something he would claim
to know. But this claim, since it rests on Socrates’ experientially warranted
presupposition that deamonic warnings and his interpretation of them is always
accurate, is taken by hum to be only a practical, and thus fallible, certainty
(4) It is more certain, nonetheless, then the results of practical ratiocination in the here and
now because of its superior inductive warrant (e.g., Socrates’s recognition of the
daimonion and the truth of its warning have apparently never gone awry in a lifetime
of experience of it), a warrant that has convinced Socrates of its divine origin.103
On McPherran’s view then, we see the daimonion not as a threat to the superiority of
reason,104 but rather as an extra-rational source used in concert with reason. In other
words, that Socrates would follow the dictates of the daimonion are not to be seen as an
irrational action, but as entirely rational because of his belief in the superior reason of the
divine. Yet, it must be noted, that inspiration and reason are complementary does not
preclude the reality that they are quite often in conflict, for, considering the warnings are
always apotreptic, it stands to reason that Socrates must have already planned on
engaging in the very activity he is warned against.105 As McPherran notes, it is precisely
in these moments of conflict that we bear witness to the degree of faith with which
Socrates holds the wisdom of the daimonion, for, “in these instances his reasons for
proceeding are deemed insufficiently compelling by Socrates simply on the basis of the
daemonic opposition.106
Given his recognition, McPherran makes clear that it is simply incorrect to assert,
as Nussbaum does, that when we witness Socrates reconsider a course of action, a
decision which he attributes to the warning of the daimonion, that he is doing so as a
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“cover for conclusions rationally arrived at.”107 That Socrates would be engaging in this
unnecessary level of deception108 is simply not compatible with the overwhelming textual
evidence to the contrary, i.e., that not only are there consistent, sincere religious
references on the part of Socrates, but further that these beliefs play a major role in his
philosophical work.109 Also, we recall examples as seen in the Euthydemus, where, aside
from the warning of the daimonion we are presented with no discernible cause for
Socrates to expect any benefit whatsoever from staying, as the interlocutors with whom
he would engage had not yet arrived.110 Indeed, in this instance, to suggest that his
decision to stay was nothing more than rational intuition would be to suggest that the
“rational” capacities of Socrates are nothing short of clairvoyant!111 Finally, McPherran
concludes, in addition to the evidence above, we have numerous textual incidences
wherein Socrates explicitly mentions experiencing a “rational hunch,” and, in these
moments, makes no mention whatsoever of his daimonion.112 If, as Vlastos and
Nussbaum suggest, the daimonion and rational intuition are one and the same, then why
would Socrates distinguish them at all?
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Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 186) Brickhosue and Smith argue here that if Socrates did not
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Given this evidence, evidence that is not only consistent throughout the dialogues,
but further, indicates that Socrates does distinguish clearly, through his own actions,
between secular reasoning and divine wisdom, we must consider Socratic references to
the daimonion as sincere.113
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that we cannot take Socratic references to religion
and divine inspiration as ironic. Further, I have argued that Socrates not only believes in
the legitimacy of such instances of divination, but further, holds them in such high esteem
as to recognize them as a viable source of truth, albeit a source that must, on account of
the limitations of human understanding, be reviewed and subject to rigorous analysis to
determine the proper interpretation. I argue this on the following grounds: (1) Socrates’
belief in perfectly rational, and thus perfectly moral, gods is not, as some have
maintained, so radical as to require that Socrates must be an atheist. As was shown, such
beliefs, while not traditional in a strict sense, were not entirely uncommon. As such, we
should dismiss his beliefs regarding the gods as veiled reference to reason itself. (2)
113

If we are to take the preceding arguments as true, i.e., that Plato sincerely believes Socrates to
be divinely inspired, then the question might be raised as to why Plato himself was not the recipient of such
divine assistance. To explain, given the gods’ status as perfectly wise beings as depicted in the early
dialogues, it cannot be the case that those individuals selected by the gods are done so at random. As such,
given Plato’s own philosophical ability and mission towards the understanding of the good life, that he
should be lacking in the sort of divine assistance given to Socrates may strike us, and Plato for that matter,
as odd. As Plato is particularly silent regarding the question of why the gods choose one individual over
another, any response to this question would be speculative by nature. However, if we turn our attention to
the Ion, we may actually uncover an answer. Looking to Ion 533d-e, we read:
It’s a divine power that moves you, as a Magnetic Stone moves iron rings. This stone not only pulls
those rings, it also puts power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does – pull
other rings.
Here, while not an answer to the question of why the gods choose one individual over the other, we do find
evidence to suggest that Plato may have considered himself to be divinely inspired, albeit indirectly. As the
above passage shows us, on Plato’s view, those that are inspired are themselves able to inspire others, just
as a magnetized ring can move other rings. Thus, as I have argued that Plato sincerely believes Socrates to
be inspired directly by the gods, given Plato’s relationship to Socrates, it is not to far a stretch to suggest he
considered himself to be inspired as such.
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There is evidence to suggest that Socrates recognized revelation, whether via dreams or
the oracle, as providing a legitimate path to the truth. That this is true is evidenced not
only in his own experiences, but further, by his own recognition that certain individuals,
e.g., poets, diviners, etc., while lacking in actual knowledge, are able to speak the truth on
those ideas given to them via moments of inspiration. (3) His strict adherence to the
daimonion, whose warnings he always obeys despite his lack of understanding at the
moment of the event. Again, it is true that Socrates can, and does, subject the
admonishments of the daimonion after the fact to determine why such a warning was
issued. The point, however, is that such reflections are precisely that, reflections after the
fact. As such, we find that the motivating force behind Socrates’ obedience to the advice
of the daimonion is his recognition that it is, in fact, originating from a divine being, one
which, based on his own beliefs, is in possession of divine wisdom. And, it is this belief,
not mere intuition, which allows his confidence in his actions that follow from this
provenance.
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Chapter 4: Socrates and Divine Inspiration in the Late Dialogues
It has been argued in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that, as Plato transitioned into
his late period, the character of Socrates no longer consistently resides at center-stage of
the dialogues. In dialogues such as the Sophist and Statesman, for example, we find in his
place the Eleatic Stranger, an individual who utilizes a new methodology, i.e., collection
and division, in his efforts towards the acquisition of definitional knowledge. Given the
change in cast and methodology of the Sophist, Statesman, as well as the Laws359, it could
be argued that Plato finally dismisses the more supernatural aspects of his earlier work,
favoring instead the rigidly rational methodology prominently featured therein. Yet,
while both the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist and Statesman and the Athenian Stranger of
the Laws, do not themselves directly appeal to the divine for assistance in their
philosophical endeavors360, when we turn our attention to those dialogues of the late
period where Socrates takes center stage, we are subject once more to a consistent appeal
to the divine for assistance in his philosophical endeavor. 361 Given this disparity, the
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Indeed, in the Laws, Socrates is absent entirely. Also, while the method of collection and
division is not used by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, it is, in contrast to the earlier, and even middle
periods, similarly rigid and meticulous in its presentation, lacking any traces of the elenchtic questioning
that drives those earlier dialogues.
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While it will be argued below, it should be noted here that despite the Athenian Stranger’s lack
of appeal to the divine for direct assistance in his own presentation of the laws, it is argued consistently
throughout the laws that the gods and their supreme wisdom must serve as the foundation for the laws of
men.
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date. For an excellent overview and analysis of the role of religion and the divine in Plato’s middle period,
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question arises as to Plato’s views on Socrates in this late period, in particular the role
that divine inspiration plays in the case of Socrates.
To answer this question, however, requires that we address a problem that arises
in Plato’s late period, i.e., the varying images of Socrates. To explain, in the late
dialogues, we are given multiple images of Socrates, all of which are, at least on the
surface, distinctly different than the last. In the Sophist, for example, we are presented
with the image of Socrates as the “noble sophist,” i.e., the individual who, through the
elenchus, is able to purge his interlocutors of their false beliefs.362 In the Theaetetus, on
the other hand, a dialogue that serves as the dramatic predecessor to the Sophist, we are
presented with a slightly different image, i.e., Socrates as midwife. Here, Socrates is able
to assist in the delivery of wisdom from within the mind of his interlocutor. And, while
this may seem similar to the “noble sophist” as described, given the more positive
capacity exhibited by the expertise of mental midwifery, such an image of Socrates
appears markedly different from the strictly purgative Socrates of the Sophist. Finally, in
the Philebus, we are yet again presented with a seemingly distinct Socrates, one who
takes up the method of collection and division as his weapon of choice in the search for
the definition of the good life. As before, this new image of Socrates seems to be set
apart from his fellow late period Socratic counterparts, most notably in his apparent
acceptance of the superiority of the method of collection and division over his traditional
elenchtic approach.
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I have argued extensively in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that, while this is not explicitly stated
to be describing Socrates in the dialogue itself, we ought take this description to be a description of
Socrates.
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Yet, despite these seemingly disparate depictions of Socrates, I would argue that
we ought to see these varying images as one and the same character, with each depiction
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of his mentor as Plato has now come to see
him. And, while this position will be argued in full in the pages to follow, it is important
to note here at the outset that, regardless of the differences in methodology utilized by the
varying depictions, there arises a common thread that carries through these late period
Socratic dialogues, i.e., Socrates’ unwavering appeal and adherence to his divine voice.
Given this consistency despite all else, it is my position that Plato maintains his continued
belief regarding the influence of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates.
Divine Inspiration and Religion in the Late Dialogues
The Diviner in the Statesman
Given the many changes that arise in Plato’s late period, before turning our
attention to Socrates in particular, it is necessary to first establish that Plato’s recognition
of the validity of divine inspiration is not limited to a nostalgic portrait of his mentor. To
do so, we look first to two dialogues of Plato’s late period that do not feature Socrates as
its protagonist, the Statesman and the Laws.
Beginning with the Statesman, we find that, in his attempt to determine the
precise nature of kingship, the Eleatic stranger notes that a division must be made
between two types of expertise regarding the giving of commands: (1) the skill exhibited
by individuals who give commands of their own design, and (2) those whose expertise
pertains to the distribution of the commands of others.363 While the true ruler is of course
to be associated with the former category, we find that the latter category involves a
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Pol. 260c1-261a.
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variety of individuals, namely, “…the rowers, the seer, the herald, and many other sorts
of expertise related to these…”364 That Plato considers the diviner (or seer) to be in
possession of an expertise is of particular importance here, as it shows a consistency of
thought that is carried over from the earlier dialogues.365 For one, in the Ion, Socrates
clearly states that the diviners are in possession of an expertise.366 Further, in the Laches,
we find that the diviner is given a position of importance on the staff of the general, a
point which indicates that the general ought utilize the talents of the diviner in matters of
military strategy.367
What, then, is the expertise of the diviner as seen in the Statesman? As argued by
Brickhouse and Smith, the answer might be derived through an examination of another
expertise listed in this division, i.e., the herald.368 To explain, it is the herald’s role to
properly relay the commands of the ruler to those that ought here these commands. Note,
the herald need not know why the ruler issued such commands, nor need the herald
understand the details or consequences of those commands. The expertise of the herald
lies not in possessing an understanding of the commands, but rather, possessing the skills
required to properly deliver the commands of others.369
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Laches 198e-199a4 As an additional note, in the Charmides 173c5-6, Socrates distinguishes
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And, while this may seem somewhat simple, it is indeed a skill, as we can easily imagine
someone ill-equipped to this task, whether that be due to lack of memory, or even a lack of confidence
when challenged on the exact wording of the command issued.
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It is in this way then that we ought understand the expertise of the diviner, an
individual who not only possesses the ability to properly receive the commands of the
gods, but further, is able to correctly deliver this message. Again, similar to the herald, it
is not necessary that the diviner understand the gods’ motives, or even the precise
meaning of the message revealed. As such, the diviner, unable to give an account of the
divine wisdom he has received, is not himself in possession of knowledge. Yet, despite
this lack of knowledge, it is clear from the evidence that the true diviner is not one
associated with sophistry or charlatanism, but as someone who, by the Stranger’s
admission, possesses an expertise that plays a role of importance in the governing of the
polis.370
The Divine and the Statesman in the Statesman
Looking deeper into the Statesman, we find that the role of the divine is not
limited to the diviner, but further, is of significant importance to the true ruler as well.371
As the stranger explains, in order to establish stability, the rulers must possess the ability
to reconcile seemingly incompatible individuals under their rule.372 As an example, the
Stranger notes that, if not properly handled, a conflict will inevitably arise between those
individuals who are more inclined towards the virtue of courage and those who favor a
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As Brickhouse and Smith note, this seems to be precisely the point made by Socrates at
Apology 22b8-c2, where, Socrates explains that poets, like diviners, are able to create as they do not due to
wisdom, but on account of inspiration. And, given my argument regarding the role that divine inspiration
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guide his interlocutors towards the truth, all the while sincerely denying a personal understanding of the
truth towards which he is pointed.
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more moderate approach. While both courage and moderation are virtues to be praised,
given the disparity between the two, the course of favored action between individuals
occupying the opposing worldviews will quite often be in conflict. Thus, to avoid this
potential confrontation, the ruler must possess the ability to “interweave” the two
together to create a harmony that is conducive to each individual, as well as the society at
large.
In response to the question posed in the dialogue by Young Socrates as to how the
ruler is able to peacefully mix these two dichotomous individuals together, the Stranger
explains that the ruler has two options: (1) through creating a mortal bond between the
two, i.e., by uniting them through marriage,373 and (2) by “fitting together that part of
their soul that is eternal with a divine bond.”374 To elaborate on precisely what is meant
by the forging of a “divine bond,” the stranger explains as follows:
I call divine, when it comes to be in souls, that opinion about what is fine and good,
and the opposite of these, which is really true and guaranteed; it belongs to the
class of the more human…Then we do recognize that it belongs to the statesman
and the good legislator alone to be capable of bringing this thing about, by means
of the music that belongs to the art of kingship, in those that had their correct share
of education.375
Thus, the statesman possesses the ability to instill within his citizens the correct opinions
on matters of the Good, Beauty, Justice, etc., which, in turn, will prevent them from
veering off into the extreme form of whatever virtue they may naturally favor. So, for
instance, lacking in such guidance, the courageous individual will, through unchecked
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aggression, eventually become more of a beast than a man.376 As such, it is the
responsibility of the true statesman to introduce the courageous individual to ideas that
properly highlight the benefit of a more moderate approach in certain instances, to
educate him in such a way as to instill a balance in his soul.377 It is important to note,
however, that the Statesman is not claimed to possess the knowledge of these things, but
rather, merely the correct opinions. Thus, we once more are provided the image of the
divinely inspired individual who, while lacking knowledge of their own, is in possession
of correct opinions, i.e., they have access to truth.378 Further, given the sincerity of this
description, not to mention the pivotal role this divinely gifted skill of interweaving plays
for the stranger in the final definition of the true statesman, that Plato would ironically
attribute this ability to divine provenance seems distinctly improbable.379
The Role of Religion in the Laws
In addition to the evidence found in the Statesman, if we look to the Laws, Plato’s
final, and perhaps most practical text, we find additional evidence in support of the claim
that matters of religion, including instances of divine inspiration, are seriously considered
by Plato even removed from reference to Socrates. To begin, we look to Book X,
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While there are indeed differences between the Republic and the Laws, I would contend that
the two texts are, in fact, surprisingly similar, a point which can be seen here in the stated importance that
the soul, and the balancing thereof, plays in the establishment of justice in the polis. For more on the
similarities between the Laws and Republic, see Larkin (2015).
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wherein we find the Athenian Stranger380, in an effort to stave off the dangers of atheism,
providing an elaborate proof designed to prove that (1) the gods exist, (2) that the gods
are concerned with the human race, and (3) that they are not easily swayed by offerings
or sacrifices. And, while a detailed analysis of this proof is beyond the scope of this
chapter, what is important is the underlying message we might gather from the Stranger’s
efforts, i.e., that the gods do exist, and that, their supreme wisdom and control over the
universe should serve as the basis from which the laws of men be established.381 And,
while some scholars have argued that the Athenian Stranger’s consistent reference to the
gods should not be taken literally,382 I would contest that such argumentation is once
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It has been suggested by some scholars (such as Strauss (1975, 2) and Pangle (1988, 511) that
the Athenian Stranger represents Socrates. In support of this position, Aristotle’s Politics 1265a is often
referenced, as, transitioning from his analysis of the Republic to the Laws Aristotle writes, “Now it is true
that all the discourses of Socrates possess brilliance, cleverness, originality and keenness of inquiry, but it
is no doubt difficult to be right about everything.” However, while this passage might be seen as Aristotle
identifying Socrates as the Athenian Stranger, we find that Aristotle never explicitly states this connection.
Further, later on in this same passage, Aristotle refers to the author of the Laws as “the writer,” whereas in
his description of the Republic the preceding passage, Aristotle consistently identifies Socrates by name.
Additionally, given Plato’s willingness to use Socrates in other late dialogues, it would seem odd that he
would, in his final work, feel the need to hide Socrates behind a curtain of anonymity. In support of this
position, see also Cherry (2013, 50-51). On Cherry’s view, “What (Aristotle) finds most praiseworthy
about the Socratic dialogues – their searching, or zetetic character – seems to be wholly absent from the
Laws.”
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Buttner calls attention to Laws 811c, wherein, in defense of the legitimization of the constitution thus far
constructed, the Stranger notes that their discussion has “not been conducted without a certain breath of the
gods.” As Buttner argues, considering the context here, it seems unlikely that we are to take this claim
ironically. See also 691e and 696b.
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Strauss (1975, 3-7) and Stalley, (1983, 24-5), both argue that the Stranger’s positing of the
divine as the basis from which we ought establish the laws of men is nothing more than a veiled reference
to the authority of reason itself. Welton (1995, 58-60), posits a similar, though softer claim. On Welton’s
view, the Stranger’s reference to the divine is one of utility, i.e., Plato, understanding the climate of his day,
uses an appeal to the divine to supply an authority to the laws that would resonate with the citizens of the
polis. However, while it may be the case that references to the particular activities of specific divinities
(e.g., that Dionysus gifted wine to men 672a5, or that the gods literally play and dance with humans,
653d4, 654d1) may be taken with a grain of salt, it has already been argued in chapter 4 of this dissertation
that a lack of belief in the official gods of mythology does not preclude the possibility that Plato truly
believed in the divine. Indeed, there is evidence throughout the dialogues that we ought not take the
Homeric depictions of the gods seriously, a point made quite clear in the banning of the poets in Book X of
the Republic.
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more guilty of anachronistic reasoning, i.e., forcing a hyper-rationalist worldview upon
Plato and the characters of his dialogues.383
As evidence to this claim, we find that, on the Stranger’s recommendation, those
who dishonor the gods, whether that offense arise as atheism, theft from a temple, or
even the practicing of improper rituals, should be subjected to capital punishment. Thus,
following the resolution of the proof for the existence of the gods, the Stranger lays out
the details for the punishments to be levied against such individuals. Beginning with
atheism, we find that these non-believers are subject to the harshest of punishments, as
such an individual, “…deserves to die for his sins not once or twice, but many
times…”384 And, this condemnation for atheism should not be taken lightly, for, while
there are other offenses Plato believes deserving of capital punishment aside from those
pertaining to impiety, e.g., premeditated murder (871d), wounding a family member with
the intention of murder (877b7-9), and waging a private war without the backing of the
state (955c), that the punishment for atheism should be more severe than the punishment
for violent charges is quite telling.385 Yet, perhaps this crime is quite fitting within the
context of the Laws, as it would seem that, given Plato’s belief in the supreme wisdom in
the gods, a supreme wisdom that must be the basis for the foundation of the laws of
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of multiple deaths, whereas the individual convicted of pre-meditated murder need only be put to death
once, is particularly interesting.
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society, insofar as the atheist denies the existence of the divine, and thus, the supreme
wisdom contained therein, he arises as a threat to the stability of society itself.386
As an additional example regarding the seriousness with which religion and piety
is treated in the Laws, we turn our attention to the punishment reserved for temple
robbers. Looking to the text, we note first that, if an individual is caught robbing from a
temple, and this individual is a foreigner or a slave, that individual will be branded on his
face and hands, and will be whipped and exiled from the city. However, as the Stranger
explains:
“If a citizen is ever shown to be responsible for such a crime – to have perpetrated,
that is, some great and unspeakable offense against the gods or his parents or the
state, the penalty is death.387
The reasoning behind the increased severity for the citizen is that, unlike the foreigner or
slave, the citizen has been afforded an education, one which, on Plato’s view, would have
provided that individual with the required insight to steer him away from such offenses.
Thus, given his transgressions despite this education, the offender should be considered
incurable, and as such, put to death. And, while the death penalty is quite often reserved
for those individuals who are deemed incurable after being subject to rehabilitation,388 in
the case of the temple robber, they are given no such chance of redemption.
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Laws 908d The Stranger notes that such individuals are often incredibly cunning, and, through
the use of beguilement, will persuade other citizens into similarly atheistic worldview. Again, given the
laws in the Laws are given weight via the authority of divine ordering of the cosmos (upon which they are
modeled), a lack of belief in the gods could result, on the Stranger’s view, in anarchy.
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E.g., the individual who, despite consistent warning, continues to maintain a private shrine in
their house. (910c-d). Another interesting example arises in the atheist whose lack of belief was the result
of foolishness, as opposed to the “complete atheist” who uses cunning and guile to disrupt the belief of
others. This foolish individual is first sent to the reform center for rehabilitation. However, if, following
their rehabilitation, this individual is once again convicted on a similar charge, he is now subject to the
death penalty. (908e6-909a7) Note, that both examples pertain to impiety.
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The severity of this punishment is made particularly clear when it is compared to
that reserved for thieves in general. Looking once more to the text, we read at 8578a1b4:
Again, a single law and legal penalty should apply to every thief, no matter what
his theft is, great or small:
(a) He must pay twice the value of the stolen article, if he loses the day, and has
sufficient surplus property over and above his farm with which to make
repayment.
(b) If he has not, he must be kept in prison until he pays up or persuades the man
who had him convicted to let him off.
(c) If a man is convicted of stealing from public sources, he shall be released from
prison when he has either convinced the state to let him off or paid back twice
the amount involved.
The punishment thus prescribed manifests two points of interest: (1) the fact that the
common thief is not only spared the death penalty, but is further afforded the chance
to atone for his transgressions, and (2) the Stranger’s initial insistence that there need
be a single law for every thief. Beginning with the former, the difference in the
severity of punishment between the temple robber and all other thieves once again
makes clear the importance that religion and piety play for Plato here in the Laws.
While the common thief is given the opportunity to pay for his transgressions through
monetary means or imprisonment, those foolish enough to rob from temples commit a
crime so heinous in the eyes of the Stranger that they are sentenced to death with no
chance of rehabilitation or atonement.
The key to understanding why these punishments are so disparate despite the
supposed similarity in the crimes committed is perhaps found in the latter point of
interest listed above, i.e., the Stranger’s insistence that there be a single penalty for
every thief. To explain, it would seem to be the case that the temple robber, insofar as
he is guilty of stealing, should be included in the category of “thief” as indicated by
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the stranger in the above passage. However, given the disparity in punishment handed
down to the temple robber in comparison to all other thieves, I would contest that such
a crime is not one to be associated with common thievery at all. Indeed, given the
severity of the punishment, it would seem that theft from the temple is not to be
categorized as thievery simpliciter, but rather as, first and foremost, an offense against
the gods, which, similar to the transgressions of the atheist, is an offense punishable
by death.
Given these examples, we find evidence to support the claim that Plato
considers crimes against the gods in particular to be of such danger to the community
that any individual convicted of such acts should be put to death. Yet, it is not simply
atheism nor those who rob from temples that merit such a punishment,389 but also
those individuals who merely conduct private sacrificial rituals.390 And, it is this last
example that I believe truly shows the sincerity of Plato’s religious convictions, for,
while the atheist might be construed as an individual who, owing to his lack of belief
in the authority of the gods wisdom, seeks to undermine the laws of the polis, it is
much more difficult to understand why private sacrifices to the gods would warrant a
punishment so harsh as death if the Plato’s reverence for the divine391 was not sincere.
As such, it is difficult to support the claim that we ought not take the Stranger, or
Plato, at his word regarding matters of the divine in the Laws.
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Divine Inspiration in the Laws
In addition to the role of religion as discussed above, we also find instances
within the Laws wherein the Stranger specifically refers to divine inspiration. The
distinction to be made between such instances of divine inspiration and the role of
religion is that, whereas the established laws are to be modeled after the divine
ordering of the cosmos to the extent that is humanly possible, the Stranger also
comments upon individual instances of divine inspiration, wherein the individual is,
similar to the diviner as described in the Statesman and earlier dialogues, the direct
recipient of wisdom from the gods. And, given these moments of revelation, by the
Stranger’s own admission, often do lead to truth, that these instances are mentioned is
of particular importance for our purposes here.
To begin, we look to 682a, where we read:
He (Homer) composed these lines…under some sort of inspiration from God. And
how true to life they are! This is because poets, as a class are divinely gifted and
are inspired when they sing, so that with the help of Graces and Muses they
frequently hit on how things really happen.
Here we find direct testimony regarding the ability to those divinely inspired to gain
access to truth. Note, however, the Stranger is not claiming that such moments of divine
revelation result in the acquisition of knowledge, a point which is once more strikingly
consistent with comments regarding divine inspiration as seen in the earlier dialogues,
most notably the Apology.392 Yet, while the divinely inspired may lack knowledge insofar
as he cannot provide an account for that which is gifted to him, he nevertheless stumbles
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upon the truth, an occurrence that occurs with such consistency that it cannot be reduced
to mere coincidence or luck.
Interestingly, that Plato takes such moments of actual inspiration seriously is
made clear in another passage found later in the Laws, one that serves as a warning of the
potential dangers that arise from adhering to the revelations as given by the gods. We
read at 719c:
When a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the muse, he cannot control his
thoughts. He is like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked.
His art is the art of representation, and when he represents men with contrasting
characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he does not know which of
the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator this is impossible,
he must not let his law say two different things on the same subject.
From this passage we might glean a number of important points. First, while the passage
does indicate that the inspired poet cannot determine which of his gifted revelations
contains the truth, we do find the Stranger indirectly noting that the truth is revealed. The
problem, then, is not the source of the revelation, nor the potential veracity of such
revelation, but rather the inspired individual’s lack of understanding. In other words, we
are once again given evidence that Plato, through the Stranger, recognizes that the truth
can be, and is, revealed through moments of divine inspiration. Second, it is admittedly
true that this passage is presented with an admonitory tone, warning us that the legislator
cannot rely on divine inspiration in matters of law, as the contradictory accounts that so
often accompany revelation would be detrimental to the consistency required for a stable
constitution. However, while this warning clearly indicates a hesitancy to rely upon
divinely inspired revelation for matters of law, it does not condemn such revelation as
chicanery, but rather, once more indicates a sincere belief in its legitimacy, albeit one that
should be approached with caution.
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Images of Socrates in the Late Dialogues
With the evidence from the Statesman and the Laws now established, we can
proceed on to our analysis of Socrates and the role of divine inspiration in Plato’s late
dialogues. As noted above, while he is often silent, or even absent, from many of the
later dialogues, he is very much present in others, most notably in he Theaetetus, a
dialogue which dramatically precedes the Sophist and Statesman, and in the Philebus, an
oddly “Socratic” dialogue wherein Socrates, though similar in many ways to the Socrates
of the early period393, substitutes the elenchos for the new method of division. In
addition to these two obvious examples, I would add a third, i.e., the image of Socrates as
indirectly presented via the 6th definition of sophistry as found in the Sophist. And, while
these three presentations of Socrates may, at first glance, strike us as three distinct
representations of Socrates, I would argue that, when viewed through the lens of divine
inspiration, these somewhat disparate images of Socrates are revealed as one and the
same, each image providing a deeper insight into Plato’s late understanding of his
mentor, and the role that divine inspiration plays in his philosophical endeavors and
ability.
Setting the Stage for Change: Socrates as Midwife in the Theaetetus
In terms of chronological events within the dialogues, the Theaetetus is the direct
predecessor to the Sophist and Statesman. And, given the Sophist and Statesman both
feature the Eleatic Stranger as its protagonist, it is of note that the Theaetetus features
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See Frede (1996, 215). Frede notes a number of striking similarities that are almost nostalgic
in effect: (1) The dialogue begins abruptly, which recalls similar literary approaches as found in the Meno
and Gorgias. (2) Socrates claims that moral mistakes are involuntary (22b). (3) The different pleasures and
kinds of knowledge are afforded the opportunity to speak for themselves, which, as Frede notes, ought
remind us of the Crito, wherein the Laws themselves are personified.
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Socrates front and center, leading a discussion regarding the definition of knowledge.
Interestingly, despite its late placement in the Platonic corpus, in many ways the
Theaetetus may strike the reader as fairly reminiscent of the earlier Socratic dialogues,
for not only is the dialogue fairly elenchtic in nature, but further, it ends in aporia!394
Yet, despite this familiar mise-en-scene, if examined closely, it becomes apparent
that this familiarity is actually a forbearer of change for Plato, not only in terms of a
break from the middle period395, but also as an indication of the need for new
developments, i.e., the methodology found predominantly in the Sophist and
Statesman.396 In defense of this position, let us look first to the image of Socrates we are
presented with at the beginning of the dialogue: Socrates as midwife.
`

Typically speaking, a midwife is an individual who is instrumental in the birthing

process, not only in their ability to rightly determine when a woman is pregnant, but
further, and more importantly, aides in the delivery of that child. Regarding the
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midwifery of Socrates, however, there are some critical differences. As Socrates
explains:
The difference is that I attend to men, not women, and that I watch over the labor of
their souls, not of their bodies. And the most important thing about my art is the
ability to apply all possible tests to the offspring, to determine whether the young
mind is being delivered of a phantom, that is, an error, or a fertile truth.397
In short, Socrates aids in the delivery of wisdom, guiding his interlocutors in the
development of their own beliefs and ideas. Further, in line with his consistent disavowal
of knowledge, Socrates admits that, similar to actual midwives’ inability to have children
themselves, he is himself barren of all wisdom. Thus, Socrates explains, when an
interlocutor does succeed in the discovery of wisdom through their interaction, it is not
from Socrates that this wisdom arose, but from within the interlocutor alone.398
However, while Socrates adamantly maintains that any wisdom delivered is not
his own, he does insist that he plays a critical role in the discovery of truth. As evidence
to this claim Socrates points to those individuals who, failing to recognize the role of
Socrates in the delivery process, mistakenly believe that the truth was discovered by their
work alone. By Socrates’ account, these unfortunate pupils who leave his tutelage
prematurely, believing themselves to be fully capable of delivering additional truths
without the assistance of their former midwife, are destined to fall back into the very
ignorance from which he so selflessly delivered them. As Socrates explains:
After they have gone away from me they have resorted to harmful company, with the
result that what has remained in them has miscarried; while they have neglected the
children I helped them bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon
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lies and phantoms than upon the truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant
fools, both by themselves and by everyone else.399
Thus, based on this testimony, it is clear that Socrates believes that he plays a
fundamental role in the delivery of wisdom from the minds of his interlocutors.
Yet, this certainty on the part of Socrates regarding his role in both the delivery,
and rearing, of truth should strike us as perplexing. Given his admitted lack of wisdom,
questions arise as to how Socrates is able to (1) exude such confidence in his ability, (2)
successfully determine who is (and is not) worthy of his tutelage, and (3) successfully
determine which ideas are in fact true. And, similar to the evidence found in the early
dialogues regarding Socrates’ seemingly inexplicable abilities, we find that the answer to
each of these questions arises through an appeal to divine inspiration.
Beginning with the first inquiry regarding the confidence exuded by Socrates
regarding his own abilities, we find that, similar to statements made as early as the
Apology400, the reason why the Socrates of the Theaetetus engages in such mental
midwifery is that he is compelled by the god to do so.401 Indeed, as Socrates notes, not
only is his engagement in mental midwifery ordered by the god, but further, it is the god
himself that leaves Socrates barren. Thus, given this lack of wisdom, it cannot be the
case that Socrates, in recognition of his own wisdom, feels obligated to instruct others.
Rather, it is divine command alone that serves as the catalyst, spurring him on towards
the assisting of young minds in the development of their ideas. And, given Socrates’
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belief in the superiority of divine wisdom to human wisdom402, a point made clear to
Socrates throughout his life via the advice of his daimonion, the origin of Socrates’
confidence regarding his role as midwife is made quite clear.
Moving now to the question of Socrates’s determination of which students are
worthy of his assistance, we find once more Socrates directly attributing this ability to the
divine. As we read at 151a1-6:
Sometimes (those that leave) come back, wanting my company again, and ready to
move heaven and earth to get it. When that happens, in some cases the divine sign
that visits me forbids me to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they
begin to make progress.
We see here, yet again, direct testimony to the involvement of the daimonion in the
decision making process of Socrates. What is also of interest here is the similarity to the
description of the daimonion as understood in the early dialogues, both dissuading
Socrates from engaging in activities that he ought avoid403, as well as the more positive
act of permitting other action.404 The point here is that we find a continued acceptance of
Socratic appeal to the divine in these later dialogues, an acceptance that is consistent in
manner and tone. In other words, if it were the case that Plato were trying to distance
himself from the more fantastical aspects of Socrates ability from the early dialogues, one
might think that by the time he set out to write the Theaetetus, an intricately woven
treatise on the nature of human knowledge, such whimsical references to the supernatural
would be absent, or at the very least relegated to a significantly diminished role.
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affirmation of his course of action.

166

However, given Socrates’ consistent and unapologetic appeals to the wisdom of such
divine insight, it is difficult to see how such a claim could withstand this blatant textual
evidence to the contrary.
Finally, we look to the most interesting of the above concerns, i.e., how Socrates,
a man who lacks all wisdom himself, is able to determine which ideas are true, and which
are false. To answer this, let us look very briefly to the methodology employed by
Socrates in the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus we are once more presented with a Socrates
who consistently admits his own ignorance, knowing nothing of the topic at hand
himself.405 And, while this may not seem a remarkable point, we find that such
consistent admissions of absolute ignorance are, in a way, a return to form for Socrates.
To explain, while the earlier dialogues are rife with such pleas of ignorance, as Plato
develops into his middle period, we find a change in the character of Socrates as well.406
Specifically, in such middle period dialogues as the Meno, Republic, and Symposium, we
find Socrates now holding a variety of metaphysical commitments, e.g., recollection, the
forms, etc., that neither the Socrates of the early dialogues, nor the Socrates found in the
Theaetetus maintain.407 Thus, with the image of Socrates as midwife we find Plato
giving up on many of the conventions introduced in his middle period, conventions that, I
would argue, were used as attempts to build upon the Socratic method, allowing for a
more positive methodology, as opposed to one used merely to expose the inconsistencies
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in the beliefs of others.408 Thus, the Socrates of the Theaetetus does not possess any
wisdom of his own. Thus, he does not, and cannot, impregnate his interlocutors with his
own ideas as sophists do,409 but rather, merely assists in the delivery via the elenchtic
form of questioning more reminiscent of his earlier engagements.
Yet, despite his lack of wisdom, we recall that, in the Theaetetus, Socrates does
claim that he is able to determine which ideas are worthy and which should be discarded.
Since such determination cannot be the result of his own wisdom (as he admits none of
his own), I would once more suggest that, on the view of Socrates, this inexplicable
ability is made possible, at least in part, by divine assistance, a claim which, again, is
admitted to by Socrates himself.410 This claim is supported by a number of factors: (1)
As noted above, in his description of his own ability, Socrates consistently refers to
divine influence as a major component of his craft. (2) The image of Socrates as midwife
that we are presented with in the Theaetetus is quite similar to the Socrates of the early
dialogues, i.e., an individual who, unlike the more protreptic figure of the middle
dialogues, is able to properly guide his interlocutor away from false beliefs without
admitting any wisdom of his own, yet, is effectively guided by his divine sign. And, (3)
given Plato’s acceptance of divine inspiration as a plausible source of assistance in these
earlier works,411 when we consider the nostalgic portrayal of Socrates found in the
Theaetetus, it stands to reason that we ought take Socrates (and thus Plato) at his word
regarding the role of the divine in the case of Socrates in the Theaetetus.
408
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Evidence from the Philebus
Yet, while the Theaetetus might provide us with an image of Socrates as reliant
upon divine inspiration, the image of the midwife is not the only version of Socrates we
are given in the late period. Indeed, in what would seem to be a directly contradictory
image to the classically elenchtic Socrates of the Theaetetus, we find in the Philebus a
Socrates that seems to do away with the elenchos altogether in favor of the method of
collection and division! Yet, despite these disparate appearances, I would argue that the
evidence in the Philebus only lends additional support to my position. My reasons are as
follows: (1) Socrates is not especially adept in his deployment of the method of division,
a lack of expertise which I will argue only helps prove my position that Plato does not
consider Socrates to be a philosopher in the unqualified sense at this later stage of Plato’s
development. (2) While Socrates does indeed use the new method of collection and
division, to aide in his progress he consistently appeals to, and relies upon, divine
assistance. Thus, while the Socrates of the Philebus, insofar as he discards the elenchos
in favor of the method of collection and division, may, prima facie, appear to be in direct
opposition to the image of Socrates as depicted in the 6th definition of the Sophist (let
alone the midwife of the Theaetetus), I would argue that upon closer examination, the
seemingly different images of Socrates we are given are not as disparate as they might
first appear.
Socrates and the Method of Division
It is widely accepted that the Philebus should be counted amongst Plato’s latest
dialogues.412 Given the dialogue’s placement in the corpus, and considering the
412
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diminished role of Socrates in the late period, the question arises as to why Plato would
choose Socrates as his protagonist. In answer to this question, some scholars have
suggested that perhaps the reemergence of Socrates is owed to the ethical nature of the
discussion at hand.413 Yet, while I do agree that the earlier dialogues do primarily focus
on more practical matters, such concerns are not entirely absent in the late period,
especially when taking the overall project of the Laws into consideration.414 If the sole
reason for Socrates’ resurrection was simply on account of the topic’s connection to more
traditionally Socratic themes, then it seems odd to render him silent or absent entirely
from other dialogues which feature similar connections to earlier dialogues.415
Given the implausibility of the above suggestion, I would argue that there must
exist other reasons as to Plato’s selection of Socrates in the Philebus. And, in this vein, I
agree with Dorothea Frede’s claim that Plato’s use of Socrates in the Philebus was, at
least in part, to distinguish Socrates from the master dialectician.416 To quickly recap,
while Socrates does indeed discuss the “divine method” of division, and further, uses it
throughout the dialogue to determine the proper ranking of goods,417 the dialogue ends
with Protarchus noting to Socrates that the task is not complete, and that Socrates should
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continue on to finish what he started.418 And, while this incomplete result is fairly
common (if not expected) for a “Socratic” dialogue, when compared to the Sophist and
Statesman, two dialogues that feature the same method of collection and division, we find
the conclusions to be strikingly different, as both dialogues end with a clear agreement
that a definition has been reached by the Eleatic Stranger. Looking first to the Sophist
268c7-268d, we find the following exchange to close out the dialogue:
VISITOR:

Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the
way we did before?

THEAETETUS: Of Course.
VISITOR: Imitation of the contrary-speech producing, insincere and unknowing
sort, of the appearance making kind of copy making, the word
juggling part of production that’s marked off as human and not
divine. Anyone who says the sophist is of this “blood and
family” will be saying, it seems, the complete truth.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
Further, a definitive conclusion of this sort is echoed in the Statesman as well, for, at the
end of the Statesman, following the final recap of their efforts towards defining the
statesman, Socrates himself responds as follows at 311c4-7: “Another most excellent
portrait, visitor, this one that you have completed for us, of the man who possesses the art
of kingship: the statesman.”419
We find then a striking contrast between the three dialogues: While all three
dialogues feature the method of division, only those wherein it is the Eleatic stranger
leading the discussion does the discussion conclude definitively. On the other hand, in
the Philebus, where it is Socrates, not the Stranger, using the method of division, we are
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left wanting, as the dialogue ends in incompletion. Given this inconclusiveness, I would
once more state that this is precisely the point, i.e., that Plato, through his use of Socrates
in this way, is demonstrating the need for a mastery of this new method if one is to
achieve definitive results. And, given his affinity for Socrates, and the skill exhibited by
Socrates throughout Plato’s corpus, that Socrates would be shown to be inefficient is
perhaps that most compelling way for Plato to emphasize this point.
The Role of Divine Inspiration in the Philebus
Yet, while it is true that Socrates ultimately fails to bring about the definitive
conclusion presented in other late dialogues, I would argue that we are not to take this
failure as an indication that Plato has lost faith in the methodology or ability of his
mentor. In fact, I would suggest that, similar to the depictions of Socrates we are given in
the Theaetetus and Sophist, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as a reflection of
Plato’s mature understanding of his teacher, one which, as with those other depictions
already described, once more prominently features an attention to the role of divine
inspiration in the methodology of Socrates.
To begin, it should be noted that, despite his failure to properly execute the
method of division, Socrates is still able to proceed quite far into the discussion. This
ability to do so despite his lack of expertise is particularly interesting, especially when we
consider Socrates’ consistent appeal to the divine throughout the dialogue: (1) The
method itself is called, by Socrates, the “divine method” (18b6), (2) there is a prayer for
divine assistance to help establish the fourfold division of all being (25b), (3) Socrates
consistently refers to the difference between the human and divine mind (22c), and (4)
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Socrates appeals to the differences between the divine and human ideal state (33b).420 In
this evidence we see, once again, that Socrates, even when utilizing the new, rigid
method of division, does not waver from his appreciation of divine assistance.
Yet, while this attention to divine influence should be of no surprise at this point
in the case of Socrates, we are presented with one extraordinary piece of textual evidence
that demands our attention. Following his praiseful description of the divine method of
division, we find, now faced with a potential roadblock in in their discussion, Socrates,
abandoning the method of division, proclaims that they need not be concerned, as, “some
memory has come to my mind that one of the gods seems to have sent me to help us.”421
This single line is of exceptional importance as, in striking contrast to the apotreptic
messages of the daimonion in which Socrates was warned against a particular course of
action, here, in the Philebus, we are given textual evidence wherein Socrates is claiming
to have received a positive message directly from the gods. And, in the context of the
dialogue, this revelation bestowed upon Socrates, i.e., that neither pleasure nor
knowledge is the good, but rather a third thing which is superior to both, is instrumental
for the remainder of the discussion.
Granted, one could argue that such a direct appeal to the divine ought to be taken
as an ironic gesture. However, given the staggering amount of evidence that has been
presented against such a claim, evidence that is found throughout the entire Platonic
corpus, such a claim seems, to me, to be particularly unfounded. Thus, instead of
approaching this problem from a skeptic’s perspective, I suggest that we take this
moment of positive divine influence with the utmost sincerity, as doing so would provide
420
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us insight into how we are to understand Socrates in Plato’s later dialogues. To explain,
as we have seen, the Socrates of the Philebus is presented as not entirely skilled regarding
the method of division. And yet, he is able to continue the discussion significantly
further than would be expected for someone lacking in expertise. And, while this lack in
ability would have crippled other individuals, Socrates, through the direct assistance of
the gods, is able to proceed onward.
The point I am attempting to convey here is that, in the Philebus, we are given
insight into Plato’s understanding of his mentor. To explain, as I have argued, as Plato
progressed into his late period, his conception of philosophy has evolved. As such, he
has come to realize that Socrates can no longer qualify as the embodiment of what the
philosopher ought be in an unqualified sense. In short, Plato came to realize that the
Socratic method, while useful for tearing down fallacious arguments and exposing
inconsistencies in the beliefs of others, is unable to achieve the sort of definitional
knowledge he desired. And yet, despite this inability, Socrates does seem to know things,
i.e., his opinions and instincts always seem to be inexplicably pointed towards the truth.
To account for this then, what we find in these late dialogues are images of Socrates
wherein the role played by divine inspiration is placed front and center. Here in the
Philebus we see evidence of Socrates, unable to push forward in the discussion, directly
assisted by the gods. Whereas others would have faltered, or given up, Socrates, through
divine revelation is able to continue. And, it should be noted, that this revelation occurs
must be seen as positive in the eyes of Plato. In other words, while it is true that Socrates
must rely on divine assistance to proceed in the discussion, such assistance does not

174

diminish the results of the discussion, especially when one considers the reverence shown
by Plato to the wisdom of the gods.
Yet, while Plato does, in the case of Socrates, hold such divine revelation in high
esteem, it is my view that he recognizes the limitations and potential pitfalls of reliance
upon those few fortunate individuals lucky enough to be so inspired. Indeed, we might
glean insight into this view when we consider the ending of the Philebus, wherein we
recall that, despite Socrates being able to rank the various types of goods, Protarchus
reminds him that his task is incomplete. To explain, we recall that in the Sophist and
Statesman, an emphasis was placed on maintaining the proper divisions all the way
through to the conclusion. In other words, the method of division is so effective because
each division can be traced back and explained to any who would inquire. In the
Philebus, however, we recall that the initial idea that spawned the discussion, i.e., that
neither pleasure or knowledge alone was the good, was given to Socrates by divine
inspiration. As such, this wisdom is not possessed by Socrates, and is thus unexplainable.
No account can be given, and so, the division cannot be considered complete. Thus,
while Socrates, via his divine connection, is able to proceed further in the discussion than
the uninspired many, and, while this can be positive given the possibilities such
inspiration provide,422 Plato recognizes the need for a methodology that does not rely on
the assistance of the divine, hence his development of the method of division.423
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Conclusion
Thus, despite the limitations that may be related to reliance upon divine
inspiration in matters of philosophy, it is quite clear that, in the case of Socrates, Plato
still recognizes its value. Indeed, when we look to the three major images of Socrates
presented in the late dialogues, we find that, despite surface discrepancies, the common
link between them is their reliance upon and reverence for the divine. As such, we find
cause to take seriously the role of the divine in the case of Socrates.
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